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PREFACE
In this monograph we study pairwise comparison structures. In these
pairwise comparisons, alternatives are evaluated with regard to certain
objectives. These evaluations may be in terms of e.g. preference,
importance, dominance. quality or effectiveness. We assume that whenever in
the comparison between two alternatives a strict choice for one of them is
uncovered. this choice is definite. This occurs for example when
alternatives and criteria have become final. and choices can easily be
motivated. But also in situations where we have to meet a deadline: in
voting procedures, such as majority voting with a tie-breaking rule, or
when we stand at the eve of an important decision.
These strict choices result in asymmetric relations on the
alternatives, which frequently occur in management and social sciences. For
instance, these asymmetric relations, consisting of the strict choices, may
represent hierarchies, preferences or dominance structures. compare Berge
and Duchet (1991), Miller (1980), Rapoport (1983), Roberts (1979) and van
Deemen (1991).
Using the pairwisc comparisons. hence the asymmetric relation. we want
to arrange the alternatives in a certain order. If the asymmetric relation
reflects a natural order of the alternatives, this is easy. But. because of
intransitivitics in the pairwise comparisons, this arranging can be very
complicated. It is possible that there is no winner. no best option.
notwithstanding our ability to make a strict choice in the comparisons
between each couple of alternatives. These intransitive choices may be due
to circular reasoning. majority voting. the selection of the criteria used
in each comparison. or other, more hidden factors.
Yet, almost always there is need for an ordering of the possible
alternatives. We want to arrange players from best to worst. or determine a
winning coalition in political situations. Therefore, in this thesis, our
first main objective is: how to rank alternatives, how to choose a best
alternative from a set of pairwise ordered alternatives, how to determine a
dominating coalition? To solve this problem, various ranking rules and
choice functions are proposed and discussed in literature. Among them we
find obvious methods based on scores. but also methods that are based on
game-theoretical or strategic considerations. In general, it is hard to
decide which method has to be used. Each of the procedures considered has
some appealing features.
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Of course, one may take their domain of applicability into
consideration. A method that is designed to deal with one category of
ranking situations. is not automatically suited for ranking asymmetricrelations resulting from another category. For example, a rule that ranksplayers in a round-robin tournament, may perform badly when applied toproblems arising in a more political context, where the notion of a
coalition becomes important
This inspired cur approach, which is tlie axiwitatic approach. To decidebetween various procedures. we start a qualitative study by developing and
investigating various conditions or criteria. These conditions are
described in mathematical terms and. depending on the ranking situation.
represent to a more or less extent the notions of reasonableness andfairness. As such. they are applicable to for instance management science,
political science and measurement theory. Most conditions are so-called
independence conditions, such as the well-known Arrow's independence of
irrelevant alternatives condition. We may roughly divide them in two
groups: conditions relating variable sets of alternatives to the finalranking or choice, and on the other hand conditions concerning variable
asymmetric relations. but with fixed alternative set. We verify these
conditions for ranking rules and choice functions. In some cases we are
able to derive characterizations. A characterization is a collection of
independent conditions for a class of methods, such that there remains just
one. precisely described method satisfying these conditions. In this way.
we may recommerld and motivate usc of a method in a particular situation,
hence determining their domain of applicability. Related research is
described in e.g. Bouyssou (1992), Henriet (1985). Laffond, Laslier and Le
Brcton (1993). Moulin (1986), and many others.
The second problem that is addressed to in this thesis, concerns the
inconsistency or circularity of tournaments. Decision theory is partly
aimed at structuring and clarifying subjective reasoning in order to make
better decisions. Therefore, we would like to quantify the quality ofsomeone's judgment Or we want to determine the usability of a set of
pairwise comparisons. This is particularly important because if consistencyis low. the rankings provided by the various ranking procedures will vary
more. The inconsistency measures that are in use. point Out to what extenta set of preferences can be sorted out. or determine the deviation to anordering. Just as is the case for ranking rules and choice functions. there
does not exist an inconsistency measure which is recognized or generally
X
accepted as being best In the scientific literature one concentrates on
the statistical aspects of these measures. sce e.g. Bezembinder (1980),
David (1988) or Slater (1961). Our approach is axiomatic. Wc characterize
circularity measures by necessary and sufficient conditions.
OUTLINE OF THE MONOGRAPH
Chapter 1 splits into three parts. The first section discusses
examples illustrating the issues of ranking, choice and circularity. We
give several ranking and choice methods and also discuss some conditions
that we use to evaluate the performance of a method. Next to it. we discuss
two levels of analysis. a local and a global level. It will appear that
many methods and conditions are focused on one of these two levels of
analysis. The second section contains definitions and some preliminaries.
We introduce basic mathematical notions that are used throughout: binary
relations. tournaments, linear and weak orders. transitive closure, etc.
The chapter is concluded with some preliminary results concerning
irreducibility and cycles. An index of methods and criteria used in the
comparison between them, is presented in an appendix to this chapter.
Chapter 2 is devoted to a study of choice functions on tournaments
(complete asymmetric relations). A choice function assigns to any
tournament on a set of alternatives X a nonempty subset of X. mostly called
the choice set or set of winners of the tournament. Starting with some
elementary properties for these functions, we discuss and characterize the
top cycle of a tournament Since this cycle often is unmanageably large and
may contain Pareto dominated alternatives if the tournament stems from
pairwise majority voting, other choice functions are considered. For
example, we discuss the uncovered and the minimal covering set and
characterizations for them. We also consider the Banks set. the tournament
equilibrium set. the Copeland choice set and the Slater choice set. An
alternative proof for the unicity of the optimal strategy of the tournament
zero-sum game is given and. as an application of this proof. we present a
characterization of the choice function corresponding to this game. After
that, we introduce. discuss and verify a few new conditions, such as A-IIA.
separability. global monotonicity and tail stability. We conclude the
chapter with a table of set-theoretical inclusions and a table of
properties for a few choice functions.
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In chapter 3. we study ranking rules. These are rules that map a
tournament onto a weak order, hence rank the alternatives from best to
worst. We introduce lots of new conditions for the evaluation of the
perforrnance of a ranking rule. They are used in characterizations. For
example. we give a characterization of the set of ranking rules that are
induced by a choice function. We derive two different characterizations of
the ranking rule that assigns to a tournament its transitive closure. and a
characterization of the Copelind ranking rule. We also give a
characterization of the Copeland choice function and a related one. Among
the rules that we compare are those induced by a notion of distance between
relations and those induced by ratings. Aside from new conditions used in
the characterizations, we introduce and consider two conditions
illustrating the difference between two levels of analysis. The results of
the systematic comparison of ranking rules is summarized in a table at the
end of the chapter. In the first appendix, we consider for a few ranking
rules maximal subsets of the set of tournaments. on which these rules
satisfy the A-HA condition. In the second appendix. we consider the
relation between the inconsistency index developed by Saaty in his
'Analytic Hierarchy Process' and the insertion of new alternatives.
In chapter 4. we discuss solutions for dominance structures. A
well-known solution scheme is formed by the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable
sets (vNM-stable sets). It combines the notions of internal stability and
external domination for a coalition. The first main result is a
characterization of the choice function corresponding to the vNM-stable
set. in case of acyclic relations which for instance occur in hierarchies.
In some cyclic relations there is no vNM-stable set This led us to
introduce a generalization. Using game-theoretical arguments, we obtain our
second main result of this chapter: a characterization of a generalized
vNM-stable set satisfying a particular balanced domination property.Besides that. we give some set-theoretical comparisons between four choice
functions for dominance structures and verify some independence conditions
that are significant in this context.
Chapter 5 handles our second problem, the circularity of a tournament
The emphasis lies on a comparison of two well-known measures: the number of
3-cycles X and Slater's i. As already remarked, our approach is axiomaoc.
We show. using an impossibility theorem, that there is no circularity
measure that combines all attractive features of both X and i. Therefore.
we present characterizations for each of them and consider the problem of
X 11
when to use which measure. Furthermore. we characterize circularities that
are defined using scores of the alternatives and show its connection to the
(probabilistic) strict utility model. Next to it. we characterize a
circularity measure that is induced by the transitivc closure of a
tournament. Following a statistical analysis, a systematic study of
properties and measures is summarized in a table at the end of the chapter.
NOTATIONS AND SYMBOLS
N=  11.2,3....}   :  set of positive integers
z = {....-1,0.1,2,...} : set of integers
R : set of real numbers
R' : set of t-tuples of real numbers.t€N
x I   : absolute value  of x
I V I:  number  of  clements  of V, cardinality  of  V






0 : empty set
X2  : set of subsets of X
XxX or X2 : Cartesian product of the set X with itself
XxY : Cartesian product of the sets X and Y
XuY : union of X and Y
XnY : intersection of X and Y
XcY : X is contained in Y
X\Y : elements of X that are not in Y
xx   :   X\{ x 1
Xiii
T. T(30. T  : set of tournaments 13.25.82
6. 0(X) : set of asymmetric relations 13.25
A.   A(X)   :  set  of acyclic asymmetric relations   117
L, L(X) : set of linear orders 14
w,  w(X)  :  set  of weak orders  14
T or (T.X) : tournament on X
G or (GOO : asymmetric relation on X
R or (R,X) : relation on X
S(G) or S(G.X) : choice set of (G.X)
j[G) or AG.X) : ranking of (G,X)
*T) or *T,X) : circularity of (T,X)
R j Y  or  (R.Y) : restriction  of  R  to  Y   12
TR or r(R.X) : transitive closure of R 14
aR  or  a(R.X)  :  asymmetric  part  of R  15
vR or v(R.X) : converse of R 73
aR or c(R.X) : permutation of R  15
Max(R) or Max(R.X) : maximal elements   of   R    1 6
Best(R) or Best(R.X) : best elements of R 16
N(T) or N(T.X) : nearest adjoining orders to (T,X) 39
(a,b) €T,R o r G:a i s a s least as good as b i n T,R o r G 1 2
aTb,  aRb  or  aGb  :  a  is as least  as  good  as  b  12
»    (T,A) » (T.B) : concatenation of (T.A) and (T.B) 16
if W is a weak order then
a,b:W means: a i s ranked ahead of b 1 4
A»B:Wmeans: for a l l a€A,b<B:a»b:W 1 4
2    x k y:W,W a weak order: x i s a s least as good as y 1 4
=             x   z   y   :    R   :    x   and   y   are   indifferent   in   R    1 2
yxT : 1\{(x,y)} u {(y,x)} 158
rT or <abc>T : reverse orientation of 3-cycle r in T 170
sx(T) or out(x,T) : Copeland score of alternative x 19. 103
in(x,T) : number of alternative that are better than x 104
upp(x,D : set of clements that are better than x in T 78
low(x,T) : set of elements that are worse than x in T 78
Xiv
n(s;Tl .....Tn) : composition 56
Sub((R.X).(R'.Y)),YCX: substitution 69,141
C : cover relation 29
tc: top cycle 27
uc : uncovered set 29,119*
uc    : recursive uncovered  set  31
mc : minimal covering set 31
b : Banks set 35
teq : tournament equilibrium set 37
cop : Copeland choice function 38
*
cop  : recursive application of the Copeland choice function 38
cop6 : A-IIA version of the Copeland choice function 84
sl : Slater choice set 40
strat: choice function induced by the strategy equilibria 45,119,134
top: top elements   119
vNM  : von Neumann-Morgenstern choice  set   117.137
vNM-max 131
fs: ranking rule induced by choice function S 65
such  as      f        71
cop




f   141top
f         : recursive application  of f       72
cop copf uansitive closure 67trans '
f    Copeland-score rule 70Out.
f out: recursive application  of fout 72
f *mum likelihood method 96prob i maxi
feigen : eigenvector method 97
y : expansion condition 32
A
7  : weaker version of the 7-condition 33
SSP : superset property 33
A-HA : 8-independence of irrelevant alternatives 78
XV
y,c*lcd: scaled circularity measure    183
d(p.q)   : distance between relations  p  and   q   156
r(a.B): rank correlation between relations a and   189
X  :  number of 3-cycles  154
i  :   Slater's  i  156
X : number of 4-cycles 173
6  :  proportion of preferences  on a cycle  173
p : Bezembinder's p 173
sc : d(tout(T).T) 173
rsc:
d(fout(T).T) 189
e : number of cyclic preferences 179
supp(2) : support of 2
  : transpose of 2
Kn : set of n-strategies 41
0(G) : set of optimal strategies for the G-game 42,45
rel(0(G)) : = {21 Y: 2 6 0(G)}, where Y is the smallest set
such that for all g € 0(G): supp(g) c Y 126




™s chapter is divided into three parts. First of all, we illustrate the
issue of ranking, choice and circularity. The second section gives
dktinitions and some prelimina,y results concerning the relation between
irreducible tournaments and the transitive closure. The appendix to this
chapter contains an index of choice functions, ranking rules and
circularity measures that are discussed in this thesis. Moreover. we list
the conditions uscd in the comparisons between them.
1.1 THE ISSUE
Consider the following tournament T„ which   may   be the result  of 6 matches
between four tennis players, a,b,c and d. For example. player a has beaten
player b and c. but had to acknowledge player d as his superior.
T,        d.«..
1.-a      -5
Both player a and b have the highest score. Since player a has beaten
player b, we may declare a to be winner of this small tournament. Moreover,
wc may rank the players to {a} *{b} »{c} » Cd}, where the symbol '»'
stands for: 'is ranked ahead of.
In this tennis tournament, each couple of players is playing just one
match. In such ranking situations we may distinguish two levels of
analysis. A binary level where alternatives are compared in pairs,
corresponding to the direct confrontations, and a more global level. We
shortly discuss this global level. Since the tournament consists Of
once-only confrontations, it has a clear end in terms Of time. Afterwards,
when the matches are over, the tournament is experienced as a synthesis of
the pairwisc comparisons at the binary level. and is ranked accordingly, as
is the case in most sports. It is generally accepted that in such
1
tournaments, it may happen that two alternatives are distinguishable at the
binary level and yet are equivalent at the global level. More than that
for two alternatives a and d, it is possible that in the direct comparison
the alternative d beats a while. because of insight obtained from global
considerations. a is ranked higher than d. This may be the case when for
example a has beaten more players than d. as in T,. Since everyone agreeswith the fact that tomorrow things may be quite different, no player is
really bothered by these phenomenons.
The rule we used to determine a winner of this tennis tournament is very
suited for this category of tournaments, because it stimulates the fighting
spirit In chapter 3, we introduce rules that reward player d for having
beaten the strong player a.
To further illustrate the local and global level of analysis, consider the
following example.
Suppose you own a restaurant. At a certain moment there are 3 guests. They
all want to have the same dinner. You can offer them the choice between
dinners 4 b and c. The three guests reveal the following preference:
guest 1:   a»b»c
guest 2: b»cia
guest 3:  c,a*b.
Assuming   that  the
'
choice  is  up   to you, which dinner  has  to   be  served?   If
you look at the majority in each pairwise comparison of the available
dinners. you will reach the decision: a»b (because of guests 1 and 3
versus guest 2),b»c and c»a.a cyclic pattern or intransinvity, scefigure 1.1. To Fishburn (1970). it illustrates the untenability of the
transitivity condition, which excludes these cyclic patterns, as a general
desideratum for social choice functions.
./....'.
Figure   1.1 A circular tournament.
2
Note that this example clearly illustrates the need for a global level of
analysis. Indeed, from a more global viewpoint. we sce that the
alternatives 'play the same role'. This may be seen with the help of figure
1.1: there does not exist a reasonable scale of measurement that can treat
the three alternatives as being really different. Hence. instead of
circulating forever between the three possible choices. each time striving
for a better alternadve. we switch to a higher level of analysis. We
conclude that the three alternatives are equivalent
Let us turn back to the tournament T, and suppose that you are a diplomat
of the United Nations. Your job is to find a new security concept for a
region that is teared into pieces because of internal conflicts. After long
talks with the different parties, four feasible concepts emerge, labelled
a. b, c and d.
Concept x is supposed to beat concept y in the pairwise comparison. if the
majority of parties involved prefer concept x. Suppose that the votes give
the tournament T, depicted above.
Which concept is the best?
If you propose concept a as solution of the conflict because it beats two
other concepts, hence using the same rule that ranked the tennis players,
you risk your life because concept d clearly is a better alternative for
the majority of the parties involved. Similarly. any other single proposal
is rejected. What causes this rejection?
In any case. the outcomes of this kind of tournaments are not the result of
a once-only confrontation. In a manner of speaking, the tournament is
continuously played, the comparisons between all proposals x and y are
raised permanently and cannot enter on an agenda. Because of these
permanent comparisons at the binary level. it is difficult to let the
global analysis prevail the choices made there. This means that it is
difficult to choose a winner, because at the binary tournament level. there
always is a better choice due to the four binary comparisons: a better than
b to be written as aT,b. bT,c. cT,d and dI',a. that constitute a cycle.
Instead of choosing just one alternative, one has to look for diplomatic
compromises. Of course. in a compromise one may usc all alternatives of the
top cycle. This set is made up of alternatives that beat directly or
3
indirectly every other alternative. In our case. the top cycle is equal to
{a,b,c,d}. But in our view, proposal c is not very attractive. Only when
compared with d, this option has some advantages. But proposal d is also
worse than b. which moreover majorizes proposal c. To use terminology
introduced in chapter 2. proposal c is not uncovered: it is covered by b.
, n    alternauve    x is uncovered. if there    is no alternative    y    that    is
superior to x and beats all alternatives beaten by x. In the example above,
the uncovered set is {a.b.d}. Solutions of this kind of choice problems are
discussed in chapter 2 and 4.
So. we may distinguish several ranking and choice situations, eachrequiring a unique approach and trcatmenL Following three informal
definitions, we present a few other examples, illustrating the issues of
ranking, choice and circularity.
Informal definitions
A choice function S assigns to each asymmetric relation or tournament
G a so-called choice set S(G). to be interpreted as: winners or best
elements.
In this thesis. we also consider several ranking rules. A ranking rule
f ranks the alternatives of X in a binary relation on X, denoted by (G.X),
from best to worst In general, we represent the outcome of a ranking rule
f   by   AG.X)    =   Xl    *    X2   '    · -    9 Xn' where   for   all   k   € {1 '....n L the
alternatives from the sets Xk are on a level with each other, so-called
maximal indifference    classes,     and     the    clements     of     X 1 are ranked above     the
elements of X2 and so on. as was done with the tennis players above.
In chapter 5 of this monograph, we study circularity measures. These
measures indicate the circularity or inconsistency of a tournament.
Example 1.1 A bening problem
Consider the following example. discussed in Williams (1982). Suppose you
are born in the time of King Arthur and his knights of the round table. It
was the time that brave man were used to challenge each other to a fight on
lance and horses. At a certain moment there are 7 knights in town. The
present ranking is as follows. Although lately most tilting have been
indecisive. you may rely on Tristam to beat Lamarok and Gareth, Tor to beat
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Tristam   and   Kay.   etc,   as   is  presented in figure 1.2. Which knight   do   you
want to place money on?
Tristam :- Lamarok
Tor




Figure  1.2 The present ranking of the knights.
To introduce competition, we assume that there is another person. Each day,
both of you may place a bet on one knight For example. if you choose
Gareth. while the other chooses Tor, you will receive 1 point, your
opponent looses 1 point. What strategy has to be followed?
A solution of this problem is given by the strategy equilibrium, discussed
in chapter 2 and 4. If you want at least to get even with your opponent,
you may use the following strategy: never bet on Kay and Gawain. choose
with equal probability one of the other knights.
Example 1.2 A ranking problem
A simple procedure, long used in chess tournaments (see David 1988, page
105). is to replace the score, which is the number of matches won. by the
sum of the scores of players defeated.
Suppose that we have 5 players. a.b.c.d and e. The outcomes are as in the
matrix below, where a '1' at matrix position (a.b) means that a has beaten
b. and '0' means that b has beaten a.
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a b c d e
a-1 1 1 0
b O-1 1 0
c 0 0-1 1
d 0 0 0-1
e 1 1 0 0-
The scores of the players are equal to 3,2,2.1. 2 respectively. If we
rank the players to the sum of the scores of the players they defeat, we
obtain the ranking   { a.e}    with 5 points, followed   by   {b,c}   with 3 points   and
{d}      with 2 points. A generalization     of     this     procedure, the ranking     rule
f.    . due to Kendall and Wei. is discussed in chapter 3. It comes down toeigen-
choosing a set of initial scores or ratings for the alternatives. such that
the process described above, which consists of assigning to each player the
sum of scores of the opponents defeated, does not change the relative
ratings. Consider the initial rating 0.267, 0.174, 0.196. 0.127, 0.236. Onemay verify that, if we assign to each player the sum of ratings of the
opponents defeated, we obtain the rating 0.497, 0.323, 0.363, 0.236, 0.441.
But. if we SCale these values, such that they sum up to 1. we regain our
initial ratingi
The corresponding ranking is {al 1 {e} * {cl » {b} * {d}.
Example 1.3 A dominance problem
In politics, it is almost always impossible to win by staying alone.
Coalitions must be formed in order to enforce a decision. Suppose that we
have six parties, whose dominance relation is as follows.
For example. d dominating a may be interpreted as: d can bend a to its
will. or d can set the conditions under which cooperation will take place.
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What    coalitions are likely to occur?     If    you     look     at the coalition      { b.c }.
you nlay verify that they dominate the other parties: party a is dominated
by b. party d is dominated by c. party e is dominated by b. while party f
is dominated by b. Moreover, the coalition is internally stable, which
means that they cannot directly dominate each other. One may verify that
the      coalition      {d,e }      has      the      same properties. These coalitions.      the      von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. are discussed in chapter 4.
But    if    we    take    a    look    at    the    coalition     { b.c },     we    sce    that    although    they
dominate {a,d,e,f}, they cannot reach a division of power between them that
is independent of the alternative that is to be dominated. For, suppose
that b and c do search for a division of power between them, Mb.pc) with
Pb + Pc= l. In order to dominate d. it is necessary that Pc > Pb. On the
other hand. domination of e requires Pb > Pc. Hence, b and c cannot reach a
satisfactory division of power.   The   same   is   true   for   { d.c }.
On the other    hand. the coalition     V     =     {b,c.d.e}     is    able to reach     such    a
division of power, for example (1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4). This division has another
nice   feature.   For   each   x   EV,   we may divide   V\{ x }   into   Ux   and   Lx.   The   set
UX is formed by the alternatives that dominate x, L  is the set of
alternatives   that are dominated   by   x. For example.    Ub   =    {d},   Lb   =    {e}.The
division of power (1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4) has the property that for all x the sum
of power of elements in Ux is equal to the sum of power of elements in Lx.
It keeps the scale of power between two clearly distinguishable groups
balanced. Furthermore. everyone can tip the scale in his favour by using
his own weight or power. In chapter 4, we prove that for every dominance
structure. there is just one coalition that satisfies the balanced dominant
weight condition, as described above.
This unique coalition satisfies another significant condition, the tail
stability. If there are parties sitting down at the negotiation table, it
is possible that party a, compared to party b, knows itself to be supported
by a majority of external voters. Indeed, in most cases, the dominance
structure between these parties is settled before the negotiations start
Now. let us denote the set of parties by X and the dominance structure by
G. Thc assumption of the choice function S being tail stable means that the
dominant coalition of parties in the choice set S(G), in our example
1 b.c,d,c}, can withdraw from 'the scene of battle', paying attention to
more important business. They are not bothered with fights between losers
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in X (G) in the tail of the ranking S(G) » X\S(G). No matter how the
comparisons between losers change. the choice set remains the same.
Moreover. for a party not in S(G), in order to become member of the
coalition, it has to focus on the comparison with parties from the choice
set. For example. it has to present better proposals to the external
voters.
Example 1.4 A choice problem
A choice function S satisfies the strong superset property (SSP). if the
following holds. Let X be the set of alternatives, and let G be an
asymmetric relation on X. If S(G) C Y Q X, alternatives from X\Y may be
deleted. without changing the choice set. The choice set is independent of
the presence of alternatives not in Y. In other words, we may shrink the
set of alternatives, without the need for an adjustment of the choice set.
To give an example. the leading countries of the European Community remain
leading countries. regardless of the presence of a minor, European
Oriented, country.




Since this tournament lacks a natural order. we look at transitive
subtournaments. These are tournaments that have a (natural) best second
bes4 .... worst alternative. For example. the tournaments restricted to
{ a.b,c},      { b.c,e},       {c,d,e}       and       {d,c.a}       are      transitive.      with      best      elements
a.b,c and d respectively. The reader may verify that these subtournaments
are maximal in the following sense: they cannot be extended. without
violating the assumption of transitivity. For example. the subtournament on
{ a.b,c }     cannot    be    extended    with    d.    because the tournament    on     {a.b.c,d }     is
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not transitive. The alternative e is not best element of a maximal
transitive subtournament. Therefore, the so-called Banks   set   is   { a.b.c,d}.
If the Banks set would satisfy SSP. we could delete the alternative e.
without changing the choice set But, as the reader may verify. this is not
the   case; we obtain   a new Banks set equal   to    { a.c.d }.
In chapter 2. we will consider choice functions satisfying this
independence condition.
Example 1.5 The problem of local versus global dijTerences
Suppose that we have five tennis players p.q.r.s and t. The results of
their direct confrontations in a tournament T are listed in the matrix
below.
p q r s t
p-1 1 1 0
q O-1 1 0
r 0 0-1 1
S 0 0 0-0
t 1101-
Since the players p,q,r and t are on a cycle in this tournament (pTq, qTr,
rTt and tTP). and each of them beats player s. we may use the ranking rule
f   the transitive closure, to be discussed in chapter 3, to rank thetrans'
players     to      {p,qi,t}      *      {s}.      Unfortunately,      this     rule      that      uses      global
information like whether or not two alternatives are on a cycle. violates
the condition of separability. We can separate the set of alternatives X =
(p.q.r.s.t} into B = {p,q} and X\B = {r.s,t}, such that for each
alternative y from X\B the following is true. Either all alternatives from
B are preferred to y, or y is preferred to each alternative in B. In a
manner of speaking, the alternatives of B behave like a single alternative.
Since in this case. each alternative y from X\B delivers the same local
information to all b € B. the local differences between b, and b2 €Bare
reduced to their local differences inside B. Therefore, a ranking rule f is
said to be separable, if the relative ranking of the alternatives of B in
the ranking of X, is the same as the ranking of the alternatives of B,
hence without X\B. If we denote this relative ranking of B in the ranking
AT,X)   of   X   by  KT.X)   B, this condition   may be formulated   as   RT,X)  B=
fIT,B). If we concentrate on local differences, this may be a significant
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condition. Since ftrans0.B) = {p} I {q} 0 {P·q} = ({P·q·r.t} , {s})IB =
fwans(T.X) I B. this ranking     rule     does not satisfy the condition     of
separability. On the other hand. the ranking rule f which orders theOut'alternatives to the total number of comparisons in which they prevailed,
leading to the ranking {P.t} » {q.r} » {s}. does satisfy this condition.
But. if we concentrate on global differences, we may expect the roles to be
interchanged.
We shortly discuss this condition concerning global differences. the
interval consistency. Suppose we have a ranking of the alternatives of X.
jIT.X) = Xl ' X2 * '- * Xi * ··· » Xj » ... » Xn. We may define aninterval as the union of successive maximal indifference classes. In the
example we choose the interval B -Xi u ... u X. Note that thealternatives from B behave like one single alternative in this ranking.
Now,     a    ranking    rule   f   is    said    to    be    interval    consistent,    if   fr,X)   B    =
AT.B). In other words. the relative ranking of the alternatives from B in
the ranking of X is the same as the ranking of alternatives from B, hence
without X\B. The rule f satisfies this global equivalent of thetrans
scparability condition. As may be deduced from the example above. fout isnot interval consistent. take the interval {p,t}.
In chapter 3, section 3.7, we will meet rules that satisfy both conditions.
Example 1.6 The problem of circularity
Consider two sets of pairwise comparisons between 5 objects
a, '....a. We5assume     that    a Ta.     if   i    < j, except    that    in the first    set    a  Ta      and    in     theJ 3    1second set a Ta :
5   1
/7.1, 82/.C.T.,
1,4/a ra a' .. a3               4                                        3               4
Which set of comparisons is more circular, is more inconsistent?
If we look at the number of reversals needed to obtain a natural ranking
from best to worst, we see that both sets require just one reversal. In the
first   set.   this is a ral'   in the second   one   this   must   be   ajTat.   So,   both
10
are equally circular with respect to this criterion.
On the other hand. the comparison STi introduces more circular patterns
than does a3Ta j. Indeed, in the second set we have three circular triads:
a,Ta rajTa„  a1TaiTajTa,  and  a,Ta4TajTai.  Hence,  the  inconsistency  a Ta,
has to receive more weight than a3Ta,.
A    great    part    of the discussions    that    one    may    find in litcraturi, revolve
around the justification of this weighting. If we assume that the choices
in each comparison are made at random. this weighting is not justified. On
the other hand, for most reasonable alternative hypotheses to randomness.
the slight upset ajTa, is more likely to occur than the major upset a5Taf
In chapter 5. wc will discuss two conditions that describe or
formalize these two principles: weighting versus non-weighting. First of
all, wc have the condition of equability. It formalizes the idea that there
does not exist a context so that some preference reversals are more
sweeping and therefore must receive more weight. This condition means that
the effects of all elementary changes at the local tournament level are to
be weighted uniformly. Hence, the two sets of pairwise comparisons given
above are equally circular. On the other hand, we have the condition of
outscore equability. This condition relates the change of circularity that
a (preference) reversal between two alternatives at the local tournament
level may cause, to the difference or distance between these alternatives
at a global level. Since one may view the score of an alternative as a
measure of the strength or desirability of that alternative, this distance
is measured using the (differences in the) scores.
Surprisingly, together with some mild assumptions. these conditions
completely characterize the two wildely used circularity measures. First of
all, we have Slater's i. which is equal to the minimal number of upsets
needed to convert the tournament into a linear or strict order. This fits
the principle as formalized by the equability condition. A second measure,
2. assigns to any tournament its number of 3-cycles or circular triads. The
more 3-cycles. the more circular is the tournament As will be shown in
chapter 5. it is related to the outscore equability.
11
1.2 DEFINmONS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this part. we introduce some basic notions which are used throughout.
Moreover, we prove some well-known theorerns dealing with the relation
between irreducible tournaments and the transitive closure.
1.2.1 PAIRWISE COMPARISON STRUCTURES
Throughout this thesis, the set of alternatives is taken to be finite.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the notion of a binary relation:
Binary relations
Let U = {ulp·-•un  be any finite set.
A   binary   relation   R   on   U   is   a   subset   of  the   Cartesian  product   UxU:   R   Q   UxU.
If (x.y) € R. we often write xRy. The relation may also be denoted by
(R.U).
An element of a binary relation R 9 UxU is written as (x.y) € R. or xRy, to
be read as: x is as least as good as y in R, where the interpretation of
'good' depends on the situation. It may represent e. g. preference. strength
or domination. If xRy and yRx. we often write x u y:R. meaning that x and
y are ind(Oerent in R. If (x.y) € R but (y,x) e R, we say that x is
preferred to, is stronger than, dominates, or beats y.
In this monograph, we frequently restrict relations on a set of
alternatives X to a subset Y C X. Its definition is straightforward.
Restrictions to subsets
Let (RX) be a relation on X. If YCXisa subset of X then the
restriction of R to Y is denoted by (RY) or R\Y and is defined by: (RY) =
{(x·y) € f:(x.y)€ R} = R nyl.
If there is no misunderstanding about the set of alternatives, we often
write R instead of (R.X).
Representation of relations
We distinguish two representations. In the matrix representation A of
a relation R. a number 1 at position (x,y) of the matrix A means that
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(x,y) € R. while a number 0 means that (x.y) £E R, see for instance example
1.2. The matrix A is called the relation matrix, or in case of tournaments
(see below). the tournament matrix. In the matrix representation of a
relation on X. we mostly put the character'-' instead of '0' on the
positions Aii' where  i  € {1 '..., IXIL
1n the network representation of a relation R, an arrow from x to y
means that (x.y) € R. If there is no arrow from x to y then (x.y) I R.
Compare figure   1.2.
Properties for binary relations
A binary relation R on U is
(a)  reflexive, ijll for all u e U: (u,u) e R.
(b)    antisyntmetric,  iff for all  (x,y)  e  UxU:
if (x.y) e Rand (y,x) e R then x = y.
(c)    asymmetric.  i  for all  (x.y)  €  UxU:
if (x,y) e R then (y.x) e R.
(d)    complete,  ijl for  all  (x.y)  e  UxU  with x * y,  (x,y) e  R  or (y,x) e  R.
(e)    transitive.  iff for  ati  (x,y),  (y,z)  e  R.  (x,z)  €  R.
In chapter 2, 3 and 5, we restrict our attention to tournaments. This name
stems from real-life round-robin tournaments: each alternative is compared
with each other alternative. In all these pairwise comparisons, a strict
choice for one of them is made.
Tournaments
A binary relation R on U is a tournament iff R is complete and asymmetric.
We introduce two sets of relations on U, the set of asymmetric relations
and the sct of tournaments.
Definition of NX) and T(X)
Let   U   =    {ul -..uJ  be a finite set.
(a)   If 0*XcU then 0(X) is the set of all asymmetric relations on X.
(b)  If 0*XcU then T(X) is the set of all complete asymmetric relations
on X.
1
if and only if
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Note that TOO c 0(X).
Linear orders and weak orders
Let  U   = {ul ....U1 be a jinite set.
(a)  Let 0*XcU.A reflexive. complete and transitive relation on Xis
called  a  weak  order  on  X.  *X)  is  the  set  of  weak  orders  on  X.
(b)      Let    0    *    X    c    U.    A    reflexive,    complete,    antisymmetric    and    transitive
Fekltion on X is called u linear order on X. UX) is the set of linearorders on X.
Note  that  LOO  9  WOO,  for all nonempty  X  Q  U.  L(30  0  w(X)  if   j X j      2.
Representation of weak orders
In general. a weak order R on X may be written as Xl » X2 * ··· ' Xk
for some k € li where X 1, X2' .... Xk is a partition of X. In this notationevery Xi is a maximal indifference class (each alternative in Xi isindifferent to every other alternative in Xi' maximality means that forevery clement x in the complement of Xi· there is an element y in Xi suchthat x and y are not indifferent). and Xi » Xj means that each alternativein Xi is preferred to or ranked ahead of each alternative in Xj. So, eachweak order may be seen as a strict order of its maximal indifference
classes. A weak order is a linear order if each indifference class consistsof only one alternative. compare the linear order in example  1.2.
For two alternatives a.b E X. let a€ Xi· b€Xj.We often write a*b:R
i f j>i.a k b:R i f j k i a n d a s i b:R i f i=j.
1.2.2 ELEMENTARY OPERATIONS ON BINARY RELATIONS
Throughout the chapters, we make use of some elementary operations on
binary relations. We give their definitions and discuss them shortly.
Transitive closure
Let G € 0(X) and Y c X. Then *G.Y) c f, the transitive closure of
(G.Y). is defined by:
for all x,y e Y. we have x(VG,Y))y 4
x = y. or there exist alternatives z ....,zk e Y. zO = x, Zk = Y' suchthat z Gz i e {0'.-,k-1}.i i+1'
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So. x(T(G,Y))y, if x=y o r there exists a path in (G.Y) with x a s its
starting point and y as its end. For each complete relation G. rG is a weak
order.
Example 1.7
Take   X   = {4 ....e }   and T equal  to
T a b c d e with graph2
a-1 1 1 1
<:=ts-b    0    -1    0    1                                         a                               d- ec 0 0-1 1 -\.4   d 0 1 0-1                   c
e 0 0 0 0-
Then   ir2   =   {a}    »   {b,c.d}   »    le};   a   weak  order.
Asymmetric part
Let R be a binary relation on X. Then the asymmetric part of R.
denoted by aR (or a(RX)) is defined by: aR = {(x,y) e R: (y,x) e R}.
Compared with the original relation G, the asymmetric part does not contain





Let     c      be      a      permutation     on     X:      c      :      X     +     X      is      a      bijection.      For     all
relations R on X, aR is a relation on X defined by:
(0(x),0(y)) € cR ily (x,y) e R.
Take   R   =   T from example    1.7. and define   a(a)   =   a.   a(b)   =  c.   a(c)   =   d.   a(d)
= b and c(e) = e. Then aTz = T2
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Maximal and best elements
Let  R   be  a  binary  relation  on  X  c  U.  Then
Max(RX) ={xEX: there is no yEX such that y(aR)x}.
Best(RX)  =   {x  e   X:  for  all   yEX.y  *  x.  xRy}.
Hence x € Max(RX), if x is not strictly beaten by another alternative.
Further, x € Best(RJO, if x beats all other alternatives. Note that
BestlTUL) 9 Max(RJO.
Let  T  be the tournament of example   1.2.  Then  Max(T) = Best(T)  = 0, while
Max('cT) = { a.b,c,d,e}. In the example above, Max(T2) = Best(T2) = {al.
An important operation is the concatenation of two or more relations.
Concatenation
Let X=YuZQU.YAZ=0.We define the concatenation
(G.Y) , (Gl) € UX) of (G,Y) e «Y) and (G.Z) € «Z) by:
(G.Y) ,(G,Z) :=
{(u,v) € XxX :(u,v) € (G,Y) or (u,v) € (G,Z) or u€Y,v€Z}.
Hence, each alternative of Y is preferred to every alternative of Z. Note
that the tournament of example 1.7 is a concatenation of three tournaments:
1 2 - Cru'{a}) 1, 0.2,{b,c.d}) 7 (1'2'{e}), where we make use of the
associativity of the concatenation operation.
1.2.3 PRELIMINARIES
In this part. we consider the relation between irreducible tournaments
and cycles. Furthermore. we show how to compute the transitive closure.
First of all. we introduce the notion of a cycle.
Cycles
Let G be an asymmetric relation on X. A cycle of length k is a
sequence of distinct alternatives {x,.....xy} c X, such that
x Gx G...Gx Gx .
1 2 k   1
A special type of cycle, is the Hamilton cycle. It is a cycle that 'visits'
each alternative precisely once.
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Hamilton cycle
A Hamilton cycle of an asymmetric relation G € 0(X) is a cycle of
length n, where  n  =   1X I.
In the tournament   T of example    1.7.   we   have one cycle: bT  T  T b.   A
Hamilton cycle  for the tournament T of example  1.2 is given by albTcTdTeTa.
Irreducible parts of a tournament
As is well-known, an asymmetric and complete relation can be
decomposed into irreducible parts. See e.g. Moon (1968). We introduce the
notion of irreducible tournaments, and give an alternative proof for this
well-known fact.
A tournament (TX) is irreducible. 4 for each partition Y=AuB, such
that An 8=0.we have: (T,Y) * (TA) * (T,B).
So, a tournament T is irreducible if it is not possible to partition its
alternatives into two nonempty sets A and B such that for all pairs of
alternatives (a,b) € AMB, we have (a,b) € T.
To give an example. consider again the circular tournament T,. As one may
easily verify T, 0 91.{a.b}) * (T,.{c.d}). in fact it is irreducible. On
the other hand, a linear tournament on two or more alternatives is
reducible.
THEOREM 1.1 Each tournament (TX) can uniquely be decomposed into a
concatenation of irreducible tournaments.
Proof (Existence) If (T,X) is irreducible, the existence is evidenL If
(TX) is reducible then (T.X) = (T,A) , (T,B) for some A and B. If (T,A)
and (T.B) are irreducible, then (TX) is the concatenation of these
irreducible tournaments. Otherwise, apply the same line of reasoning to
(T,A) and/or (T,B).
(Unicity) Suppose that (T.A,) * ... » (T,Ak) - (T.Bt) » ··· * (T.Bm) are
concatenations of irreducible tournaments. Since both A, and Bl arepreferred to all other alternatives, Ci := AlnB, 0 0. Suppose that C1 is
strictly contained in either A, or B,. This means that all alternatives
from Cl are preferred to all other alternatives. which contradicts the
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irreducibility of either (T.A,) or (T,B,). So. A, = B,. Similarly. we
obtain A=B
22..... Ak = Bk. .
This theorem teaches us that each tournament (T.X) € T(X) may uniquely be
decomposed into (TX) = (T.Xl) * (T.X2) » ··· * (T.Xn) where the
tournaments    (T.Xi).    i    € {1 '....n}      are     the so-called irreducible parts     of
(T.X).    Take    X    = {4 ....c} and T equal to the tournament in example 1.7.
Then     9230     =     (T2'{ a })     1     (T2'{ b.c.d})     p     (T2'{e}).     Note     that the theorem
also holds for arbitrary asymmetric relations.
There is a connection between irreducible tournaments and the occurrence of
Hamilton cycles. which is expressed in the following theorem. see Moon
(1968).
THEOREM 1.1 Let T be a tournament. Then T is irreducible iS T has an
Hamilton cycle.
proof  (only   if)   Let   T   be   an irreducible tournament   on   X   with    IXI=n.   We
construct a Hamilton cycle as follows. Since T is irreducible. there is at
least one cycle, so we assume the existence of a cycle C C X, of length
k < n:
x Tx T...Tx Tx .1 2   k l
We show that we may extend C to a Hamilton cycle.
Suppose that we are able to choose an element a EX\C, such that there is
an ie {l '....k}   with  xiTa  and  aTx   .  Then  we  may  extend  the  cycle  C  toi+1
x TaTx    T...Tx   Tx.
i j.1 i-1  1
If we cannot find such an element 4 then we may divide X\C into two
subsets W and S such that for all w e W and s€S w e have xiTw and sTxi'for   all i€{l '... .k}.      Since     T is irreducible. W and S are nonempty and
there exist w' € W and s' € S such that w'Ts'. But then, we may extend C to
the cycle x,Tw'Ts'Tx2T...TxkTxi.
So, we are able to extend C to a cycle of length k+1 or k+2. Continuing in
this manner, we finally obtain a cycle of length n. a Hamilton cycle.
(if) Evident.  
Together with theorem 1.1. this implies that if (T,X 1) ' - (T,Xn) is the
decomposition of (T.X) into irreducible parts, the transitive closure of
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(T,X) is equal to the weak order Xl * ··· » Xn
To give an impression. consider figure 1.3, where it is to be understoodthat if an arrow has not been drawn. it is oriented from left to right.
The cycles are Hamilton cycles for the irreducible subtournaments (T.Xi)·where  i € {l .....n}.
(T.X l) (T.%2) . · · · · (T.Xrl)
C   'A
Figure 1.3 Illustration of the decomposition into irreducible parts.
An important tool to measure the performance of a player in a tournament,
is the score. In graph-theoretic terms it is the out-degree.
Copeland scores in tournaments
Let T be a tournament on X. Then the (Copeland) score of alternative
x€Xis equal to sJT) = \{y €X: xTy}  (Copeland, 1951). If the choice
of tournament is clear, we often write s.X
The score vector is s - (s T))xex' and is equal to AS A being the
tournament matrix and e- a vector of l's.
So, the score of an alternative x is equal to the number of alternatives
that are preferred by x.
Let   T   be a tournament   on   X.   n   =  X . Suppose   that   s   is its score vector.
such that si 2 sj if i k j. Then
(a)         , 1' 'i   =    C }
k
(b)  ifals, 2 Itl. k e {1 ....,n}.
Indeed, the number of pairwise comparisons in a tournament on n
alternatives is equal   to Bl.
which proves   (1).   The   sum   of Copeland scores
of the tournament restncted to {al '...,ak ),      is      equal      to        .      But      in      the
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sum presented in (2). also comparisons with alternatives belonging to the
last n-k alternatives are counted, which proves (2).
As   for the computation of irreducible parts. we present proposition    1.3.   It
may be found by combining page 2 and 61 from Moon (1968). Note that for all
k > 0, =0+1 + 2 + ..+k-1.
PROPOSITION 1.3 L,t T be a tournament on X, n = IX   .  Suppose  that  s  is  its
score vector, such that si k sj if i k j. We denote the corresponding
alternatives with al····.an
The alternatives alt+1 '.Il,aj constitute an indi rence class of thetransitive closure of T. and hence an irreducible pan Of T  ijT
Cl)    I si =  1 orh = 0,ill
(2)      Z s.-  (j)
i.i' -  l2)'
k
(3)   if h+1 < j then   si >    . for k E {h+1 .... j.-1}.
proof   I.Ct us suppose that (x,y) € afr, the asymmetric part of the
transitive closure of T. Then. using figure 1.3. we may deduce that
s% > s . Indeed. we have xTy, and if yTz then KTz. Hence, an indifferenceclass of iT is equal to {au,·-,au+v} for some u and v such that  1 S u andu+v 5 n. Second. observe that a Ation between the alternatives A =
(al....,aj} and B = {aj+1 .....an } separates indifference classes     of     TT.     iffor all clements x€B and all elements y€A.w e have that not (y.x) €T,
so   that   we  obtain      ,s i   =    [i}..
Example 1.8
Take the tournament T of example 1.7. Then. as one may easily verify, the
score vector s is equal to (0.2.2.2,4) = (scib.sc' dia) Since se = 0,te}      constitutes an irreducible     part     of     T2     and     the     last     indifference     classof fr . Because
0+2>0+l a n d 0+2+2>0+1+2 and 0+2+2+2=0+1+2+1
{ b,c,d 1       is      the      second      indifference      class      of     HI'2. The first indifferenceclass is {a l:0+2+2+2+4=0+1+2+3+4.
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APPENDIX: INDEX OF PROCEDURES AND CONDITIONS
In the tables, the numbers correspond to the page numbers.
0 CHOICE FUNCTIONS
Table I: Choice functions
Top cycle, tc ch. 2: 27
Uncovered set, tic ch. 2: 29 ch. 4: 119
Minimal covering set, mc ch. 2: 31
Banks set b ch. 2: 35
Strategy equilibrium. strat ch. 2: 45 ch. 4: 119. 134
Copeland choice set. cop ch. 2: 38
Slater choice set. st ch. 2: 39
T-equilibrium scL teq ch. 2: 36
Von Neumann-Morgenstern. vNM ch. 4: 117, 137
Maximal elements, top ch. 4: 119
0 RANKING RULES
Table II: Ranking rules
ftrans ch. 3: 67 feigen ch. 3: 97
f            ch. 3: 70         f            ch. 3: 87Out stat
f            ch. 3: 72          f             ch. 4: 141Out vNM
f            ch. 3: 71          f            ch. 4: 141cop top
fprob ch. 3: 94         f            ch. 4: 142strat
• CRIERIA FOR CHOICE FUNCTIONS AND RANKING RULES
In this monograph. we introduce and discuss lots of intuitively
appealing conditions for ranking and choice methods. In table III, we list
them. Also compare the tables at the end of each chapter. Note that for
bconditions mentioned in table III . the precise formulation for ranking
rules and choice functions is of course different.
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Table ma: Conditions for choice functions
Condorcet properties ch. 2: 26 ch. 4: 122
Concatenation consistency ch. 2: 26
Neutrality ch. 2: 26
tproperty ch. 2: 32
7 -property ch. 2: 33
Strong superset property. SSP  ch. 2: 33 ch. 4: 138
Monotonicity ch. 2: 34
Sen's condition ch. 2: 34
Chernoffs condition ch. 2: 51
Balanced dominant weights ch. 2: 46 ch. 4: 132
Local differences ch. 4: 123
Table mb: Conditions for choice functions and ranking rules
8-IIA ch. 2: 48 ch. 3: 78 ch. 4: 138
Separability ch. 2: 53 ch. 3: 90
Global monotonicity ch. 2: 57 ch. 4: 138
Tail stability ch. 2: 59 ch. 4: 121, 142
Independence of 3-cycle
orientation ch.  3:  81
External stability ch. 4: 116,144
Table Hf: Conditions for ranking rules
Commutation properties ch. 3: 64,73
Free of upsets ch. 3: 68
Right-interval consistency ch. 3: 66
Weakly-A-HA ch. 3: 80
Interval consistency ch. 3: 90 ch. 4: 142
Partial independence ch. 3: 73
Independence of interval
changes ch. 3: 69
Positive responsiveness ch. 3: 85
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0 CIRCULARrrY MEASURES
In the following two tables. we list the measures and conditions.
Table IV: Circularity measures
Number of 3-cycles.  1 154 Proportion intransitivity, 6 173
Slater's i 156 Bezembinder's p 173
Number of 4-cycles. X 173 Distance to ranking by f . 8 179trans
• CRITERIA FOR CIRCULARITY MEASURES
Table V: Conditions for circularity measures
Standardization 160
Independence of labeling 159
Uniform weighting of elementary changes 158
Tie-breaking reduction 159
Reducibility by elementary changes 161
Equability 161










CHOICE FUNCTIONS ON PREFERENCE RELATIONS
2.1 INTRODUCI'ION
Given    is a finite    sct    U    = {u l v-,un 1     of    alternatives,    and a tournament    T
on X c U, which expresses decisive judgments for all pairs of alternatives.
It is well-known that often tournaments do not contain a best alternative.
Therefore, we construct and compare choice functions, that handle the
difficulty posed by the nonexistcnce of a clear winner in different ways.
Let X C U b e a nonempty set. Then T(X) is the set of tournaments on X. In
this chapter. we often will use variable sets of alternatives. Therefore.
we introduce the set T, which iS the union of all Sets T(X), where X Q U i s
a nonempty set Analogously to T, the set 0 is the union of all sets of
asymmetric relations NX) on X. where 0*X Q U. Note that if (G.X) € 0(X)
and Y c X. then (G.Y), the restriction of G to Y, is element of 0(Y).
Choice functions
A choice function S on 0(X) is a function S : 910 -* 2 1{0}. A choice
function S on G is a family of choice functions, one for each 0(X).
0*X c U. Completely analogous. we may define choice functions on T(X) and
T.
Most conditions that wc will consider, are stated in terms of asymmetric
relations. But. of course, they may be transformed to conditions
stated in terms of tournaments. by changing G to T.
2.2 ELEMENTARY PROPERTIES
We provide three elementary conditions. Throughout this chapter. we only
consider choice functions for which these conditions hold.
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• Condorcet consistency (sce e.g. Moutin. 1986)
A choice function S on UX) satisfies the condition of Condorcet
consistency  if for all  (GX)  €  «X)  and all a€Xwe  have  that
if  aGb  for   all   b  e   ]Na}   then  S(GX)  =   {a}.
For tournaments. this condition means that if a tournament has a best
element. this unique element constitutes the choice set.
We next introduce another consistency condition.
• Concatenation consistency (compare e.g. Storcken, 1989)
A choice function S on G satisfies the condition of concatenation
consistency  if for all AA  9 U  such that ArB  =  0  and all G e  «AuB):
SI(GA) , (GB)1 = S(GA).
As for the concatcnation consistency: if each alternative from B is
defeated by all alternatives from A, the choice set from (G,A) *(G.B) only
depends upon (G,A). Note that the Condorcet consistency is implied by the
concatenation consistency.
Let a be a permutation on X. If G is an asymmetric relation on X, then
aG € 600 is defined by: (ax,ay) € aG iff (x,y) € G.
• Neutrality (see e.g. Moulin. 1986)
A   choice  function   S   on   «X)   is   neutral   if  for   permutations   c   of  X   and
all (GX) € 0(X), we have S(c(GX)) = cS(GX).
Neutrality excludes the possibility that a choice function S makes a
distinction between different ways of naming the alternatives. Compare the
commutation with pcrmutation, discussed in chapter 3, section 2.
Let Sbea choice function on G. If for each 0*XQU.S: 0(X) + #\{0}
satisfies a certain property. say 4, then S is said to satisfy property 4.
For example, a choice function S on o is neutral if each member of the
family of choice function   S  :   0(X)   -4  2 { 0},0  0  X   C  U, is neutral.
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2-3 CHARACTERIZATION OF THE TOP CYCLE
In this section, we give a characterization of the choice function tc.
which assigns to a tournament its top cycle.
An alternative u is in the top cycle of a tournament T € TOO. if for
all    x    EX. u(fr)x. where    fT    is    the transitive closure    of   T.    sce    chapter    1.
section 1.2.2. Unfortunately, the top cycle often is unmanageably large.
This may be seen by taking a linear order and reversing the order between
top and bottom element But it has another drawback. If. for example, the
tournament sterns from pairwise majority voting. the top cycle may contain
Pareto dominated alternatives. To give an example. consider a cyclic
tournament on 4 alternatives as depicted below.
T,       d.           -
-1
a       -b
It is possible that all agents vote for alternative b in the comparison
between alternative b and c. So bT,c is unanimous. For example, this occurs




Nevertheless using the choice function tC, together with a,b and d, the
Pareto dominated alternative c is chosen.
To avoid choosing Pareto dominated altcrnatives when the tournament stems
from pairwise rnajority voting, we will introduce other choice functions in
the sections to come.
But first, we provide a characterization for the choice function tC. For
this purpose, we consider the following condition.
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• Condorcet transitivity (sec e.g. Moulin, 1986)
A  choice  function  S   :   UX)  4  2 \{0}   satisfies  the  Condorcet
transitivity if:
for all G € 0(X) and all a.b € X: if a € S(G) and bGa then b € S(G).
This condition means that alternatives from tile top cycle have to be
chosen, sce theorem 2.1.
Smallest choice function
In the following theorem. we use the term 'smallest' choice function. A
choice function     S is smaller    than a choice function    S'.     if    for     all
tournaments   T,   we   have   that   S(T)   c   S' (T),   and   S   *   S'.
THEOREM 2.1 (Characterization of tile top cycle)
(a)  The choice function tc is the smallest choice function on I, that
sati*fies the Condorcet transitivity.
(b) If a choice function S satisfies the Condorcet transitivity and
the concatenation consistency, then S = tc.
Proof (a) Lzt T € T(X). Suppose that b € SCT). For all a € tc(T), there
exists a path along T from a to b: a = x,Tx,T...Txk = b, k 2 0. But then,applying the Condorcet transitivity property k times. we conclude that
a € S(T). (b) Left to the reader. ,
We will meet other theorems that look alike to the characterization given
above. These kinds of characterizations make clear the balancing between
certain consistency conditions, in this case the Condorcet transitivity,
and the desire to obtain small choice sets. In general, the conditions give
a lower bound to the size of the choice seL If we relax the conditions,
more choice sets will satisfy these conditions. giving rise to a reduction
of the lower bound.
If we do not consider the top cycle of a tournament as a candidate for the
final choice, because in general   it   is too large,   theorem   2.1   implies   that
we have to relax the assumption of Condorcet transitivity.
In the following section. we will discuss another characterization of tc.
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The difference with the characterization given there, is that in section
2.4.2, we use independence conditions in terms of variable sets of
alternatives
2.4 THE UNCOVERED SET AND THE MINIMAL COVERING SET
In this section, we introduce and discuss some choice functions that
resolve the problem of choosing Pareto dominated alternatives. We introduce
the uncovered set and the minimal covering set. In the second subsection,
we look at some properties and characterizations for these sets and the top
cycle.
*
2.4.1 The choice sets uc, uc  and mc
The uncovered set: uc
In Fishburn (1977) and Miller (1980) the cover relation was
introduced. Given an asymmetric relation G, it is defined as:
x covers y  iff
xGy and for all z € X: if yGz then xGz.
We write xCy if x covers y.
The uncovered set of G. denoted by uc(G) is the set of maximal elements in
this cover relation. Sce chapter 1 for the definition of maximal elcments.
Since the cover relation C is transitive and X is finite. uc(G) is not
empty.
Note that for each tournament T originating from pairwise majority voting,
uc(T) only contains Parcto undorninated alternatives. To show this. recall
that all parties involved in the majority voting procedure are supposed to
have a transitive preference over the existing alternatives. Now, let x€X
and suppose that the alternative y is unanimously preferred to x in the
tournament T. Then. if xTz, meaning that the majority prefers x to z. the
same majority prefers y to z. implying yCx. Hence x 1 ucCD.
In case of majority voting one is interested only in uncovered proposals.
29
Indeed. suppose that xCy. then it is not very attractive to choose y: y is
overruled by x.
The computation of uc(T) is straightforward if we usc the following
proposition.  Let  A  be the tournament matrix. see chapter  1.
PROPOSITION 2.2 (Miller.  1980) Lzt T e  T(X) be a tournament. The following
three    statements   are    equivalent.   Let    B    =    A    +    I.
(1 )     i  e  X  is  uncovered
(2)  for all y*xinX. there is a path along T from Xtoyof
length 1 or 2
(3)  for all y e X: (B ,xy * O.
Proof (1 4 2) Suppose that yTx. Since x is uncovered, there is an clement
z. such that xTz and zTy, meaning that x can reach y in two steps. (2 => 3).
The enuy 032)   is equal to the number of paths of length 1 or 2 from x toXYy, hence it is not equal to 0. (3 4 1). The alternative x is able to reach
any other alternative in 1 or 2 steps. So yCx for any y is impossible. ,
The uncovered set arose in the study of majority voting. Most of the choice
functions which we will introduce hereafter, were originally inspired by
the theory of collective choice, in particular the strategic analysis of
voting rules based upon majority voting.
In this light, the uncovered set itself does have a shortcoming. For
example, there may be domination within the uncovered set. To give such an
example. consider (T'30. X = {a.b.c.d.e}
T'  a b c d     e          uc(T:X)   = {a,b.c,d}, while
a  -  1  0  1  1    uc(T',{a,b,c,d})=la,b,c}.
b O-1 1 0
(1 0-0 1
d 0 0 1-1
e 0 1 0 0-
Therefore, one tries to find refinements of the choice function uc. We
consider the recursive uncovered set and the minimal covering seL
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Composition of choice functions
Let S, S' be two choice functions on G. Then the composition ScS' is achoice   function   on   G   defined   by   SoS'(GX) = S(G,S'(G.X)). for ati relations(GX) € 0.
*The recursive uncovered set: uc
*Let uc  be the recursive application of uc, defined as follows.
We introduce a sequence of choice functions on G,
uc, uc, ..., defined by1          2
uct =u c and if k 2 2 then uc = ucouck             k.1'
Now, since o is finite, there does exist an integer a, such that f = ucafor all k k a.
We der,ne uc = ucoc
*It is clear that the relation G restricted to  uc (G) is irreducible foreach asymmetric relation G € G.
The minimal covering set: mc
In Dutta (1988) a new choice function on T was introduced.
Let T E T(X). A set D g X i s a covering set of the tournament T iff
(i)   u«T,D) = D and
(ii)  if x EX\D then x i uc(T,Duix}).
Hence. a subset D is a covering set. if all elements from D are uncoveredin (T,D) and. moreover, each alternative x from X\I) is covered in(T.Du{x}).
*In Dutta (1988) it is proved that uc (T) is a covering set Moreover. heshowed that mcm := n{D: D is a covering set of T} is a covering set of T.It is called the minimal covering set.
It is contained in the top cycle of uc(T): mc(T) C tCouC(T). Moreover. itis contained in uc*(T).
We now present table 2.1, containing the choice sets of the choicefunctions introduced so far, for the tournament T2.
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T2abcde f gh tc. { a,b.c.d.c,f,g.h }
a-1 1 1 1 1 0 0 uc:     (a,b.c.g,h}
*
b O-1 1 1 1 0 1 uc:    { a.b.c, g}
c 0 0-1 1 1 1 1 mc:      {a.c,g}
d 0 0 0-1 0 1 1
e 0 0 0 0-1 1 1
f 0 0 0 1 0-1 0
g 1 1 0 0 0 0-1
h 1 0 0 0 0 1 0-
Table 2.1 Choice sets of the tournament T.
2
2.4.2 Characterizations for uc, mc and tc.
In this subsection. we consider properties that are in terms Of
variable domains.
We start with a property that is used in a characterization of uc.
• 7: (Sen, 1977)
A choice function S on G satisfies the Y property if for all nonempty
XX'  9 U. for ati  G  e  «U):  SCGX)  n S(G,X')  9 S(GXur).
This condition means the following. Suppose that a€X n X'i s chosen when
only elements from X are available. Moreover. it is chosen when only
elements from X' are available. Then a has to be chosen from the union of X
and X: Stated otherwise, joining forces against a does not pay. ™s
condition sometimes is called the expansion condition. If alternative a is
able to cover the whole set U by suitably chosen subsets Bi such that
a € S(G.Bi) for each i, then a € S(G,ID.
If we combine the consistency conditions, we obtain the following
characterization:
THEOREM 2.3 (Moulin 1986, characterization of the uncovered SCO. The
choice function uc on I is the smallest choice function that satisfies
neutrality. 7 and Condorcet consistency.
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proof We give a sketch of the proof. Let a choice function S satisfy the
conditions mentioned above. Take b € uc(T.X). We prove that b € Scr.X).
Divide   X\tb}    into    X+    =    I x    E     X:    bTx }    and    X-    =    {x    E     X:    xTb 1. Because    of
Condorcet consistency,   we   have   that   {b}   =  S(T, { b.x }).   for  all   x  €    X+.
Because b € uc(T). all elernents from X- are reachable in two steps. Thus
for   all   x   e    X-,   there does exist an element   y   E    X+   such   that   (T,{x,b,y})   is
a     3-cycle.     Hence.     because of neutrality.     for     all     x    e      X-,     b    E      S(T, { x,b,y }).
Using the property 7, we know that b € SCD. I
In order to be able to present a characterization of mc, we introduce a few
more conditions.
First of all. we have a weaker version of the 7-condition.
A
• 7 : (Sce e.g. Dutta. 1988)
Let   G   e   «U).   Suppose   X
1
'...
X k   is    a   finite    collection   of   subsets    of
U. Then
k                          k                         k
a € n S(G.Xi) implies  U Xi - (a,1 * S(G, U Xi)·
2.1 :..1 ,=1
ANote that if a choice function satisfies 7, then it also satisfies y .
The following condition is an independence condition.
• Strong superset property (Sce e.g. Dutta, 1988)
A   choice   function   S   on   G   satisfies   the   strong   superset   property   (SSP)
if for  all  G  €  sUJ)  and for all XX'  c U:
if  S(GX' )  cX  CX'   then  S(GX)  =  S(GX').
To describe SSP in words: if S(G.X') c X c X', elements outside X may bc
deleted. without changing the choice seL It is independent of the presence
of elements outside S(G.X'). The condition SSP is a strong one. most choice
functions do not satisfy it. Nevertheless. it may be significant in certain
circumstances. If just before the announcement of the name of the champion
one of the losers is disqualified, we do not want that this suddenly leads
to another champion. To give another example, the leading countries of the
European Community remain leading countries, regardless of the presence of
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a minor, European oriented. country.
Let Xx = X\{X}.
• Monotonicity (See c.g. Dutta, 1988)
A choice function S on «X ) is monotone dI
for all G.G' € «X) and all x e S(GX).
if for all b€X xGb implies xG'b, and G1Xx = G'  Xx
then x e  S(G' X).
So, if at the binary relation level. nothing changes at the expense of x.
the same is true in the final choice at the more global level of analysis.
Putting these conditions together. we obtain
THEOREM 2.4 (Dutta, 1988, characterization of the minimal covering set).
The choice function mc on I is the smallest choice function that
satisfies monotonicity, neutrality, SSP and 1.m
One of the characterizing properties for S = tc (top cycle), using variable
domains is:
• Sen's condition (See e.g. Moulin, 1986)
A  choice  function  S  on  G  satisfies  Sen' s  condition  if
for all G e  «U) aAd all Y c X:
if S(G.Y) n S(GX) * 0 then SCGY) c S(GX).
Let a choice function S satisfy this condition. If we extend the set of
outcomes. then, if one of the old champions is chosen. all of them are
chosen.
THEOREM  2.5  (Moulin 1986, characterization  of  the top cycle). The choice
function tc on T is the smallest choice function that satisfies
neutrality,  7,  Condorcet  consistency  and  Sen' s  condition.  l
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2.5 OTHER CHOICE SETS
In this section. we discuss the so-called Banks set of a tournament. the
tournament equilibrium set. the Copeland choice function and the Slater
choice set.
2.5.1 The Banks set
In Banks (1985) the now so-called Banks set was introduced. Given a
tournament T. the Banks set b(T) is defined to be the set of alternatives
which are top element of at least one transitive subtournament of T.
maximal with respect to inclusion. Such subtournaments may be seen as
stable hierarchies; they cannot be extended without violating this
stability.   In the tournament of table   2.1,   such a subtournament   is   given   by
hT I . Indeed. it cannot be extended. without violating the transitivity,
indicating that h € AT2)' The reader is invited to verify that *T2) =
{a.b.c,g,h}.
The motivation for this choice function iS the following.
Consider a group of voters, faced with a set of alternatives. As
already mentioned, if the tournament sterns from pairwise majority voting,
the top cycle sometimes does contain Pareto dominated alternatives.
Therefore. choice functions like uc and mc were introduced. But these do
not entirely solve the problem, because often the group of voters use an
agenda to reach a decision. An agenda is simply an ordering of the pairs of
alternatives from which pairwise comparisons may be made. Now. the choice
of a particular agenda is very important. since, using an appropriate
agenda. it is possible to end up with Pareto dominated alternatives. For
example, consider the tournament Tl. There the alternative c was dominated.
But if wc use the following agenda, we end up with just this alternative:
alternative b versus a: a is chosen,
alternative a versus d: d is chosen,
alternative d versus c: c is chosen. and is the final choice.
(Note that for any agenda. we always end up in the top cycle. )
To by-pass this problem. Miller (1977). Moulin (1979), Shepsle and Weingast
(1982) and others considered so-called sophisticated voting. Without going
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into details, it comes down to choosing a binary tree or agenda, such that
the outcome ends up in the uncovered set. See Banks (1985) or Moulin (1986)
for   details.   We   give   the   tree for tournaments   on   X   when    I X      =  4, see figure
2.1.     where      1.2.3     and 4 stand     for an arbitrary permutation     of the clements
from  X  To  illustrate.  let  T,   be the circular tournament  on  X  =   {a.b.c.d}
with c as the Pareto dominated alternative. of section 2.3.
If we choose 1=4 2=b.3=c and 4=d. then. as one may easily verify.
we end up with the alternative d. If l=d,2=b,3=a a n d 4=c,then we
obtain b. If wc consider all possibilities, we end up with either a. b or
d. So. we never end up with the (possibly) Pareto dominated alternative c.
1213 1214
Figure  2.1 The sophisticated agenda  for  X  when    X     =  4. (compare Moulin.
1986).
In Banks (1985) it is proved that for any tournament these outcomes are
precisely the clements of b(T). So, using this tree for T, as is done
above, we sce that b(T1) = {a.b,d}.
2.5.2 The tournament equilibrium set
In Schwartz (1990) another choice function on T is proposed. It arises in
a cooperative recontracting process. The choice set SCT.X) is interpreted
as the set that a majority might make a jinal contract to choose from. Now,
take any x € X. Then a tentan've contract to choose x from X can be upset
by a contract to choose something else. What else? Because members act
cooperatively, they will cooperatively choose a replacement for x: some
majority will make a contract to replace x with an alternative that beats
x; a contract that is final in the process of replacing x. though perhaps
only tentative in the larger process of choosing from X. Given the
interpretation  of  S.  x is replaced  with  y  iff  y  e   S(T.{z€X:  zTx}).
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So. suppose a choice function S is defined for all tournaments on Y with
Y         5     k.     k     E       N,      where of course      S(T. {a} )      =      {a}      for     all     T     and      all
alternatives   a.    Now,   suppose   we   have   a   tournament   (T.X),   with     X     =   k+1.
Based  on  the  fact  that  S is defined for tournaments  (T,Y)   with    Y    5  k.  we
may define a replacement relation D(T.X) on X as follows:
aD(TX)b   iff  a   E    S(T, { y€ X:   yTb }).
Note  that.  because     {y€ X:  yTb }     5  k.  this  is  well-defined.
Based on the relation D. we may define a choice function teq, the
tournament equilibrium set, as follows: teq(T.X) is the union of the
maximal components of the transitive closure of D(T.X).
To illustrate this function. let us again take the circular tournament T,
on X =  {a,b,c.d}.
Since {x€X: xT,a} = {d} and d € S(Tl'{d}), we obtain dD(Tt'X)a. Moreover.
{x€X: xT,b} = ta}. hence aD(Tt'X)b. Next we have {xEX: AT,c} = {a,b}. So,
we must determine Sgf{a,b}). Because  {x€ {a.b}:  xT,a}  =  0 and further
{x€ {a,bl:   KT,b}   =   {a}. we obtain S(Ti,{a.b})   =   {a}. This means  that




It is clear that there is just one maximal component: {a.b.d}. So. teq(T,)
=   la,b,d}.
The     choice     set     for the tournament     T of table     2.1 is equal     to     teq(1'2)     =
{a.c,g}.
We next describe the three characterizing properties for the choice
function teq.
A subset B of X is called S-retentive in X. where S is an arbitrary choice
function. iff no tentative contract to choose an element from B can be
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upset by a tentative contract to choose an element of X\B. Then the
recontracting process. having entered or begun in B, can never depart.
Therefore, Schwartz demands that the set SCT.X) is S-retentive. Moreover.
there is no proper subset B of S(T.X) such that B is S-retentive, while
S(TX)\B is not. Finally. if the process began in an S-retentive subset, it
would never depart, so the final choice would belong to that subset
Therefore, if B is S-retentive, then BAS(T,X) 0 0.
Schwartz proved the following theorem:
THEOREM 2.6 (Schwartz 1990, characterization of teq). A choice function S
on T satisfies
(i)    for each (TX) e T, S(TX) is S-retentive in (TX).
(ii)  there does not exist a proper subset B of S(TX) such that
B is S-retentive in X, while S(TX)\B is not,
(iii)   if B is S-retentive in X, then B A S(TX) * 0,
iff  S  =   teq.   I
2.5.3 The Copeland choice set
Let cop be the Copeland choice function. For a tournament T, cop(T)
consists of those alternatives with highest Copeland score. This score was
introduced in chapter   1.   If we consider the tournament   T of table   2.1,   we
obtain cop(T2) = {a.b.c}. As observed by Miller (1980), for each tournament
T, we have cop(T) c uc(T): if x covers y, then s  > s . Unfortunately, as
observed by Moutin (1986), the Copeland choice set may be a dominated
subset of the uncovered set: there are tournaments T. such that
cop(T) n tcouc(T) =0.
*The recursively Copeland choice function: cop
This choice function is defined in the same manner as was uc . For example,
*
cop    (Tz)   =    {a} .
For practical reasons, we postpone characterizations of cop to chapter 3,
section 3.5.4.
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2.5.4 The Slater choice set
Given a tournament T. nearest adjoining orders are linear orders L that.
with respect to the tournament T, have a minimal number of differences or
upsets. An upset is a pair of alternatives x,y such that yTK while xLy: in
L the loosing alternative is ranked ahead of the winning alternative. To
give an example, consider the following tournament.
T a b c d e
3
a-  1  1  0 0 There are two nearest adjoining orders:
b O-1 1 1 a»b»c»d»e a n d
c 0 0-1 1 b,c*dve*a.
d  100-1 Withrespectto these orders. T3 has two upscts.
e 1 0 0 0-
The reason for studying these nearest adjoining orders is the following.
Due to disturbances, the tournament contains upsets. The linear orders with
minimal number of upsets are the orders representing the rankings that are
most likely.
We denote the set of nearest adjoining orders to (TX) by N(T.X) or N(T).
These orders were introduced by Slater (1961).
For the computation of the nearest adjoining orders, we refer to Remage and
Thompson (1966) and Phillips (1967, 1969). The computations require
exponential computer time. Another computation method is described in
Bezembinder (1981).
The nearest adjoining orders  for the tournament Of table  2.1  are:
a,b,c,d»e» f »g»h,
a»b»c»d,e*g,h* f. a*b,c»e, f *d,g»h,
a»b»c,d,e,h* f »g. a»b»c» f »d*e,g»h.
They all need 5 reversals to be converted into the tournament (T 'X).
Now, we shall define a choice function. that is based upon these nearest
adjoining orders.
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Suppose T € r(X). Let st(T) be the set of elements that are best in a
nearest  adjoining   order  (st  stands  for   Slater,   1961).
To  give an example.  sl(T )  =  {a}.
One may conjecture that for all tournaments T, the intersection of cop(T)
and sl(T) is never empty. Nevertheless, Bermond (1972) provided a
tournament on 7 alternatives, for which cop(D n sim = 0. So the
respective winners may be entirely differenL
2.6 THE TOURNAMENT ZERO-SUM GAME
In L ond et at. (1993) and Fisher and Ryan (1992). a new choice function
was introduced, which uses game theoretical arguments. We give an
alternative proof for the unicity of the optimal strategy or mixed strategy
equilibrium of the tournament zero-sum game and provide a characterization.
Let T  be the following tournament
,»Cid
Consider two candidates who compete for the votes of the electorate through
the poliCy positions they adopt, compare Laffond et al. (1993). The
electorate votes and the majority decides for each couple of political
issues      from { a.b.c.d,e}. which      one      has      to      get most attention. These
majority votes are represented in the tournament above. Both candidates
travel around the country, each day concentrating on one of the political
issues. Once they announce this issue. we may use the tournament results to
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sce which one will get most of the credit We normalize the payoff to 1 for
winning. -1 for loosing. If both come up with the same choice, their payoff
is 0. This results in the zero-sum game with skew-symmetric matrix A:
'0  1  1 1 .1  '
-1    0    1   -1    1
-1   -1    0    1    1
-1    1   -1    0    1
1   -1   -1   -1    0
What are the optimal strategies for this tournament game? Later on. we show
that the optimal mixed strategy is (1/3,1/9,1/9,1/9.1/3). This means that
1/3 of the time. they have to concentrate on issue 4 1/9 of the time on
issue b, etc. Only this strategy has the highest possible guaranteed mean
profit, no matter which mixed strategy the other candidate chooses. Note
that the alternative e receives more weight than alternatives b, c and d,
which. at first sight, is somewhat counterintuitive.
In    general.    let    G    be    an asymmetric relation    on    X    = {x l '...,xn L We define   A
=   (a..).   a zero-sum nxn-matrix,   by:
1J
a..   =    1    if   xiGx„   a..   =   -1   if  x.Gx.   else   a..    =   0.   i.j € {l .....n}.4    J U J 1 1JThe game corresponding to the skew-symmetric matrix A is symmetric and is
called the G-game. In case of tournaments, as in this chapter, we speak of
the tournament (zero-sum) game.
We first discuss some elementary topics on zero-sum games. We number the
alternatives as 1,2.....n. A mixed strategy g is a vector g € R , such that
g 2 Q and Ilmi qi = 1. Sce the strategy given above. Tile set of mixed
strategies is denoted by Kn.
The number v 1 is called a security level for player 1, if there exists a
strategy   2   such   that   £A   2   vle.   where   e   is a vector   of   l's. By playing   2,
the payoff to player 1 at least equals vt: RA  2 vlfg' = v for each
1
choice of strategy g.
The number v2 is called a security level for player 2. if there exists a
strategy g such that Ag' 5 v '. By playing this strategy, player 2 loss is
less or equal to v2: RAg' 5 Ev  = v2 for each choice of 2·
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Of   course, this implies   that   vl   5   v2   for   all    security levels. Surprisinglyenough, there are strategies 2 and /, such that the corresponding
security levels are equal:  vt   =  v2   (von  Neumann,   1928).   The  value  vl   =  v2
is    called the value    of    the    game.    see    for    example    Owen    (1982).    and    is
denoted by v or v(A). The strategies 2 such that EA 2 ve, are called
optimal strategies for player     1.    The    set of optimal strategies for player     1
is denoted  by  0,(A). For player  2, we analogously obtain  02(A)
Because the matrix A is skew-syrnmetric (A' = -A), the G-game is symmetric.
and wc can prove the 1cmma below. see Owen ( 1982).
LEMMA 2.7 Let G e «X). For the G-game with matrix A. we have that
(i)   01(A) = 02(A)
(ii)  v(A) = 0.
Proof Let  R   €   0,(A).  g.  €   02(A).  Then  for  all  2.9  e   Kn,  n  =    X :
RAg' 5 v(A) 5 2'Ag'.
Transposing these inequalities, we arrive at
g'A'£ 5 v(A) 5 gA' ('.
Because A' = -A, we get
gAR' 5 v(A) 5 g'AR'.
This means that 12' i 02(A) and 51. € 0,(/ ). Hence 01(A) = 02(A).As for v(A):
v(A) = 2'Ag ' = 2'(-A')g" = -2'A'/' = <Al(' = -v(A), thus v(A) = 0. I
Now. since v(A) = 0 and (1/3,1/9.1/9.1/9,1/3)A 2 0, we deduce that the
strategy (1/3,1/9.1/9,1/9,1/3) is optimal for our starting example T ' for
both candidates.
The optimal strategy for the tournament game corresponding to $4 appears to
be unique. This unicity is no coincidence. Laffond ct al. (1993) and Fisher
and Ryan (1992) independently proved that for all tournament games there
exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium (82) or optimal strategy 2·
These proofs are quite different. In Laffond et al. the relation RA k Q for
an optimal strategy 2 is exploited. In the proof given by Fisher and Ryan.
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the emphasis lies on the fact that the optimal strategy 2 is a null-vector
of a submauix of A.
We present an alternative proof which is also based on the relation PA 2 Q.
THEOREM 1.8 The optimal strategy of a tournament game is unique.
proof We first prove: all optimal strategies do have equal support
Let 2 be an optimal strategy and Y = supp(0. Using lemma 2.7, the
tournament zero sum game with matrix A is symmetric and has value equal to
0. So we have
RA 2 Q. (la)
Note that for arbitrary 2 and x E X, we have that
(RA)x -     I   Ry  -     I   Ry. so if x t Y then     I     2 1/2.
Y€ Y. YTX y€ Y. ITY Y€ Y. YTI
We prove:
if x t Y then     I   RY  > 1/2.y€ Y. YTI
Therefore, we suppose that this sum is equal to 1/2. In deriving a
contradiction, we need the following.
Since     a..     €      4     i.j     € {l .....n },     it is possible to choose optimal strategies
1J
2. such that all values 2 are rational. Because  I 2  =1. there exists anyEY y
integer d such that d  is an integer for all y. and at least one
component, say dpv. v e Y. is odd. We prove that d is odd.
In general, for a symmetric game with matrix B (having value 0) and OptiInal
strategy 2,
(RB)x > 0 =* ax = o, (lb)
for all optimal strategies g.
Hence, because Ev , 0, we have (RA)v = 0 or (dRA)v = 0· giving
E  dRY  -    I  dpy= 0.
Y€ Y. y TV y€ Y .v Ty
Thus    I  dRY  +    I  dE  is even.Y€ Y, yTV y€ Y, vTy Y
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Since this last sum is equal to d - dpv' the number d must be odd.
Going back to our assumption. we obtain
I  de, =  d.Y€Y.YTI
But id . 14 while for all y € Y. dp  E 4 which is a contradiction.
To summarize: if 2x = 0. then     X   Ry  > 1/2 or, putting it differently,
Y€Y.YTI
if Ex = 0 then (RA)x > O, (lc)
which is the converse of (lb).
But now. we are able to prove that all optilnal strategies do have equal
support.    say     Y.     Let    21     and     22     be two optimal strategies with support    Y 1     and
Y2. such that Yl * Y2. We derive a contradiction. Since Yl 0 Y2' there areopumal strategies 2 and g. with all components rational. such that their
supports  Zl  and  Z are different.
If x I Zl' then, using (lc), we know that (EA)x > 0· Using (lb). this means
that   for the optimal strategies   g,   gx   = 0 Hence. supp(g)   9   Zl.   The   same
way of reasoning shows that supp(0 is contained in supp(g). So. Zl = Z2'
which contradicts our assumption.
In the second part of the proof, we show that there is just one optimal
strategy with support Y.
Consider the linear program for the computation of optimal strategies for B
=  A+E.  E  being a matrix  of  l's:
maximize I li
i..1
s.L B  5 e.
All optimal bases do contain the set Y. because the support of any optimal
strategy is Y. Thus. if. in an optimal basis, a basic variable is positive.
it remains so in any optimal basis; analogously, if a basic variable is
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assigned the value 0. it remains 0 for all other optimal bases. So the
right-hand-side corresponding to variables in Y is larger than 0. while for
a basic variable not in Y, this is equal to 0. Hencc. pivots to other
optimal bases do not affect the value of any variable. ,
In Laffond et al. (1993) and Fisher and Ryan (1992), the following
proposition may be found.
PROPOSHION 2.9 The number of alternatives in the support of the unique
optimal strategy is odd. a
We next introduce the choice function strat for arbitrary asymmetric
relations.
The choice function strat
Let (GX) e G. We define
strat(GX) := U     supp<2)·
PEO(G)
where 0(G) iS the set of optimal strategies for the G-game.
In Laffond et al. (1993), this choice function was introduced for
tournaments and is called the bipartisan set As proved above. in case of
tournaments the optimal strategy is unique, contrary to the case of
arbitrary asymmetric relations, see chapter 4.
The   choice   set  for the tournament  T2 of table   2.1   is  strat(T2)   =   {a,c,g }.
Note that our example at the beginning of this section shows that the
optimal strategy is not necessarily uniform over its support This
indicates that it is possible to further refine the choice set given by
strat.
We next present a characterization of the choice function strat on T.
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• Balanced dominant weights
A choice function S : «x) + 9(  0  satisfies the balanced dominant
weights  property. if for all G  €  0(X) the following  holds:
S(G)   is   support   of  a  distribution   of  weights  2  2  Q  summing   to   1.  such
that:
(I)   if x e S(G) then I
Ry
y€ S(G).xTyyY€ S(G). YTX
(II)  if x e S(G) then I   Ry > I   Ry·yes(G).yTx y€S(G).iTy
If a choice function S satisfies the balanced dominant weights property.
the coalition S(G) c X is able to reach a satisfactory division of power.
By satisfactory, we mean: it is internally stable, expressed by (D. and it
is externally decisive, expressed by (ID. So. (I) expresses the
balancedness, while (ID stands for the dominance. In chapter 4. we provide
a more extensive discussion and show its connection to the von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets.
There is just one choice function on TOO satisfying this condition:
THEOREM 2.10 (Characterization of strat on T) Lzt S be a choice function on
T(X). Then S = strat iff S satisfies the balanced dominant weights
property.
proof (only if) Take Y = supp(0. where 2 is the unique optimal strategy.
Now. for arbitrary x, we have (RA)x =  I  Ry -  I Ry Because 2 is the
y:yTx y:ITy
optimal strategy and Px , 0 for x € Y, we have (RA)x = 0, which proves the
balancedness (D. Moreover, using a general theorem from game theory and
the fact that the optimal strategy is unique, or using (1.c) of the proof
of theorem 2.8, we know that if x t Y then (BA)x >0, which proves the
dominance (II). (iO Conversely, the balanced dominant weights property
implies (RA) 2 9, hence 2 is the unique optimal strategy. Since S(T) =
supp(0. SCD = strat(T). ,
From the proof of theorem 2.8. we deduce:
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COROLLARY   2.11   For  tournaments  T   on  X,   the   distribution  2  is   unique  and
*equals 2·.
Two characterizing properties for the choice function mc were the SSP and
the monotonicity. These are also satisfied by strat.
PROPOSITION 2.12 (Laffond et at. 1993) The choice function strat on T
satisfies the conditions of SSP and monotonicity. ,
In Laffond et al. (1991), a comparison is made between strat and mc. They
proved:
PROPOSTTION 2.13 For all (TX) € T. we have that strat(TX) 9 mc(TX). For
some (TX). we have: strat(TX) s mc(TX). a
From these two propositions. and the characterization of mc given in
A
theorem 2.4, we deduce that strat does not satisfy the 7 property. We
illustrate this using the following tournament. see figure 2.2.
There we have:
f € strat(T,{ a,f}), f € strat(T,{a,b,f}), f € strat(T,{a,c,f}),
f     €      strat(T,{d,f}),     f     €      strat(T,Id,e,f}).     But     the unique optimal strategy
is 2 = (1/5.1/5.1/5.1/5.1/5.0). as may be verified using theorem 2.10.





In this section, we consider some other independence conditions. We verify
them for a few choice functions. The section is split up in two parts. In
the first part, we consider conditions with respect to variable sets of
issues. In the second part. conditions with respect to variable relations
are introduced.
2.7.1 Variable sets of alternatives
Conditions like SSP. 7 (expansion) and Sen's condition, discussed in
previous sections. nlay be categorized as independence conditions. In this
section we consider three further independence conditions that are stated
in terms of variable sets of alternatives. These arc A-Independence of
irrelevant alternatives, Chernoffs condition and the separability
property.
• A-Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, A-IIA
Before giving the formal definition of the A-IIA condition, let us
illustrate it using the tournament T5 in figure 2.3. This tournament may
originate from the comparison of 6 distinct alternatives. For example,
these alternatives may be dangers that threaten a frigate. such as
torpedoes. airplanes, submarines etc. If two such threats occur at the same
time, we must choose against which of these defensive actions have to be
taken first. All pairwise comparisons Of the threats constitute a
tournamenL It is conceivable that this tournament contains a cycle
aTbTc'Idra, as is the case in our example. Aside from the fact that this
cycle may be caused by the tension and confusion of the risky situation.
there may be structural factors that cause the decisions to   be
intransitive. For example, the number of characteristics by which the
threats can be compared is so large as to necessitate a selection of the
criteria. Since this sampling may depend on the threats that are to be
compared. there is a possibility of circular behavior. (see also Quandt,
1956).
Now. suppose that wc use the choice function cop to determine the most
threatening danger. Since dangers a and b have the highest Copeland score
and alb, against danger a defensive actions have to be taken first
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Suddenly we are confronted with a new threat, call it co. Maybe a new ship
at the horizon. maybe something that already was at the scene but was not
experienced as dangerous. which reveals itself as a potential threat.
Assume that in the pairwisc comparisons with the other alternatives, it
appears to be more dangerous than d.e and f, but less dangerous than a. b
and c. At this stage we may apply our choice function cop to the new
tournament to determine our strategy. According to the A-IIA condition.
a should be chosen.
T            f-         e5
6
/ \a.      d\ /
b  ·c
Figure 2.3
Note that in this case. indeed the alternative a is chosen. But, as we will*
see. in general cop  does not satisfy the A-IIA condition.
Let,   if   x   €    X.   the   set   Xx   be   X\{x}.
A choice function S on T satisfies the A.IIA condition, if for
all (TX) € T and all x e X:
if aTx for all a e  S(TXx). then S(TX) = S(TXx)·
This condition is related to the A-IIA condition for ranking rules,
described in chapter 3, section 3.5.3.
*Unfortunately. neither cop nor cop satisfy this condition. Consider the
following tournamenL
T a x b c d e f g6
a-1 1 1 1 1 0 0
x 0-1 1 1 1 1 1
b O O-1 1 0 1 0
c 0 0 0-0 1 1 1
d 0 0 0 1-0 0 1
c 0 0 1 0 1-0 1
f 1 0 0 0 1 1-0
g 1 0 1 0 0 0 1-
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If   we   consider the tournament   (T63<x). we obtain cop(T6,Xx)   =    {a}.   We   have
aTx. but nevertheless cop(T 0 -  {x}.
The choice function uc also does not satisfy the A-IIA condition: consider
the tournament (T,'Xx)
T7 a b c de f
a-1 1 0 0 1
b O-1 0 0 1
c 0 0-1 1 1
d 1 1 0-1 0
e 1 1 0 0-0
f 0 0 0 1 1-
One may verify   that   uc973<x)   -    {a,c.d}.    If we insert x between    { a.c,d}    and
{b.e.f} we obtain the tournament  T7   and   uc(T7)   -   { a.c.d.x }.
Like the 7 condition. the A-HA condition prescribes how to choose from an
extended set of alternatives. Note that e.g. SSP is different. in that it
prescribes how to choose from a smaller set. In chapter 3 we Will use the
A-IIA condition, actually a weaker form of it, in a characterization for
the choice function cop. We conclude our discussion of A-IIA with its
verifications for a few choice functions:
THEOREM 2.14 The choice functions mc, b and strat, defined on T are A-HA.
proof Wc start with S = mc. Let M = S(T,Xx)· This means that (i) uc(T,M) =
M and (ii) for all y e XxW: y 1 uc(T,Muly}). Because for all m e M: mTK,
it is clear that also x 1 ucg,Mu{x}).
Wc next prove that b is A-IIA. Let a E b(T,Xx), which means that a is top
element of a maximal transitive sub tournament of (T,Xx). In T. this
subtournament remains maximal, or x can be inserted (not at the top),
giving maximality, hence a € b(T).
Conversely, suppose b is top element of a maximal transitive subtournament
of (TX). We have to consider a few cases.
If x is not in this subtournament, this transitive tournament is also
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maximal in (T.Xx) and hence b € b(TX).
Now suppose x is in this transitive subtournament that is maximal with
respect to inclusion. We assert that x cannot be the top element.
Indeed. if we assume that x is the top element of this maximal
subtournament. then all other elements of this subtournament are in X\b(T)
because of transitivity. Hence. if we delete x from this subtournament it
loses its maximality property, because the top clements of maximal
subtournaments in (TNx) are in b(T.Xx).
This means that we can extend this transitive subtournament so that it
becomes maximal with respect to inclusion. Suppose that there is a
transitive extension with an element z at the top. If xTz, then the
original subtournament would not have been maximal: insert z between x and
the rest. Hence zTx. But now too we may deduce that the original transitive
subtournament is not maximal; put z on top Of this subtournament.
Now consider a maximal transitive subtournament containing x, with b as its
top clement. hence b € b(T). We prove that b € b(T.Xx). Suppose we delete x
from this maximal subtournament, keeping the transitivity property. If it
is still maximal in T. we may deduce that b € b(T,Xx). If not. we can
extend it to a maximal transitive subtournament. Is it possible that a part
of the extension is at the top, so that b is not top element anymore?
Suppose so. Let k be the new top element. It is clear that k E b(T,Xx). But
then k could already have been added to the original subtournament. because
kTx. contradicting maximality. Hence b remains the top element. meaning
b € b(T.Xx)
The  case  S = strat is evident  if  we use theorem  2.10.  I
Another condition with respect to a variable domain is the Chernoff
condition, se e.g. Moulin. 1986:
• Chernoffs condition
A  choice  function  S  on  G  satisfies  Citernoff s  condition  if
for all G and all X.Y c U: if {Y QX} then {S(GX) nY; S(Gy)}.
If there is a subset Y such that y is not in the choice set S(G.Y). then
there is no set X that contains Y. such that y € S(G.X) (Nash-IIA). No
matter how favorable the relation on X is to y. Positively stated, we may
describe this condition as follows: if y is chosen from X. it is chosen
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from any subset Y of X containing y. which may be seen as a positively
stated. reversed y condition.
It is very strong as is illustrated by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2.15 (Moulin 1986). No choice function S on T sad€ es
together  Condorcet  consistency  and  Chernoff s  condition.
Proof Take B' = {a.b,c } and T such that its restriction on B' is a cycle
aTbTcTa. (Note that we assume that there are at least three elements.) From
Chernoffs condition, Condorcet consistency and aTb it follows that
S(T.B') n (a.b} 9 S(T,{a.b}) = {a}. Thus b e S(T.B'). Similar arguments
from bTc and cTa show successively that c fE ST,B') and a rf S(T.B'). So,
Sg.B') = 0. which contradicts the assumption of S(T,B') €  2 3\{0 }..
This Chernoff condition emerges in a study of rationalizable choice
functions, see e.g Moulin. 1985. In these studies one has a choice function
that picks some outcomes from every subset of a fixed set A of outcomes.
When is this function derived from one preference relation on A. hence.
when are these choice sets made up of best alternatives within each subset?
It appears that the Chernoff condition is a necessary condition for the
existence of this relation.
The final condition of this subsection is the separability property.
Separable tournaments (Compare Storcken. 1989)
Suppose that (TX) € T. Then the tournament (TB), B C X, is said to
be   separable  from   (TX),   if  for   alix   EX\B:
(T,Bu{x}) = (TB) * (T,{x}) or (T,Bu{x}) =(T,{x}) , (T.B).
This means that the alternatives from B behave like a single alternative.
Suppose that we can separate the set of alternatives X into B and X\B,
such that for each alternative x from X\B the following is true. Either all
alternatives from B are preferred to x, or x is preferred to each
alternative in B. In a manner of speaking, the alternatives of B behave
like a single alternative. Since in this case, each alternative x from X\B
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delivers the same local information to all b € B. the local differences
between b, and bz r B are reduced to their local differences inside B. If
we concentrate on local differences, the following condition may be
significanL
• Separability
A choice function S on T respects separable tournaments, if for atl
sets X CU, all (TX) € T(X) and all tournaments (TA) that are
separable from (TX):
if S(TX) R B*0 then S(TX) AB= S(T,B).
Note that the separability condition has some resemblance with the Chernoff
condition. Compared with the previous proposition. we state:
PROPOSHION 1.16 There is no choice function S on T satisfying Condorcet
transitivity and Condorcet consistency, that respects separable
tournaments.
proof Consider  a  circular   tournament   T,   on   four   alternatives   { a.b.c.d}.   As
one may verify, 9,.{b.c}) is separable from Tt. Because of the
Condorcet consistency. SCrl'{b,c}) = {b}. As proved in theorem 2.1. if S
satisfies the Condorcet transitivity, then tc(T,) 9 Scri). Since tc(Tt) =
{a,b.c.d}. S(T,) = { a.b.c.d}. But then, SCT,) n { b.c} * S(T„{b,c}), which
means that S does not respect separable tournaments. ,
We conclude this subsection with a verification of this condition for a few
choice functions in propositions  2.17  and  2.18.
PROPOSHION 2.17 The choice functions uc, b and mc respect separable
tournaments.
proof Take T E  T(X), such that B C X i s a separable subseL
We start with the choice function uc. Suppose A = uc(T) and B is separable
in T. Assume that AnB *0. We prove that uc(T.B) = AnB. Take b E B\A. Hence
b is covered in X by an alternative a € A. Suppose a € A\B. Then aTd for
alld€Band a covers all clements from B, because B i s separable,
including the clements from AnB. But this gives a contradiction. since
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AnB 9 A. Thus b is covered in X by an element from AnB 9 B. This means that
uc(T,B) 9 AnB. Conversely, since B is separable in T. AnB is uncovered in
B. This may be seen by observing that a e Ar,B is able to reach all
alternatives b€B i n n o more than two steps. using only elements from B:
aTx and xTb. where x e B i s impossible due to the fact that B i s separable.
Suppose A = bm and B is separable in T. Assume that AnB 0 0. Take
b E AnB. This element b is top of a maximal transitive sub tournament L of
T.   Because   B   is   separable,   we   may   write   L   =   L   B   ,   L  (X\B), implying   that
b E bg,B). Now take c € b(T,B). We may extend the maximal transitive sub
tournament L' in (T,B) with c as its top element, to a maximal transitive
sub  tournatnent  in  (T,X), by pasting  L   (X\B)  at the bottom. Hence we obtain
b(T,B) 9 AnB.
We now consider the choice function mc. Let A = mc(T). We prove that AnB =
mc(T.B) if AnB * 0.
We first prove that AnB is a covering set for (T,B). Therefore, we have to
prove that (i) uc(T.Ar,B) = Ar,B and
(ii)  for all b e B\(AnB). b *E uc(T.(AnB)u{b}).
First of all, we show that uc(T,AnB) = AnB. Since mc(T) = A, we know that
tic(T.A) = A. Hence, each alternative from A is able to reach all other
alternatives from A in no more than two steps, only using elements from A.
Now, take an alternative y from ArB. We prove that y is uncovered in
(T.AnB). Suppose that xTy. x.y € AnB. Since x.y €A, y can reach x in two
steps, using an element z from A: yTzTx. But because B is separable and
x.y E B. we have that z € B, meaning that z E AnB. Hence y is uncovered in
(T.AnB). Finally. we have to prove that whenever b € B\A, then
b i u«T,(AnB)u{b}). Because A = mc(T), we know that b d ucg,Au{b}). This
means that starting from b, we cannot reach (in A) all clements from A in
maximal two steps. On the other hand. elements from AnB c B are able to
reach all elements from A in no more than two steps, because uc(T,A) = A.
Hence. because B is separable. elements of A\B can be reached from b in
maximal two steps. But then. since b cannot reach all elements from A in
maximal two steps, b cannot reach all clements of AnB in no more than two
steps. Thus b i uc(T.(AnB) u {b}).
To finish the proof. we next show that AnB is the minimal covering set of
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(T.B).
Consider the set C := A\It u mc(T,B). Because, as is proved above, we have
mc(T,B) c ArB, we know that C c A. We show that C is a covering set of
(TX)• which means that because of the minimality of A, we have that C = A.
But then we obtain mc(T.B) = AnB.
Therefore, we prove:
(i)  uc(TIC) = C
(ii)  for all y €X\C. y i uc(T,Cu{y}).
Since the proof of (i) is easy if we use the facts that CCA, uca.A) = A,
B is separable in (TX) and uc(T.mc(T,B)) = mc(T,B), we only consider (ii).
Let y EX\C. First. assume that y € B\C c B. Since y 1 uc(Tmc(T,B)u{y}),
it is covered in mc(T.B) by an element a € mc(T,B). Because B is separable
in (TX), y is covered by a in (T,Cu{y}).
Finally, assume that y 6 CuB. Because y 41 uc(T.Au{y}), inside the set Au{ y }
it is covered by an element a € A. If a € (A\B)umcg,B), then y is covered
by a in CU{y}. Now. suppose that a € (AnB)\mc(T,B). Since y £ B. we use the
separability of B to deduce that y is covered in (T,C) by any clement from
mc(T,B). This proves (ii) and completes the proof for the choice function
mc. I
PROPOSHION 2.18 Let Y = strat(TX) and 2 be the unique optimal strategy.
Suppose B is separable in (TX). Then, if strat(TX) r, B * 0, we have:
(a)  for al! be B: I Ry = I   Ery€ Y\ B . yTb y€Y\B ,bTy
(b) the unique optimal strategy for (TA) is proportional to £\B,
implying that strat(TB) = strat(T,X) n B.
proof We first prove that (a) and (b) are equivalent. Because B is
separable in (T,X). we may reorder the alternatives of X to VuBuL, such
that V,B and B»L i n the tournament (T,X). If we denote the restriction
of the zero-sum matrix A to the subsets B, V and L respectively with B. V
and L, we obtain
A. ITY : d
where    J (-J) stands    for a block    of     l's (-1's), while .. indicates    that
there are no conditions on the corresponding matrix entries.
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If  2   e    Kn,   then   for   Z   c   X.   we   let  2   Z   be   the   vector   2   with   components
outside Z deleted.
Because 2 is an optimal strategy. RA 2 8
Now. suppose that for all b € B: I   Ry =     I    2· Then we have
y€ Y\ B , y Tb y€Y\B.bTy Y




X           RY   +   ((218)8)b   =y€ Y\ B . yTb y€ Y\ B, bTy
((2 1 B)B)b
Hence  2   B is proportional   to the unique optimal strategy   of  (T.B).
Conversely, suppose that the optimal strategy of (T,B) is proportional
to  2   B.   Take  b  €    B   such   that  4  >  0·   Then   of  course,   we  have   ((12 1 B)B)b  =  0.
But. since 2 is also optimal in (T.X), we also have (RA)b = 0. implying
(a) in case b E YAB. Since B is separable, this holds for all b € B.
Now it is sufficient to prove (a). We first show that strat(T,BnY) = BnY.
We need two results from Laffond et al. (1993) and a composition operation.
We   start  with the composition. Given  is a tournament  (S,Z)  €   T(Z),  n  =   I Z  
and     n     tournaments     (T,Yi)· We denote     by T(S:T, .....T ) the tournament
(S',Z')   obtained   from the composition   of   S   and   T,i   =   l.....n.   The   set   Z'
is the disjoint union  of the  sets  Y.  and  S'  is defined  by:
aS'b  iff       (1)  a  and b belong  to  the  same  Y  and  aT b.  or
(2)  a  belongs  to  Y  and b belongs  to  Y.  i  * j  and  aSb.
The tournaments T are called components and S is called the summary of the
composed tournament.
The two results from Laffond et al. (1993) are
Corollary 2. Let 2 be the unique optimal strategy, with support Y. Then
(T.Y) is the summary of a tournament (Z,V), in which all elements have
equal score. Moreover, for each y EY, 2 equals the proportion of the
component y in (Z,V)
Proposition 2. Let (13) be the summary of a tournament (Z.V) in which all
n elements have equal score. Let d(x) be the order of the component x. Then
stratg,X) = X and the unique optimal strategy is equal to 2. where Ex =
d(x)/n.
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Using corollary 2, we know that since Y = strat(T.X), (T.Y) is the summary
of a tournament (T:Y') in which all alternatives have the same score.
Moreover, for each y € Y. 2  represents the proportion of the component y
in (T:Y').
Because B is separable in 930, all elements of (T'.(BnY)') have the same
score. Hence, (T.BnY) is the summary of a tournament in which all
alternatives do have the same score. From proposition 2. we may deduce that
strat(T,BnY) = BnY, and that the optimal strategy is proportional to
El (Bny).  Let  B'  be the restriction  of  A  to  BnY.
Because    of this proportionality,    we    know    that    (2   BnY)B'    =   Q.    So,    we    deduce
that. since (RA)b = 0 for b 6 BnY,
for all b € BnY: I  Ry
= I RY,y€ Y\B.yTb y€ Y\ B . bTy
which implies (a), because B is separable. ,
2.7.2 Variable relations
In this subsection, we consider two independence properties that are
stated in terms of variable relations. Both conditions are used in chapter
4.
• Global monotonicity
A choice function S on «X) is globally monotone, if for all
asyntmetric relation (GX) e «X) and all x,y € X.
if x €  S(GX), y e  S(GX), while (x,y) e  G,
then S(G,X) =  S(G' X), where  G'  =  [G\{(y.x)}1  u  {(x,Y)}.
Suppose that the choice function S on 0(X) is globally monotone. Let
(GX) € 000. Then, adjusting preferences in the 'right direction',
inspired by the ranking S(G.X) 1 X\S(G/0, does not change the choice set
If. for example x € S(G,X). y e S(G.X) and yGx. then the choice set docs
not change if we reverse the relation between x and y to xG'y.
The distinction to the monotonicity property used in the characterization
of the choice function mc, is the following. In the formulation of the
global monotonicity, we not only state a condition for x, but also for all
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members of the choice set. Moreover, y has to be an clement of XV(G.X).
It is a strong condition. The choice functions uc. b and cop do not fulfil
this condition. We show this for uc and b.
Let  T,  be the following tournament  on  X = {a.b,c,d,e}.
b i ./.Td
...ls.»
As onc may verify. the alternative c is covered by d. Moreover, uc(Ts, =
b(T8) = {a,b.c,d}. Now. let T'8 = 1.8 1(e.a}) u {(a.e)}. Then a covers b in
T'8' hence uc(T8) * uc(T'8). The same holds for the choice function b. For
these choice functions we have: what is good for a member of a coalition,
in   our case alternative   a    in   the   coalition    {a.b,c.d}.    is not necessarily
profitable for the total coalition. In our case, it is not good for b.
PROPOSrriON 2.19 The choice functions tc, mc and strat on T, are globally
monotone.
proof We only consider the case S = mc. The other two cases are easy. Take
T € TOO and let A = mc(T). Assume that x € A. y G X\A and yTx. Lzt T' =
[1\{(y,x)}] u {(x.y)}. We prove that mc(T') = A.
It is clear that uc(T'.A) = A, since (T',A) = (T,A). Moreover,
y 1 uc(T,Auty 1), because A = mc(T). Again, it is clear that
y 01 ucg'.Auly}). Thus A is a covering set of T'. We prove that it is the
minimal covering set.
Because A = mc(T) is a covering set for T', we have:
mc(T') 9 mcm.                           (I)




Because the differences between T and T' are outside mc(T), we have that
mc(T'mc(T)) = mc(T.nic(T)). (Ha)
Moreover, again using SSP. we obtain
mc(Trmc(T)] = mc(T). (IIb)
So, mc(T) = mc(T'). ,
• Tail stability
The last condition of this section is the tail stability. To explain it, we
consider the ranking S(G,X) » X\5(G,X) of an asymmetric relation (G,X). If
we change comparisons between alternatives not in S(G/0, the tail
stability of S means that there is no need to adjust the choice set;
nothing will change. So, the choice set is stable with respect to changes
in the tail of the ranking mentioned above.
We   also may explain it using the relation matrix (see chapter   1) in figure





lil  1.1  i.  ll'li
Figure 2.4 Changes in the shaded area do not have any impact on the choice
set S(G.X). S being tail stable.
We finally present the formal definition:
A choice function S on «X) is tail stable, if for all asymmetric
relations  (GX)  and (G' X)  on X.
e. 0 0  [*2 - CX - SCG.'0,1  . G. 0 [*, 0 (X. SCG.'012} t'-
S(GX) =  S(G' X).
We have the following proposition. The proof is easy and is left to the
reader.
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PROPOSinON 2.20 The choice functions tc, mc and strat are tail stable. i
Note that the choice functions b and uc do not satisfy the condition of
tail stability. To illustrate this. let T, be equal to:
b»«d
...J.»
Then   u«T,)   =   b(T,)   =   { a.b,c }.   If we reverse the comparison between   e   and   d
to   dT;a. we obtain   uc(TJ)   =   b(TJ)   =    { a.b,c,d }.
We conclude this section with a connection between some conditions stated
in terms of a variable relation. and SSP. a condition stated in terms of a
variable set of issues.
PROPOSITION 2.21 Let a choice function S on G be globally monotone. tail
stable and concatenation consistent. Then S satisfies SSP.
proof Suppose that S(G,B') C B c B: We have to prove that S(G,B) =
S(G.B'). Because S is globally monotone and iS tail stable. we may change
the relation (G.B') to (G'.B') such that (G',B') = (G,B) » (G,B'\B), while
S(G'.B') = S(G,B'). Since S is concatenation consistent, we obtain S(G'.B')
= S(G.B). I
As a corollary, we present
COROLLARY 2.22 (Characterization of mc) The choice function mc is the
smallest choice function satisfying (simultaneously) global
monotonicity, tail stability. concatenation consistency, neutrality.A
monotonicity and 1 .
Proof Use proposition 2.21 and theorem 2.4. I
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2.8 SET THEORETICAL COMPARISON, TABLE OF PROPERTIES
In this final section. we consider set-theoretical comparisons between
various choice functions and give a table of properties.
Set-theoretical comparisons of the various sets S(T) may be found in for
example Banks (1985), Banks ct al. (1991), Dutta (1988), Laffond et al.
(1992). Moulin (1986) and Schwartz (1990). We present the following table
from Laffond et al. (1992).
*
IC    Uc tCouC uc   cop sl b b mc teq
tC
UC               C
tcouc      C   C
*
UC =C=
cop 9 9 0  0
s l g i c 0 0
b C99 n00
*
b QCC 9 0 0  C
mc C99 =00 n •
teq ==C C00 9  9
strat ==C 900 . /9
Explanation: (i) S 9 S' iff for all T € T(X): S(T) 9 S'(T).
(ii)        S n S' iff not S 9 S' and not S' 9 S. and for all
T € T(X): Sm n S'(T) 4 0.
(iii) S 0 S' iff Sm n S'(D = 0 for some T.
(iv) S   •   S'   iff the relation between   S   and   S'   is   yet
unknown.
Table 2.2 From Laffond ct al. (1992).
Of course. using this table. we may construct new choice functions. For
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example, since for all tournaments T. baD n mc(T) is nonempty. we may
define Sh.wxCD = bm n mcm. This choice set combines the attractive
features of both elements from b(T) and mc(T).
To give an interesting relation between sl(T) and uc(T), we mention the
following theorem.
THEOREM 2.23 (Banks et al. 1991). Suppose (T.X) € T(X). Let (C.X) be the
cover relation. If (LX) is a nearest adjoining ordering of (TX).
then C c L. i
Now it is easy to prove that sl(T,10 9 uc(TA for all (T.X) € T.
We conclude this chapter with a table of properties.
A-IIA :epa,able    /3.dlil.   tail :table SSP    y
UC                O                 .                 O                 0                     0          I
b   .0 0 0 0
mc              • • • •                     I          o
strat                                                                                        o
o: not satisfied
.: satisfied
Table 2.3 Table of properties.
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CHAPTER 3
RANKING AND RATING TOURNAMENTS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Given       is       a       finite       set       U       = {u l '*..,uk} of alternatives.     In     this
chapter. wc consider the ranking  of a finite collection  X  = {xl '....xn  9 Uof distinct alternatives, by way of pairwise comparison. We assume that the
alternatives are value-distinguishable, so that in each comparison of two
distinct alternatives. a strict preference for one of them is revealed. In
this chapter we concentrate on rules that rank tournaments arising from the
direct confrontation between various alternatives or players, for example
players in a chess tournament. Most conditions and assumptions in this
chapter, are significant in this context.
If a tournament is free of cycles. a natural ranking does exist: there is a
best alternative, a second best etc. In the nontransitive case, there are
more possibilities than just one, due to the existence of cycles. All rules
that will be introduced and discussed deal with these cycles differently.
Ranking rules
A ranking rule f on T(X) is a mapping f : T(X) 4 W(X). A ranking rule f On
T i s a family of ranking rules. one for each 0#X C U.
3.2 ELEMENTARY CONDITIONS
Throughout this chapter, we assume that the ranking rules satisfy some
elementary conditions.
Wc start with the commutation with concatenation. Later on. we will
introduce two other commutation properties for ranking rules, commutation
with respect to permutations and conversion. These three properties were
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introduced in Delver. Monsuur. Storcken (1991).
• Commutation with concatenation
A ranking rule f on T commutes with concatenation if for all Y and Z
such that Y r, Z=0, for all (T,Y) € 1(Y) and ati (TZ) € 1(Z):
jI(T,y) ,(TZ)] = f(T.Y) . furl).
This condition assures that the preferences yTz € YE, contained in
the concatenation (T,Y) » (T,Z) are preserved. Furthermore, the preference
of jI(T,Y) , (T.Z)] in Y (or Z) only depends on (T,Y) (or (T,Z)). Since
(T,Y) * (T,Z) implies that (T.Y) and (T,Z) may be ranked independently.
this is a reasonable condition. Compare this with the concatenation
consistency for choice function, introduced in chapter 2.
Note that since every tournament (T,X) may uniquely be written as (T,X) =
(T.Xl) * ··· * (T.Xn)' where the sets Xi· i = 1.....n. are the irreducible
parts of (T.X), we have AT,X) = AT,Xt) ' ··· " ·RT.Xn) whenever f
commutes with concatenation.
• Commutation with permutation
Let a be a permutation of X. For all relations R on X, aR is a relation on
X defined by: (a(x).a(y)) € aR iff (x.y) € R.
A ranking rule fonT  commutes with permutations if for ati XQU and
for all permutations c of X and all tournaments T e T(X)
f(dr) = afa).
We impose this condition upon f to exclude the possibility that f makes a
distinction between different ways of naming the alternatives. Now. let
T € T(X) and suppose that two alternatives a and b play the same role in T.
which means that there is a permutation a such that aT = T and a(a) = b. In
proposition 3.1 we prove that for any ranking rule f commuting with
permutation. the two alternatives are indifferent: a=b: AT). To give an
example. suppose T' is a simple 3-cycle on X = {a,b,c}. So we have T' =
{(a.b),(b,c).(c,a) }.     If    «a)     =     b.     a(b)     =    c     and     «c)     =    a     then     CT'     =
{(b,c),(c,a),(a,b)} = T: Hence, using proposition 3.1, we sec that
a 9, b: fT'). Since in this example all alternatives play the same role,
any f that commutes with permutation maps T' onto a single indifference
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class.
PROPOSTTION 3.1 Let a. b € X. If a ranking rule f on T commutes with
permutations. and alternative a plays the role of alternative b in
TE T(X), then azb: f(TX).
proof Lct T e T(X) and a.b € X. Take a such that cT = T and a(a) = b.
Suppose that (a,b) € .RT). Then (c(a),0(b)) € cll[T) = f[aT) = AT). In
general    (4(a).d(b))    €    «RT)    =  AD.    Because   a   is a bijection   and    j X I     is
finite, there is a k such that ak(b) = a. So we have the chain (a.b).
(a(a),a(b)). ...., (2(a).a) G AT), in which a,(a) =  -1(b). The
transitivity of fo gives: (b,a) € fD. Similarly (b,a) € AT) gives
(a,b) € fI).sothat a = b : AT). .
From proposition 3.1, we deduce that if f commutcs with permutations.
ATOO) is not a subset of L(X). Since commuting with permutations is very
natural. this explains why we have to accept that, in general, AT,X) is a
weak order.
Note that for all ranking rules f : T(30 -4 w(X), some loss of information
must be accepted. in the sense that a given image does not always determine
a unique original: in general, there are more tournaments that weak orders;
f is not injective.
3-3 INDUCED RANKING RULES
In this section, we introduce the class of ranking rules that are induced
by a choice function. Moreover, we present a characterization for this
class.
Given a choice function S on 0, we may define the induced ranking rule fs
on o:
Let S be a choice function defined on G. Then the induced ranking rule fs
on G is defined as follows. For all (GX) € 0,
if X\S(GX) = 0 then  fS(Gx) = S(GX), else
f G,x) = SCGX) , fS(G,X\S(GX)).
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Not every ranking rule is induced by a choice function. An example is
provided by the rule that orders the alternatives to their Copeland score
(f   to be discussed in section 3.5). To prove this, suppose f = fsOut OUtwhere  S  is a choice function. Consider  the  tournament  TI.
T
d-       c\»./.''-L             -b
Since f (T,) = {a.b} * {c.d}. S('rt) consists of the two alternativesOut
{a. b} with score equal to 2. Now, if S(T„{c,d}) = {c}, then S(T„{c,d}) 4
{c.d} = fou:(Ti)|{c.d}. meaning that f/w is not induced by S. If
S(T„{c,dl) = {c,d}, then {c,d}\5(Ti,{c,d}) = 0, so we must havefourgl'{c.d})   = S(Ti'{c,d}), which  is  not  the case, since  f    (T .{c d})   =out 1 -
{C}.
We give a characterization of ranking rules that are induced by a choice
function. For that purpose, we need the notion of a right-interval. Suppose
W = Xl * X2 '  - * Xn is a weak order. We may define a right-interval of W
as the interval  Y  = Xi  u  ...  u Xn'  i  E {l .....n}.
If a ranking rule f is induced by a choice function S. it satisfies the
following independence condition.
• Right-interval consistent
A ranking rule f on G is right-interval consistent, if for all
relations (GX) € 0(X) and all right-intervals Y of f(GX). we have:
hGX)\Y = hGY).
This means that the ranking of the alternatives in the tail of the ranking
produced by f, is independent of the presence of alternatives in the top of
the ranking.
Conversely, it completely characterizes those ranking rules:
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THEOREM 3.2 A ranking rule f on G is induced by a choice function. ijf f is
right-interval consistent. In that case f = fs· where S = Best(f).
proof (only if) This is evident from the definition of the S-induced
ranking rule. (if) Let G € 0(X). Define S = Best(t): S(G.X) = Best(RG.X)).
Now,  let AG)  =  Xl   *  ·'-   *  Xn  and  Y  =  X\Xl.  Then AG)  =  S(G)  » AG) j Y.  But.
because   AG) I Y    =   AG,Y),    this    is    equal    to   AG)    =    S(G)     *   AG,Y)    =
S(G) i jiG.X\S(G)). ,
We refer to sections 3.6, 3.7 and chapter 4. section 4.5.2 for more results
concerning induced ranking rules.
3.4 THE TRANSITIVE CLOSURE
We introduce the ranking nde f which assigns to a tournament irstrans'
transitive closure. We present two characterizations.
Let (TX) be a tournament with irreducible parts 9391)' ···' (T,Xn)' such
that (T.X) = (T.191) i ··· 1 (T.Xn 
We define fyans('r.X) := Xl * X., I ... » Xn. It is called the transinve*
dosure of (T.X),see Roubens and Vincke (1985). Also sce chapter 1.
A serious drawback of the ranking rule 4rans is the fact that it produceslarge indifference classes. This may be seen by taking a linear order and
reversely connecting top and bottom clement. To f then, all elementstrans
become indifferent. To give yet another example. consider the tournament T
of table 3.1, section 3.5.1. There we have the cycle aTb, bTc. cTd. dTe.
eTf, frg, gTh and hTL Thus f (T)    =    {a.b,c.d,e.f,g.h}.    From    thesetrans
examples, it is clear that the ranking rule f has li tri etransdiscriminating power and will often have to be refined.
On the other hand, it may be seen as one of the most natural ranking
methods. because it is the only one that satisfies the conditions mentioned
in theorem 3.3. In preparation of this theorem. we introduce:
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• Free of upsets
A ranking nde f is free of upsetS if
for ati X, for ati tournaments (TX) and all x.y € X:
if iry then xky: f(TX).
This condition may also be formulated as (T.X) 9 jZT.X)  for all (T.X) €  T.
THEOREM 33 (Characterization of frans   Let f be a ranking nde on T.
Then f =ftrans iff
f commutes with concatenation and is free of upsets.
proof (only if) Evident. (if) Let T be an irreducible tournament on X.
Since f commutes with concatenation, it is sufficient to prove that jur) =
X. Now. because T is irreducible, there exists an Hamilton path
xl,X2,-•xn'xl in T. Because f is free of upsets, it follows that
xl  EX22...2xnkxl  :·RT). Hence m=X.I
Compare this theorem with theorem 2.1 of chapter 2.
If we do not consider the ranking produced by f as a serious candidatetrans
for the final ranking of the alternatives from X. we have to accept the
phenomenon of upsets. We have to allow that there are alternatives a and b
such that aTb, but nevertheless b*a: fD. This means that there will be
friction between direct comparisons at the tournament level and final
rankings, which in fact may be seen as a balancing of information from the
tournament. especially a balancing of pairwise comparisons along cycles.
Sumrnarizing. wc have to allow that two levels of analysis. the local and
the global view. may give rise to different conclusions.
Of course, this balancing of binary comparisons has to be reasonable. To
exclude arbitrariness. we look at desirable properties and
characterizations of ranking rules.
But first, we give another characterization of f , which was presentedtrans
in Delver. Monsuur and Storcken (1991). There the notion of independence of
interval changes was introduced:
• Independence of interval changes
Suppose we have a ranking of the alternatives in a tournament (T.X):
.RT.X) = Xl ' X2 » ·-· » Xi * ··· 1' X. p -. 1 Xn. We may define anJ
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interval as the union of successive indifference classes. In the example we
choose the interval Y = X. u ... u X.. Next. (T.Y) is modified to (T'.Y).1                       JRelations between alternatives outside Y remain as they were, also the
connection between Y and the remaining alternatives is kept the same. Thus
we obtain a new tournament (T'.X). A ranking rule f is said to be
independent of interval changes if the changes of ranking are limited to Y.
and occur according to .RT'.Y). More precise, f is independent of interval
changes if we obtain AT'30 = Xl * - * Xi-1 » AT'.Y) » Xj+1 * ·· * Xn
As may be easily verified. f is independent of interval changes.' trans
To be more precise, let Y C X. (T,X) € TOO and (T'.Y) € T(Y). Then
Sub((T.X).(T',Y)) := 1 (x.y) E XxX : (x.y) c YxY n T' or
(x,y)  1   YXY  and  (x,y)  €  T}  €   T(X).
A ranking rule h on T is said to be independent of interval changes. if for
all XCU and all (TX) f T(X), all intervals Yof h(TX) and all
(T,Y)    €  T(Y):  1«Sub<(TX),(T,Y)))  =  Sub< 1«TX),h(T,Y)).
Note that this condition implies the right-interval consistency of section
3.3.
THEOREM  3.4  (Characterization  of f )   Let   h   be   a   ranking   rule   on   T.trans
Then h = ftr(Ins' if and only if
h is independknt of interval changes and
h commides with concatenation.
proof l'he "only if' part being straightforward, we only prove the "if'
part Suppose that h satisfies these two conditions. Let T E TOO and let
Xl , X2 '·· ' Xn = h(T). By the commutation with the concatenation we know
that (T,X ) is in,educible. hence has a cycle containing all its
alternatives. It is sufficient to prove that there is no cycle involving
several indif classes of h(T). Suppose a€ Xl'b€Xj,j>1 and
bTa. We deduce a contradiction and are done. Let (Li.Xl) € L(Xl) be such
that   a   is    its top element   Take    (L23<a)    E     L(Xa)    C   =   L(X-{a})   )    such   that   bis its top element Note that b is the top element of
Sub(Sub((T,X).(L„Xl)),(I,2.Xa)).                               (1)
X1 is an interval of h(T,X). Hence, by the independence of interval changes
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it follows  that ,
h(Sub((T,X),(Li.Xl)))= Sub(h(T,X),h(L,.Xl)) =
{a} , (L,391-{a}) * X2 *·· ' Xn
SO X  is an interval of h(Sub(T,X),(Lt)fl))· Using the independence of
interval changes. we obtain
h(Sub(Sub((T.X),(L,.Xt)),(I.2' Ca))  =
Sub(Sub(h(T.X).h(Ll' 1))·h(I,2' a)) = {a} * {bl » (I,2398-{b}).   (2)
From (1) and (2) it follows that h docs not commute with the concatenation.
l'his contradicts our assumptions. I
It is easy to verify that the conditions of theorem 3.4 are independent
3.5 COPELAND SCORES
In this section, we discuss the Copeland scoring rules. In the first
subsection. we introduce them and show how to compute the rankings. In
section 3.5.2. we characterize the ranking rule f Section      3.53       is04devoted to a particular independence condition, which will be used in
section     33.4.     Rankings     and      choice      sets     that      only      depend     on     the      score
vector,    are    characterized    in    section    33.4.    In    the    same    section,    we    present
characterizations of the Copeland choice function and a related one. In
section  3.53,  we  discuss   some  results   that   may  be  found   in  the   literature.
3.5.1 The Copeland scoring rules
The Copeland-score rule: f
Out
The rule f is defined as follows: Let T 6 T(X). ThenOut
(1)  X , Y : fout(T) **  sx(T) > sym and
(2)  x=y: fown **  sx(T) = sym.
The algorithm f is very popular. It is easy to compute and easy toOut
explain. It is suited for all kinds of outcome tournaments, like tennis and
football tournaments. Since f only uses the scores of the alternatives.Out
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which is equal to the number of defeated opponents. it stimulates the
fighting spirit
The ranking rule induced by the Copeland choice set: f
copLet cop(T) be the Copeland choice set. which consists of alternatives
that have the largest outscore or Copeland-score. If these champions
withdraw from the tournament. for example because they are promoted to a
higher division in the football league. the ranking produced by fout may
not bc satisfactory for some of the players that stay behind. It is
possible that one of the new first ranked players is different from the
original first runner up. see for example Tl. In that tournament the
alternatives c and d become winners, after removal of the alternatives a
and b. This means that
f    (TX) 1 [x\cop(T)]   0  f     (T.XVop(T.X)) in general.   I.e    fOut Out is notOut
induced by cop.
To by-pass this problem. we consider the rule f . induced by cop:
cop'This ranking rule determines the champions cop(T.X), and then only uses the
information contained in (T,X\cop(T.X)) to further rank the remaining
alternatives.  Now  we  have: f     (T,X) I [X\COP(T,X)]  = f     (T X2Op(T.X)).
cop COP  '
Recursive application
For each ranking rule f on T, we. may introduce a sequence of maps .f'. . ,
...... on T as follows:
2  3 f  wd
/  for all k 2 2 i s defined as follows:
if ft-l(T,X)  =  Xl  I  X2  N  ···  *  Xt  then
/(TX) := Kr,Xt) , A'r.]92) , ·· , fr,Xt).
Hence. in a manner of speaking, for all k f  N: /  = /4kl.
Since we assume that U = {ul '...,un}   is  finite. the number of tournaments
on X is finite. Hence there exists a number k* such that /  = /  for all*   6*k 2 k*. We define f=f.
The rule f is called the recursive application of f Note that in further
71
refining an indifference class I produced by f. it only uses the
inforrnation contained in the tournament (T,I).
*f
Out
In order to obtain a further ranking of the indifference classes of an
image produced by f it may recursively be applied to its ownour
indifference classes. For example, if more than one player has the highest
stort, i oux sometimes produces a unique winner.
To   give   an   example,   we   look   at   T, .
There we have s = c =2 and s=s=1.a   -0          c    d
Since fout(Ti.{a.b}) = {a}  *{b} and fourgi.Ic.d}) = {c}  »{d}. we obtain
*
f oukfri) = {a} I {b} » {c} I {d}.
The following table contains rankings  of T. produced   by the various
*    2.ranking rules introduced so far, where f is the recursive applicationcop
Of f
cop
T2a bcde f gha-1111100 f  f  / f  /trans Out out    - cop copb O-1 1 1 1 0 1
c 0 0-1 1 1 1 1  { a.b.c. {a.b,c}         {a}            {a,b.c}            {a}
d 0 0 0-1 0 1 1 d.e.f, {d,c,g} {b} {d.e}      {b}
e 0 0 0 0-1 1 1 g,h} {f.h}    {c}    {f.g,h}    {cl
f 0 0 0 1 0-1 0            {d}       {d}
g  110000-1                      {e}              {c
h 1 0 0 0 0 1 0-            {g}       {f,g,h}
{h}
{f}
Table 3.1. Various rankings of T20
3.5.2 A characterizations for f
Out
This section is based on Delver. Monsuur. Storcken (1991).
In preparation of a characterization of f . we need a few moreOut.
properties:
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• Commutation with conversion
If (T.X) E TOO, we let v(T,X) be its converse. defined by
v(TX) = {(a.b) € XxX : (b.a) € (T.X)}.
A ranking rule f commutes with conversion if
for all tournaments (TX) e T(X): If(v(TX))  = vj(TX)1.
If f satisfies this condition, application of f to the reversed tournament.
reverses the original ranking. For example, ftrans and fout commute with
conversion. As may be verified, using the results from table 3.1. f does
copnot satisfy this condition.
It is easy to verify that f commutes with permutations, conversionOut
and concatenation. These three conditions together with an independence
condition which we will introduce hereafter, are necessary and sufficient
in order that a map f. which assigns a weak ordering on X to a tournament
on X. satisfies f=fOuf
• Partial independence
Suppose we take two elements a and c. and change relations between
alternatives. not involving a or c. Only change. for example, relations
inside a set B. to which a and c do not belong. Then f is said to be
padal independent. if the relative ranking of a and c is not disturbed by
of changes in B.
It    be easily verified that the ranking rule f is partialmay Out
independent. Indeed. the number of comparisons in which alternative a
prevailed, is the same as before. This also is true for alternative c.
Remarkably enough. partial independence, together with the three elementary
commuting properties, fully characterize f  - sce theorem 3.5. In order toour
present this theorem, we more precisely introduce the partial independence
condition. as was done in Dclver. Monsuur and Storcken (1991):
A ranking rule honris partial independent, if and only if for all XCU
and  all  tournaments  (TX)  and  (TX)  in  T(X)  and  all  B  c X:
if T n ((XxX)-(BxB)) = T  n ((XxX)-(BxB)). then
h(T,X)\(X-B) =  h('r X)\(X-B).
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To explain this condition, let (T,X), (T'.X) € T(X) only differ on
B c X. So T n ((XxX)-(BxB)) = T' n ((X><X)-(BxB)). Then partial independence
means, that the order of the clements in X-B by h(T.X) and h(T'X) are the
same. So in that case the order of the elements in X-B only depends on the
ordcr of the elements in T n ((X>(X)-(BxB)).
Note that f is partial independent. since if T n ((X><X)-(BxB)) =Out
T' n (0000-(BxB)) then s (T.X) = s (T'.X) for all y € X-B. So partial
independence as well as commutation with permutations. conversion and
concatenation are necessary conditions if h=f.Ouf
THEOREM 3.5 (Characterization of fou ) Suppose h is a ranking rule on T.
Then h=f
J Out
if and only if h is panial independent and
h commutes with permutations. conversion and concatenation.
proof First of all. we will prove that if h satisfies these three
conditions, then for a special type of tournament (T,X), we have that
h(TX)  = fout(.Tx).
LEMMA Let h satisfy the conditions of the theorem.
Let X = {al,a2,..• anic}. s € {l '...,n-1} and (TX) € T(X) be such
that
airaj      5  i   <  j,
airx   ijr i > s. and
xTa. ijfiss.
,
Then h(TX) = f  ulfrx).
proof Let h and (T.X) be as above. By induction on n 2 2 w e prove that
hur,0 = fou,crxl
Basis. If n -2, then (T.X) is a simple 3-circuit, hence h(TX) = X. Of
course f    (T.X) = X. which establishes the equality.Out
Induction step. Suppose n > 2. Let B = {x,al L
Note  that  (T,X) n (00(10-(BxB))  =  ({al }   *  (T,X-{al }))  n  ((X>(X)-(BxB)).
Hence by the partial independency of h, we have:
h(T.X)  X-B - ( al  * h(T.X-{al}))1(X-B)
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= ( al) * fout(T.X-{al}))1(X-B)
= (32  " -  p {as.1  ' {as'as+1j » {as+2} » '- * {an .   (1)
Similarly it follows that
h(T,X) X-{x.an   -  {al}  »  ···  »  {as·as+1 } » . . . » Can.1}·                    (2)
Since h(T.X) e WOO and n > 2. it follows from (1) and (2) that
h(T,X) X-{x}  = Ial} , {al} * ··· » {as·as+13 » - » {an 
= 4u,(T.X) 1(X-{x}).
Take  G   = { as'as+1 '...,an} and D = {al '...,as+1}·
(T.X) n (X-G)2 = ((T,X-las}) *las}) n (X-G)2. Hence by the partial
independency of h it follows that
h(TX) (X-G)     =  h((TX-{as}) » {as})1(X-G)
= (h(T,X-{as}) » {as})1(X-G) (concatenation)
=   h(T,X-{as}) 1(X-G)
= four(T.X-{as ) 1 (X-G) (induction)
- fow(T.X) 1 (x-G) (concatenation and
partial independence)  (3)
Similarly it
follows that h(TX)   (X-D)  = f/ur(T.X) 1 (X-D).                                    (4)
So it is sufficient to prove that:
(x.as) € h(T,X) iff (x.a ) €f  (T,X) and                                (5)S         Out
(x.as+1)  6  h(RX)  iff (x.as+1)  E  fout(T,X)·                                                     (6)
Note that h(T.X) e WOO. Hence this holds if there is an ai E lal '...'as-1}
such    that    (x.a )    €     h(T.X)    or    there    is    an    a     €     {as·1.2
.....
an }      such     that
(aj,x) € h(T,X).
Suppose     (ai.x)    €     ah(T,X)     for    all    ai    E {al .....as 1 }    and   (x.a )   €    ah(T,X)
for     all     aj     €      { as+2 ,...'an  .     It     is    sufficient    to    prove    (5)    and     (6)     for    this
case. Now by (3) and (4) it follows that for the Copeland scores we have
sx(T) = sa (T) = s-   (T) = s and 25 = n. Take a permutation a. such that
S       as+1
a(ai) = a for  all  i  € (1 '...,n}. Note that c(T.X) = v(T.10.n-i+1
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Hence (x.as)  E  h(T,X)  iff (as'x) f h(v(T,X))
iff (as.x) e h(aCT,X))
iff (as'x) € ah(T.X)
iff (as+l,x) € h(T,X).
Hence Ix.as,as+1 }2  9  h(TX)  and h satisfies  (5)  and  (6).  ,
By virtue of this lemma we can prove the theorem:
The "only if' part is obvious. We prove the "if' part Suppose h satisfies
those three conditions. Let (T.X) € TOO. Take (x.y) € XxX. It is
sufficient to prove  that  h(T.X) I { x.y }  = fout(T.x) 1 i x,Y )
Let better(a.T) := {b€X: (b.a) € (T.X)},
worse(a.T)  := {b €X: (a.b) € (T.X)}. for a€X.
Take X1 = better(x,T) n better(y,T),
X2 = better(x,T) n worse(y.T),
X3 = worse(x,T) n better(y.T) and





Take 023<2) € L(X2) and (T,X3) e L(X3) arbitrarily.
Let Y = X  U X  U {X.Y}.
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Define (T'.Y) =
1 (a.b)   E    YxY   : (a.b)   f    (1'2'X2)   *   (T3'X))·
(a,b)   6    X2   x   (x}   u   {y}   x   X2   or
(a,b)   €    XJ   x    {y}    u    {x}    x   X3}.
By the lemma we have f   (T:Y) = h(T'.Y). Note that (T,X) n (X-(X-{x,y}))2Out
= ((T.Xt) , (T'.Y) * (T.X4)) n (x-(x-{x.yl))2.
So by the partial independency we have:
h(TX)  {x.y} = h(T.Xl) ' (T'.Y) 1 (T.194))1{x,y}.
Using the commutation with concatenation, we have:
h(T,X)  { x,y } (h(T,Xl) » h(T'.Y) » h(T,X4))1{x,y}. Hence
h(TX) I tx.y} ha:Y)l{x,y} =f (T',Y)l{x,y}. IOut
Note that f docs not verify the partial independence condition: take acop
cyclic tournament on four alternatives and reverse the preference between
the two alternatives having the highest score.
3.5.3 A-Independence of irrelevant alternatives (A-IIA)
One may wonder why we do not require the commutation with restriction:
fr,Y)   =  Ar.X)   Y,   for   all   Y   c   X.
This condition means that the image of (T,X) in Y. only depends on (T,Y).
So it guarantees a kind of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. See
Arrow (1978) and (1948). That this is a strong condition, is illustrated by
the fact that when in addition f commutes with concatenation. then f would
map every strict preference   onto   the same strict preference:  AT.X)   {a,b}   =
AT,{a.b}) = {a} * {b} if aTb : (T.X), hence AT.X) = (T.X). Since a
tournament is not in general a weak order, commuting with restriction and
concatenation  simultaneously.  lead to nonexistence of f
We therefore will consider weaker forms of commutation with restriction,
so-called independence conditions concerning variable domains. An example
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is the right-interval consistency. Another example is provided by the
following condition.
• A-IIA
In Delver, Monsuur and Storcken (1991) a weaker form of commutation
with restriction condition was introduced: the A-Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives condition (A-IIA). Before giving its formal definition. let us
illustrate it using the tournament in figure 3.2. Let a ranking rule f be
A-IIA, and assume that with x deleted from the tournament. it would produce
the ranking {a} followed by {b,c,d}. In direct comparisons a dominates x.
which in turn dominates b.c and d. According to the 8-IIA condition. f
applied to the full tournament would then also place x between a and the








In this small tournament frrans,  fout  and f out  all  satisfy  the  A-IIA
condition. The frans algorithm does so in general, but this is not the
case for f and all its refinements.' out
We now formally introduce the A-IIA condition. Let a(R.X) be the asymmetric
part  of a relation  (R.X). We define upp(x.T)  =  {y  €  X:  yTK}  and  low(x,T)  =
{y€     X:   xTy } .    Finally,   Xx   =   X\{ x} .
A  ranking  rule f on T  is  called  &-IIA  iff for all  (TX) €  T  and x E  X:
Yu e upp(xT) Vw e loMx.T)[(u,w) f qf(TXx)1 4
f(TX) = f(TXx)\Upp(x,T) * {x} , frrxx)\'ow(x,T).
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*
Unfortunately, fout and f both violate the A-IIA condition. Considerout
the following example.
T3a xbcde f g
a-1 1 1 1 1 0 0
x 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
b 0 0-1 1 0 1 0
c 0 0 0-0 1 1 1
d 0 0 0 1-0 0 1
e 0 0 1 0 1-0 1
f 1 0 0 0 1 1-0
g 1 0 1 0 0 0 1-
Then f (1.3-10 = {x} » laI * {b,c,e,f,g} » {d}. If we consider theOut
tournament 03'Xx), we obtain fow(T3.Xx) = {al » (b,c,e,f,g} » {d}. Now,
upp(x,T )   =   {a}.   low(x.T3)   =   1 b.c,d.e.f.g }.   and
VU € Upp(X.T3) Vw € low(x,T,) [(u.w) € Vow(T3'Xx)]
So. in (T ' x)' we inserted x between the alternative a and the rest
resulting in the tournament (T ' 0. According to the A-IIA condition. we
have to obtain the ranking
{a} * {x} » {b.c,e.f,g} » {d}
which is not the case.
Note that this example also shows that every refinement of f including*                                                              out.
f our violates the A-IIA condition.
Compare this condition with the corresponding A-IIA condition for choice
functions, introduced in chapter 2, section 2.7.1. If S is &-IIA. then fs
is A-IIA. It is not clear yet. whether or not the converse assertion is
true.
The following two theorems may be found in Delver et al. (1991).
THEOREM 3.6 The ranking rule f is A-IIA.trans
Proof Let T€ TOO. Suppose that u»w  f    (T,X%). This is equivalent' trans
to u(ar(T.Xx))w. Inserting x between the indifference classes of u and w in
the ranking fransCr.Xx)· we obtain u(afr)w. I
79
As one can see in the example above. f satisfies a weaker A-IIAOut
condition.
A ranking nde f on T is called weakly-&-IIA i5 for all (TX) e T and
x e X:    Vu e upp(x,T) Vw e low(xT)1(u,w) e qf(TXx)l 4
j(Tx)ixx - jrrxx) 
It means that 'properly' inserting an alternative x does not change the
relative ranking of the original alternatives.
THEOREM 37  The  ranking  rules j  out and f      are weakly-&-IIA.Out
proof Since su(T.Xx) +1= su(TX) for all u€ upp(x,T) and sw(T.Xx) =
Sw(T) for all w€ low(x.T). the proof follows easily. ,
In chapter 2. section 2.7.1, we showed that the uncovered set. given by the
choice function uc. is not &-IIA. The rule 4/ is weakly-&-IIA:
PROPOSITION 3.8 The ranking nde fuc, induced by the choice function uc, is
weakly-&-IIA.
proof We show that the following is true.
For all T € TOO, for all x € X:
if for all a € uc(T.Xx): aTx. then uc(T) is equal to either uc(T.Xx)
or   uc(T.Xx)   U   {x l.
For this, it is sufficient to prove that for all b € Xx the following
holds: b is covered in (T.Xx) iff b is covered in T.
(if) Evident (only if) Since the cover relation is transitive, the
alternative b is covered by an alternative a € uc(T,Xx). We prove that b is
covered by a in T. Suppose a does not cover b in T, hence b can reach a in
two steps. Then we must have: bTx while xTE But this is impossible,
because a € uc(T.Xxh •
3.5.4 The score vector as a sufficient statistic
A ranking may be seen as a synthesis or balancing of the binary decisions
contained in cycles. From this point of view. an interesting condition
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might be:
• Independence of 3-cycle orientation
A ranking rule f Ichoice function Sl on T(X) is said to be independent
of 3-cycle orientation if for all pairs of tournaments (TX).
(T X) S T(X),
if  (T X)  can  be  obtained  from  (TX)  by  reversing  the  orientation  of  a
3-cycle.  then f(TX)  =  f(TX)  ISCrx)  =  Scr' X)1.
In balancing information contained in cycles, a ranking rule f satisfying
this independence condition, does not take into account the direction of a
particular 3-cycle.
One may have some difficulty with this independence condition. For example,
an alternative beating a strong alternative cannot be rewarded. Because if
we reverse a cycle containing the comparison between these two
alternatives, according to the independence condition, nothing will change.
This point will be taken up again in section 3.8.
Taken together with just one commutation property. it severely restricts
the possible choice of a ranking rule, see theorem 3.9 and corollary 3.10.
In theorem 3.9. we use the term sufficient statistic. There, it means that
the ranking only depends upon the scorevector.
Henriet (1985) proved the following two results in the case of ranking
complete binary relations. We give alternative proofs for the case of
tournaments:
THEOREM 3.9 Let f : T(X) 4 *X) be a ranking rule. Then f is independent of
3-cycle orientation, if
the score vector is a suSicient statistic in the determination of the
ranking produced by f.
proof (only if) Suppose that (T.X) and (T'.X) do have the same score
vector.    As    will be derived    in the proof of theorem    5.11 of chapter   5,
(T'30 can be obtained from (T.X) by a sequence of 3-cycle reversals.
Hence. Kr.X)  = fr'30.  (if) Evident. I
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COROLLARY 3.10 Suppose that the ranking rule f commutes with pennutation
and is independent of 3-cycle orientation. Let (TX) be a tournament
and assume that for two alternatives x and y. we have sx = sy
Then xgy: f(TX).
Proof Let X = {al ...,an   .  Take two permutations  01   and  02'  such  that
sa (ck r)  2  sa,(ak'r)  if  i  5 j.  k  =  1.2.
J
Since sx = sy, we may take aix = ap, aly = ap+1 and 02% = ap+1' a2y = ap,
for  some  p  € {1 .....n}.
Because f is independent of 3-cycle orientation, jia,T) = .AcI2 D  := W.
Now, assume that x » y : m. Then aix * ciy : ar T) = ACIT) = W,
because f commutes with permutation. Further, 02x » Cuy i azAT) = Acu r) =
W. So, on the one hand, we have a  , a +1 : W. on the other hand we have
ap+1 *ap: W. This gives a contradiction.  
As may easily be verified. the rules f and f do satisfy theout trans
conditions of the theorem above. ™s means that there does exist a
function   g   :   R    -4   ,«X),   n   =    I X  ,   such   that  ftrans T) = g(sl-.sq).   2'his
is a well-known result. see proposition 1.3. The rules f and  f    do
cop Outnot satisfy this condition. This may be seen by taking T and using
corollary  3.10:
d-,          c sc=sA, butc»d: f  (T)and
 «1
U* COp  4
c»d:f out(T4)I
I2             -b
From theorem 3.9 wc know that if a ranking rule f is independent of 3-cycle
orientation, then the score vector is a sufficient statistic in the
determination of the ranking. If we add the condition of weakly A-IIA and
the commutation with permutation, we can prove more, see theorem 3.11.
In the proof of theorem 3.11, we need to add alternatives. So, instead of
*ranking rules on T. we have to consider ranking rules on T .
The set T
*
The set I  is the collection of 1(X), for arbitrary non-empty finite X =
<xr- j.
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*THEOREM 3.11 Let f be a ranking nde on T . Suppose that f commutes with
permutation, is independent of 3-cycle orientation and satisfies the
weak-&-IIA condition. Then for each couple (x,y) of alternatives from
X c U and aN tournaments T € I(X),
if s 2 T.X) 2 sfI X) then xky: f(TX).
Proof From corollary 3.10, we know that the first two condition do imply
that a g b: AT) whenever s= st). Now, suppose that sa > sb' buta
b*a: AD. Thus we may partition X into two subsets A and B, where a€ A
and b€B. such that for all u€B and all v€A.u, •v: AT). Next,
introduce new alternatives xt' .." x , where p = sa - st, Insert them
between  B  and  A:   uT'xi'  x,T'v  for  all  u  €   B.  v  €   A.  i  e {1 ....,p}. Then,
using the weak-&-HA condition p times, we obtain b»a: f[T'). But, since
sa(T') = sb(T'). b*a: fr') is impossible. l
Using this theorem. we can characterize the Copeland choice function. which
was introduced in chapter 2. In the formulation of the theorem, we assume
that S(T,X) = BestuiT.X)), for a ranking rule f This is no restriction.
since SCT.X)  = Best(4(T.X)), where 4 is the S-induced ranking rule.
THEOREM 3.12 (Characterization of the Copeland choice function) The choice
function cop on I equals Best(f) for a ranking rule f satisfying the
following conditions. The rule f commutes with permutation, is
independent of 3-cycle orientation and is weakly-&-IIA. Moreover, if a*
choice function S = Best(f) on T , where f satisfies these conditions,
then for all  tournaments  (TX)  e  T*.
we have that cop(TX) C S(TX).
Proof The verification that cop satisfies the conditions mentioned is
straightforward. if we note that cop = Best(four). We only prove the*'moreover' part Let 930 E T. Suppose that we have two alternatives a
and b such that sa > sb. and b € S(T.X) = Bestu). Using theorem 3.11, we
obtain a € S(TX). So. cop(T,X) C SCT.X). ,
Logical independence of the conditions of theorem 3.12.
(1) cop  = Best(f/ut ' where f is weakly-A-IIA. But it is notout
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independent of 3-cycle orientation.
(2) vcop =
Best(Aou#' where ff the converse of f is independentOut' Ouf
of    3-cycle    orientation.    But. as showed in theorem    3.11.    it    is    not
weakly-A-HA.
Note that in the proof above, we need to express S in terms of Best(0.
Indeed, a choice function S being weakly-&-IIA would mean something like:
'S(T.X) or
if aTx  for all a €  S(TX) then S(T,Xulx}) = . S(T.X)u{x}  or .
.{X}
This last possibility, S(T,Xu{x}) = {x} gives problems in the proof of
theorem  3.12.
See Henrict (1985) for characterizations of cop on arbitrary relations.
that use a monotonicity argument instead of the weak-&-IIA condition.
We consider what will happen, if we replace the weak-A-IIA condition by the
6A-IIA condition. For that purpose. we introduce the choice function cop.
The choice function cop6
j
Suppose (T,X) E I. Let fOU TX) = Xl n '-. 0 XA Then cops(T,X) :=   Xe
where jklis the smallest number such that
j
for all y <UXi. we have sy k iX\UXil.
The reason for taking these union of indifference classes of f  - is thatourthis choice function copB is A-IIA (introduced in chapter 2). The
verification of this is straightforward.
We have the following characterization.
THEOREM 3.13 (Characterization of cop . The choice function cop  on5                       6*
I satisfies neutrality, independence of 3-cycle orientation and &-IIA.
*
Moreover, if a choice function S on T satisfies these conditions,
then for all  tournaments (TX) e  li  . we  have that  co (TX) 9 S(TX).
*proof We only give a proof of the 'moreover' part. Let (T,X) €T, and
84
cop8(T,X) =     Xi· where Xl  * ...  ' Xn = f (T.X). Analogous to the proof
i./ OUt
of corollary 3.10. we may deduce that if a E S(T,X) and s  = sb. thenb € SCI'X). Next, suppose that sa > sb' b € SCT,X), while a ff S(T.X). We
derive a contradiction. To this end, introduce p new alternatives
 1'  -'Yp, P = sa - sb* Let (T.Xu{yl····,yp}) be such that for all
i € {1,...,p}, for all u € S(T.X) and all v € X\5(T.X), we have: uTyi and
yiTv. Using the A-IIA condition p times, we obtain thatb € S(T.Xu{Yl '...,y }). But now, a and b do have the same score. so
a € S(T.Xu{Yl·····Yp})' which is impossible, because S is A-IIA.
k
This means that S(T.X) =   U Xi· for some number k
t=l
Next. suppose that k is smaller that the number j. Then there is an
alternative    z    €     S(T,X).    such    that    sz    <       X (T,X)  . Consider (T,Xu{a}),
where for all u € S(T.X) and all v € X\5(T,X), uTa and aTv. Since. because
S is A-IIA, SCT.X) = SCT,Xulal), we obtain z E S(T,Xu{a}). But. in the
tournament (T.Xu{a}). the score of a is at least as large as the score of
z. Thus a e SCT.Xula}), which contradicts the assumption of S being A-HA.,
Logical independence  of the conditions in theorem  3.13.
(1) The choice function strat is &-IIA, but it is not independent of
3-cycle orientation.
(2) Thc choice function cop is independent of 3-cycle orientation, but it
violates the A-IIA condition.
3.5.5 A survey of characterizations in the literature
Another characterization of f may be found in Rubinstein (1980). WeOut
present his theorem.
• Positive responsiveness
Let (TX) be a tournament on X and x.y € X. x # y. Then yx(T,X) is a
tournament that is defined by
yx(T.X)   =   1 (Y,x) 1   u  (T.X)\{ (x,y) }.
Let f be a ranking rule. Suppose (T.X) is a tournament on X and x.y are two
distinct alternatives. Assume x k y: AT,X). Let z b e a third alternative
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such that zTx. Then f is said to satisfy positive responsiveness if
x»y: AxzT.X).
THEOREM 3.14 (Rubinstein, 1980) The Copeland ranking rule f is the onlyout
ranking rule that satisfies commutation with permutation, positive
responsiveness and partial independence. a
Henriet (1985) gives a generalization of Copeland scores in a complete
binary relation R. To each couple (x,y) of alternatives an integer value
R(x.y) is associated, defined by
R(x,y) = 2 if xRy and -,yRx
R(x,y) = 1 if xRy and yRx
R(x,y) = 0 if -,xRy and yRx.
Then the Copeland score of some alternative a is equal to
C(a) = I R(a.b).
b€ X ,b*a
The corresponding rule is defined by
a k b: fc(R.X) iff C(a) 2 C(b).
In Bouyssou (1992). the relation R is replaced by a valued binary relation
R. To each couple (a,b), a * b, a value R(a.b) € [0.1] is assigned. Then
the Net Flow Method is introduced, which is based upon the score
SN a) =   I  (R(a,b) - R(b,a)).b€X\lal
Henriet and Bouyssou give characterizations for their rules. Compared with
the characterization of f given by Rubinstein, the partial independenceOuf
is replaced by a notion of independence of cycles. For tournaments, the
condition of Henriet is the same as our independence of 3-cycle
orientation.
Using theorem 3.9, it is easy to prove that the conditions given by Henriet
also characterize fout:
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THEOREM 3.15 Let f b e a ranking nde on T. Then f=f ijr f commutesOut
with permutation, satisfies positive responsiveness and is independent
of 3-cycle orientation. ,
3.6 RANKING RULES INDUCED BY NEAREST LINEAR ORDERS
In this section. we introduce three ranking rules based on nearest
adjoining (linear) orders.
We refer to chapter 2, section 2.5.4 for the definition of nearest




Suppose T € T(X). Let sl(T) be the set of elements that are best in a
nearest adjoining order (sl stands for Slater. 1961).
We define the rule f on T as follows. Let (T.X) e T(X).'slatl
if X\:l(TA - 0 then f (T.X) = sl(T,X), else' slatl
fsiatlcrx) = st<rx) ' fslaticrx\sicrx)).
It is the sl-induced ranking rule.
fslat2
The ranking rule fslat2 orders the alternatives to their highest
ranking in any nearest adjoining order. For example, in table 3.2, for each
of the alternatives d, c and f, there is a nearest adjoining order in which
they are ranked fourth, see section 2.5.4, chapter 2.
fslat3
Let T E TOO. Define the relation S C XxX as follows:
S= U L.
L€N(T)
Now we may define the following ranking rule.
fslat,(T)= TS, r is the transitive closure.
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This means that x 2 y: fslat)(T) iff there exists a sequence of
alternatives x=a,..-,a= - y, m 2 1, and a sequence of nearest adjoining
orders L....L   . such that for all j=0'...,m-1, we have: a.La0          m-1 1  1 21
T a b c d e f g h2
a-1111100    f   f   fslat 1 slat2 slat3
b O-1 1 1 1 0 1
c 0 0-1 1 1 1 1        {a}   {a}   {a}
d 0 0 0-1 0 1 1        {b}    {b}    {b}
e 0 0 0 0-1 1 1        {c}    {c}    {c}
f 0 0 0 1 0-1 0 {d,e,f} {d,e.f} {d,e.f.g,h}
g 1 1 0 0 0 0-1        {g}   {g,h}
h 1 0 0 0 0 1 0-          {h}
Table 3.2 Rankings of T2.
As an illustration, we take the tournament from table 3.2. For example.
although in all nearest adjoining orders L, eLh, we have that
e=h: fslas(T). This is true because we have the sequence h. f, e and
two nearest adjoining orders:
a»b,c,d*e»h» f *g and a»b»c» f »d»e»g*h. In the
first one h,f,i n the second one f *e. Hence h Z e: fgas(T). On the
other hand, because e»h i n all nearest adjoining orders. we also have
ckh:
44£3(T).
The rules fslatl and fstaa are not A-IIA. This may be seen by using T7'
given in the following section. Bestqslatl(T,)) = Bestgslat207)) =
{a,b,c}. If we insert X between { a.b,c} and {d,e,f, g}, we obtain T7: Now,
Bestuslatlgi')) = Best(f 97')) = {al, because there is just oneslat2
nearest adjoining order: a*b*c*d,c»f*g.
THEOREM 3.16 The ranking nde fslad is A-.IIA.
Proof Suppose that we need m reversals to convert (T.Xx) into a linear
order. Let fslat3(T.Xx) =Xl» ··· p Xn. Now we insert x between Xi and
Xi+1· as described in the A-IIA condition. giving the tournament (TX). We
88
have to prove that fslat)(T.X) = Xl  * ···  » Xi  »  {x}  * Xi+1  »   -  * Xn,
By consuuction of the rule
fsiat3' we know that both upp(x,T) =
Xl u ... u Xi and low(x,T) = Xi+1 u ... u Xn are intervals in all nearestadjoining orders of (T.Xx)·
It is sufficient to prove that all nearest adjoining orders of (T.X) can be
obtained from the nearest adjoining orders of (T.Xx). by inserting x at the
appropriate position: between upp(x.T) and low(x.T).
Take a linear order L on X. If upp(x,T) or low(x,T) are no intervals in
L   Xx'   it is clear   that   we   need  more   than m reversals to convert   (TX)   into
L. Now suppose that a linear order is obtained by inserting x in a nearest
adjoining order of (T.X ). but not at the right position. Then again, we
need more than m reversals. I
3.7 LOCAL AND GLOBAL DIFFERENCES
In this section, we discuss two independence conditions. They difer in
just one aspect. The first condition is focused on the binary comparisons
at the local level of analysis, the second one on the global level. If, in
a binary relation, the alternatives from a set B behave like one
alternative with respect to alternatives from X\B, hence are
interchangeable, these conditions state that we may reduce the set of
available    alternatives    to    B,    without    the    need    to    change    the    relative
ranking of these alternatives.
3.7.1 Introduction of the two conditions
If a tournament (T.B) is separable from (T.X) (sce section 2.7.1), the
alternatives of B behave like a single alternative. Each alternative x from
X\B delivers the same local information to all b € B. So, the local
differences between b and b€B are reduced to their local differences12




We say that a ranking rule f on T respects separable tournaments. if for
all nonempty subsets X c U, for all (TX) € 1(X) and for ati tournament
(TB) € 1(B) that are separable from (TX):
ATX)\B =  T·B)·
Consider the circular tournament T, on 4 alternatives. As may be easily
verified. 91'{ b.c } ) is separable from 0,30.
But.  4ans(Ti'{b.c})   =   b   , c while   b   =   c   :  frans(T„301 {b,c}.   So.   the
rule 4rans does not satisfy this condition. This is not surprising. if we
realize that frans is based on global considerations, while the condition
is concerned with local, binary information, as explained above.
• Interval consistency
Let W€ w(X). I C X i s a n interval of W i f for all x.y €I and z€X i f
(x,z),(Ly) € W, then z € I. Hence if Xl » X2 » ·· » Xn = W then everyinterval I is a union of successive indifference classes of W.
Consider the following tournament Tj on X = {a.b,c,d,e,f}.
Tjabcde f
a-0 1 1 1 1
b l-0 1 1 1
c 0 1-0 1 1
d'0 0 1-0 1
e 0 0 0 1-0
f 0 0 0 0 1-
Then f  95) = {a.b} » {c} » {d} » Ce,f}. Furthermore I = {c,d} is anOutinterval   of  f   g ). Now, consider the ranking   of the tournamentOUt 5
restricted to I f 55'{c,d }) = {d} » {c}. We see that the rule f. Out Outchanges existing intervals. This means that it is profitable for
alternative d to adhere to a more local or binary level of analysis. This
means that the tension between the local and global level becomes stronger.
In this respect. the rule f is not very stable. We introduce forOut
arbitrary ranking rules the condition of interval consistency:
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A  ranking  rule f on T  is  said to  be  interval  consistent  if for all
(TX) e T and all intervals I of f(Tr):
f(Tx)\I = frrj).
This mp.anR that the ranking of alternatives in an interval I only depends
upon the tournament restricted  to I.  So,  in  that case  we have f e f.
As announced, the condition of interval consistency is a global equivalent
of the scparability condition. This may be seen by observing that in an
interval I, the alternatives behave like one alternative to the
alternatives of X\I.
Using T = Tj' we may show that f out and f     do not satisfy the conditioncopof interval consistency.
Note that this condition is stronger than the condition of right-interval
consistency. So, if a ranking rule f is interval consistent. it is induced
by a choice function.
We conclude this subsection with the following proposition:
PROPOSHION 3.11 If a ranking rule f on T is interval consistent, commutes
with concatenation and is weakly-&-IIA, then f is &-IIA.
Proof Suppose AT,Xx) = Xl * ··· * Xn' Suppose that in (T,X). the
alternative x is inserted between X. and X Because f is weakly-&-IIA,1       i+1
AT.X)   Xx- X l , ... »X.
Hence the alternatives in Il = Xl u ... u Xi u {x} and/or
I2 = Xi+1  u ... u Xn u {x}  constitute an interval of jiT.X). Suppose Il  is
an    interval.    Because   f   is    interval    consistent,   AT.X)   Il     = ·RT,Il)' which
is Xl ,  - * Xi * {x}, because f commutes with concatenation. But then I 
too  is an interval, hence AT,X)   I2  ={x}  *  Xi+ 1  *    -  *  Xn   I
3.7.2 Verifications
In what follows, we verify the two conditions for some ranking rules that
were introduced in previous sections.
Thc following two results are easy to prove.
PROPOSITION 3.18 The ranking rule ftrans is interval consistent. i
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*
PROPOSIr'LON 3.19 The ranking rules four f out and f    respect separable
cop
tournaments. ,
The tournament from table 3.2 shows that fslat2 is not interval consistent
because of the interval {g,h}. We show that f is not intervalslatl
consistent either:
1'6a  bcde
a-1 1 1 0 fslatl(1.6) = {Le} p {b} ,{c} * {d}.
b O-1 1 1 But f'statl(Te{Le}) = {e} I {aL
c 0 0-1 0 Note that fslat396)= X.
d 0 0 0-1
e 1 0 1 0-
PROPOSHION 3.20 The ranking mle f.'at3 is interval consistent. so it is
induced by a choice function.
proof
Claim 1. By construction of the ranking rule fsiat3' we know the following.
If /slad(T.X) = Yl * ··· * Yn' then for all i < j, all a E Yi and all
b € Yj, we have aLb in any nearest adjoining order. Indeed. suppose bLa,
then b k a: fslat;(T.X).
Claim 2. Now, suppose that a 1 ' -. * an is a nearest adjoining order of
(13). Then it is easy to verify that:
b  * ... * b is a nearest adjoining order of
S            S+t
(T,{as,···,as+t))' where s 2 1 and s+t En,iff
al ' - i as.1 ' bs * ··· * bs.+t » as+1+1 '-. » an is a nearest
adjoining order of (T.X).
Now. let u. v € I. an interval of f . and suppose that we havestat3(TX)
u k v: 41ad(T,X). We have to prove that u k v: 4/ad(T.D. Because
u 2 v: fslao(T.X). we know that there exists a sequence of alternatives u
= uu...,u= = v. and a sequence L,....,L=-1 of nearest adjoining orders of
(T,X) such that for all j = 0.....m-1, we have: u.L.u. . Note that all
1  1 3.1
u € I. Using claim 1, we know that I is an interval of each L. where/
0 5 j 5 m-1. Applying claim 2. where L=a*a* ... *a and I=j 1 2
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1 a....,a      },      we     see      that we obtain a sequence of nearest adjoining ordersS     '+t
L' = L   I  for (T.D. in which  u L'uj*,. Hence uk  v : 4/at3(T.D. Usingan analogous line of reasoning. we are able to show: if u,v: fslae(T.X)
then u  * v:f       rr n' stat3' - -'    i
The rule 4hz13 does not respect separable tournaments: Take the tournament
T = T  below. Then fslad(T7)     =     {a,b,c,d,e,f,g},     because     there     are     three
nearest nearest adjoining orders:
a»b»c,d*e»f»g,b»c»d»e»f»g»a a n d
c»d,e,f»g»a»b. But (T,'{e.f}) is separable from (T,X).
T7abcde f g
a-1 1 1 0 0 0
b O-1 1 1 0 0
c 0 0-1 1 1 1
d 0 0 0-1 1 1
e 1 0 0 0-1 1
f 1 1 0 0 0-1
g 1 1 0 0 0 0-
PROPOSIFION 3.21 The ranking nde fslau respects  separable  tournaments.
proof Suppose B is a separable subset of X in T E T(X). We first prove that
there exists a nearest adjoining order such that B is an interval. Take
s.t € B such that s and t are separated by Y c X\B in a nearest adjoining
order (L.X):  s*Y*t i s a n interval of (L.X). Because B i s separable, we
know that for each y€Y, either y»B o r B»y. Let m  denote the number
of elements of Y such that B » y. let m- be the number of elements of Y
such that y , B. Because (L,X) is a nearest adjoining order, we have m+ =
m-. This means that we may change (L.X) so that s and t are consecutive,
while keeping a nearest adjoining order. by moving t towards s or s towards
t. Continue this process for other elements from B.
Now the remaining part of the proof may be accomplished with the help of
claim   2   in the proof   of the previous proposition, by defining {a .....a,+1}
=B and for each choice of b€B letting a, » ... *a  b e a nearest
adjoining order in which b is highest and in which B is an interval. ,
There do exist ranking rules that satisfy the two conditions of this
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section.
PROPOSKION 3.22 The induced ranking rules fmc and f satij* both thestrat
conditions of separability and interval consistency.
proof As shown in chapter 2. section 2.7.1. the choice functions mc and
strat respect separable tournaments. So. the induced ranking rules respect
separable tournaments. Since the ranking rules are induced by choice
functions that in addition satisfy the strong superset property (sce
chapter     2,     theorem     2.4 and proposition     2.12),      they     are     interval
consistent ,
3.8 RATINGS FROM TOURNAMENTS
In this section, we consider tWO methods to derive ratings from
tournaments. We introduce a maximum likelihood procedure and the
eigenvector method. After that we give a shon discussion on the use of
ratings which are derived from ordinal information contained in a
tournament.
A maximum likelihood method· f
' prob
Suppose a system P = (Pab), a.b € X is given. such that for all
a.b € X, pat) is the probability that alternative a beats alternative b. The
likelihood of a tournament T on X therefore is L(T) =   11 Pab' where we
(a.b)€T
assume that all choices are made independently of one another.
A pair comparison system P = (Pab)' a,b € X, satisfies the so-called strict
utility model if for all x there exist weights wx * 0, such that for all a




In that case, we may compute the likelihood of a tournament T given this
system P, as follows:
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L(T) = M ,  where  (sa)af X  is the score vector.
ilwa 
(01,"ETPab   =     n         (wa+  wb)
(a. b)€T
Now. suppose that we have an irreducible tournament T. We could have
generated this tournament using a system P of probabilities Pab' sausfying
the strict utility model. We may wonder which values of pab are the most
natural. The strategy we follow is: choose those
Pat) satisfying the strictutility model, that maximize the function L, giving rise to the marin:wn
likelihood estimates pab
If the tournament is reducible. it is easy to verify that the maximum value
cannot be attained by systems satisfying the strict utility models. The
strict utility models do not constitute a compact subset of all systems P.
For, suppose that (w )'a€Xis the point where the maximum value is
obtained. Then, if (T,X) = (T,Y) » (T,Z), we replace wz by kwz'zEZ and
0<k<1. But now the value of L(T,X) grows. a contradiction.
In case T is irreducible. there exists a unique point where the
maximum value is obtained, see David (1988, page 62) or Moon (1968, page
43). As pointed out by Zermelo and Ford. these strengths w give exactly the
same ordinal ranking as one would obtain using the scores of the
alternatives. See the following proposition, which was presented as an
exercise in Moon (1968).
PROPOSHION 3.23 (Zermelo (1929) and Ford (1957)) Let s  be the score and
let wi be the maximum likelihood strength of alternative xi, where
i€{1 '...,n}. If si > (=) sjthen wi > (=) wj.
Proof Suppose (wl ....,wn) maximizes the probability of obtaining the
11 wisitournament T: L(T.wl.-w-) = . Taking the logarithm and puttingn      II.(Wi + Wj)
19
the partial derivatives equal  to  zero, we obtain  for  i E{l ,..,n)
 -I
1
= 0.                                        (a)i k*i wi + wk
Hence,
si - k i wi-1 wk
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If s. > s. then
1       J
I wi > I   wjk#i wi + wk   k#j wj + wk
It follows that
n       wk(Wi - W·) I . > 0. thus w  > Wj..1       J k=l(wi  +  wk) (wj  +  wk)
An iterative scheme for the determination of these weights may be derived
from (a) in the proof above. see Moon (1968):
Let  n  =    X ,  wic°)  =   1/n  and  w:(k)  =                         si for
11       I (wi(k.1)+ W (k.l))-1
j *i
ie {1 ....,n}.
Suppose T E T(X) is irreducible. Now define: a *b: 4  b(T) iff w  >w bandagb: fprob(T) if wa = Wb. In general, the rule f is defined as
prob
follows. If (T.X) = (T,Xl) » ·-·» (T.Xn)' where (T,Xi), i E /1 '...'Il   is
ineducible, then fprob(T.X) = fprob(T.Xi) p -  ' fprob(T.Xk)
COROLLARY 3.24 (Zermelo (1929) and Ford (1957)) For aU tournaments T.
fprobrr) = foutfr). i
If we try to maximize L(T) under the assumption that P = (Pab satisfiesthe so-called weak stochastic transitivity condition, we obtain other
results:
Thompson and Remage (1964) and Remage and Thompson (1966) let a.. be  1 if
1Jalternative a. wins from ., otherwise it is taken to be 0. The likelihoodi a
of a tournament T therefore is L(T) = Ti x..%(1-1c..)1-aij. Thompson and4   48<J
Remage propose ranking the alternatives by maximizing L with respect to
p... subject to the weak stochastic transitivity condition:
1J.
Weak stochastic transitivity
A  system satisfies  weak stochastic  transitivity  if for all  ij,k:
if p·- 2  112  and pjk k 112     then     pik 2 112.Y
Now.     suppose    that    P    =    (p..)     is    such a maximizing system, satisfying     the
1J
weak stochastic transitivity condition. We then may derive (various)
linear orders. as follows: al * a2 » ··  ' an where p.. 2 1/2 if i < j.
1J
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Thompson and Rernage proved that these resulting linear orders are nearest
adjoining orders.
The eigenvector method: f .
eigen
A method due to Wei and Kendall. see Moon (1968) takes into account
the quality of the defeated opponents. Suppose that to all players x an
initial strength w(x) is assigned. These strengths will be adjusted using
the outcomes of the tournament We may do this by assigning to each player
the sum of the initial strengths of the opponents he has beaten. Hence,
Enew = Afold' where A is the tournament matrix (where au - 0) and fold is
the vector of strengths. It would be nice, if we are able to choose the
initial strengths iold' such that Enew = AEold for a real number X > 0. For
this would mean that the ratios of the ratings given by w = Eold fit the
tournament, or are predicted by the tournament. We show that this indeed is
possible.
If T is irreducible. the tournament matrix is primitive. which means
that there exists an integer n such that An has only positive entries. In
that case, using a theorem of Frobenius (see for example Bermann and
Plemmons 1979), we may deduce that there is a unique positive
characteristic root or eigenvalue X of the tournament matrix A with largest
modulus. The eigenspace is 1-dimensional and contains a vector w with all
components positive. All other eigenvectors of A with all components
positive are multiples of w.
This unique eigenvector w is a candidate for the rating: Take fold = w.
then w . Afold = kiold' hence all ratios are preserved.-new
If T i s irreducible. we put a k b: feigen(T) iff wa 2 El). If T i s
reducible, we continue as follows. Let frans(T) = Xl * ··· » Xk. Then
feige„(r) - feige„(rxl) , ... * feige,Fxn)
These strengths w may be determined recursively. First assign to each
player the number of matches he has won, giving the vector w.r which is
equal   to As where   A   is the tournament matrix   and   e   is   a   vector   of   1 's.   Now
suppose that Ei is given, then take Ii+ 1 = Am. This means that in going
from Ii, the initial strengths, to wi+l, each player is assigned the sum of
the initial strengths of the players he has beaten. Hence lii = Ail. If
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im irl c =lim-2 = woi-,oo c -        i.,oo    X 1         -
We illustrate f · using the following tournament.elgen
Tl                 d - C
&  <1 11=Ib
Then wl = (2.2.1,1). w2 = (3,2,1.2), w3 = (3,3.2.3), 1Mz' = (5,5.3.3). ...and finally, w = (.827. .729. .425, .593) while X = 1.396. Note that
alternative d receives more weight than alternative c, because d beats the
strong alternative a.
If    T     is    as in table     3.1,    then f. ranks this tournament toeigenfeigencru) = la} *{b} ,{c} » {g},{d} »{e} »{h} » {f}.
We verify some of the properties introduced in previous sections.
First  of all. f. is not independent of 3-cycle orientation: Take theeigen
tournament T< Then Tl is ranked to {a} » {b} * {d} » {c}. If we reverse
the cycle aT,cT,dT,a. the ranking becomes {a} » {b} » {c} » {d}.
The ranking rule f . is not weakly A-HA either:elgen
crs'Xx):
Tgabcde f g
a-1 0 1 1 1 0
b O-1 1 0 1 1
c 1 0-0 1 1 1
d 0 0 1-0 1 1
e 0 1 0 1-1 0
f 0 0 0 0 0-1
g 1 0 0 0 1 0-
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feigen(Ts•Xx) - {a} , {c} * {b} * {e} * {d} :, {g} 1, {f}
Adding an alternative h between   { a.b.c,e}   and {d,f,g}, gives:
f .    (T 30 - {c} *la} * { b } » {e} * {d} » {g} » {h} » {f}.eigen 1
The  rule f. is not interval consistent. Again take T = Tl. Theneigen
f ·   9,) = {aJ ' lb} * {d} * {c}, because alternative d beats the strongelgen
alternative a.  But f . (T.{c,d}) = {c} , {d}.eigen i
Concerning the choice set Max(f.   ) and the uncovered set, we obtained:elgen
THEOREM 3.25 For all (T.X) € r. Max(f .   (TX)) 9 uc(T.X).eigen
Proof Suppose xCy in T, where C is the cover relation. Let w be the
eigenvector. then Aw = 11. Hence, Afu =  I   wz for all x EX. Because xCy,
Z: UTZ
we  have   {z:   yTz}   c   {z:   xTz}   and  xTy.   Thus   wx  >  wy·   .
A method due to Wei and Kendall. a long period of time used in chess
tournaments. is to replace the score si (the number of games won by player
i). by the sum of the scores of the players defeated by player i. l'his new
score is equal to As = A25. Note that the cigenvector is a generalization
of this idea Another method is described in Moon (1968), given by Katz and
Thompson. They let the vector of relative strength be proportional to
(A + rA2 + r 3 + ...W = Ag-rA) ls when r is some positive constant
smaller than 1-1 (the dominant eigenvalue) so that the series converges.
Thompson showed that the relative strengths given by Ag-1-1A)-le are the
same as those given by the Kendall-Wei method.
Ratings and tournaments
One may have difficulty with the derivation of ratings from a tournament,
which contains (possibly nontransitive) ordinal information only.
Nevertheless, we look upon these strengths as being predicted or co,t#nned
by the tournament, as was the case for fprob and feigen. We give two other
examples. The IQ test Consists of a number of small tests for several
abilities. Now. some tests are more important than others. Therefore, it is
conceivable that one obtains a tournament where the binary dominance
reflects the relative importance of the different tests. The IQ score then,
may be seen as a weighted combination of the teSt scores. In this way the
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predictability of intellectual performance is maximized. See Coombs et al.
(1970).
The second example is given by the Elo-ratings used to measure chess skill.
Each player's performance, Ui, is assumed to be normally distributed with
mean Pi (the scale value or 'true rating') and standard deviation a.
Moreover, player i beats player    j     if    V..     :=    Ui    -     Uj     >    t.    a    threshold.     Now4
it     is     easy to derive that Prob(V..     >     t) = $[(pi-pj-t)/al      =:     «pi-pj).     (0     isU
the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal variable.) This
is the key assumption used in Elo-ratings: the probability of a win, loss
or draw between two chess players only depends on the difference between
the two player's ratings. Now, one may use hypothetical scale values Pi· to
calculate for each match or tournament the expected number of points, where
a win gives two points. a draw one point It is clear that one may use the
tournament results and the points derived from these results, to obtain
estimations of Pi· For example, Pi = (Wi-Li)2a/M + 0, where Wi is the
number of wins. Li the number of losses. M the number of players and b is
the average rating of the opponents, which may arbitrarily be chosen.
because p is on an interval scale. Sce Batchelder and Bershad (1979),
Batchelder and Simpson (1989) or Elo (1978).
In many situations numerical indices are devised to predict some dependent
variable on the basis of some independent variable. In this way we want to
look at the use of the eigenvector. If we assume that strength or
preference is on a ratio scale we see that the ratings given by this vector
are predicted by the tournament.
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We end our discussion of ranking rules with a table of some properties.
=val  *p.nble A.HA ind../dent  put,al  :Odcp=.
cons#.'£* d inteNd Indepco-   dent of
ch.ng" dent 3-qcles
ftrans i D,00 0,
f       o       •      00       9Out
f o w       O           •          O       0            0          0
f o•O o o o
cop
f      o             00       0      0eigen
fstatl
= 0 0 0 0
41012 0 . ° ° ° °
fda,3 ' °  ° ° °
o: not satisfied
.: satisfied
0 : characterizing properties. if taken together with the elementary
commutation properties




In this appendix. we restrict our attention to the set H C T o f irreducible
tournaments. Given the ranking rule f=f. which violates the A-IIAOut'
condition of section 3.5.3. we want to determine a subset &(0, called a
kernel,   such   that  f   8(0   is  A-IIA.
In this appendix, wc write out(x) instead of sx. the Copeland score of
alternative x.
Suppose   that   we   have   a   set   A of irreducible tournaments,    such   that  fl A   is
A-IIA. By this we mean the following.
For  a  ranking  rule f on  H. fl A  is  A-IIA.  iff
for all X. for all x E X, for all 930 € H:
if (T,Xx) € A and Vu 6 upp(x.T) Vw E low(x.D:[(u.w) E Wrr.xx)]· then
AT,X)  = AT,Xx)  upp(x,T)  *  {x}   , jiT/Cx)  low(x,T).
We demand one more thing: A has to be closed under insertion with respect
to t. a subset A of H is called closed under insertion with respect to f.
iff
for all X. for all x E X, for all (T.X) e H
if (T.Xx) e & and for all u € upp(x,T) and all w € low(x.D:
[(u.w) € MIT,Xx)], then
(TX) f A.
Now we can define:
f-kernel
Let f be a ranking rule on H. A set & c H is called an f-kernel £5
(i)     & is closed under insertion with respect to f and
(ii)   fj& is A-IIA.
An fkernel is written as AU).
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Note that because  of the definition  of an f-kernel.  we  may  extend  fl AU)   to
a A-IIA ranking rule /6 on H. by defining /6(T.X) = f    (T,X) = XxX if
trans
(TX) i AU). To show that this is true, we take a tournament (T.X) € FL
Just for convenience. we introduce expression a:
a = Vu e upp(x,T) Vw E low(x,T):[(u,w) E WiT.Xx)]·
If    (T.Xx)    E     AU)    and    04    then    (T,X)    E     &(0,    and    we    know    that   fl AU)    is
A-LIA. Now, suppose that (T.Xx) 01 AU). Then, because we assume that (T.Xx)
is irreducible, we know that AT,X ) =f    (T.X ) = X · Hence a is notx         trans         x
true.
We present two kernels; for f   and for fuc' where tic is the uncoveredOut
set.  We define in(x,(T,10) =    {y€X:  yTx and y * x}1.
PROPOSHION 316 We have the following f   -kernel. TakeOut
N := 6(foub-
{(TX)  €  H\  If fouFX)  =Yl  '  ···  '  Yp  then Vs  =   1...p  Vy  €   Ys:
Iout(y.(T.X))  2     Ys+,1 +  ···  +   1 Yp 1     and
in(y.(T.X)) 2  Y,1 + ···+ 1Ys-,11  
proof This consists of a number of straightforward verifications. m
Note that this kernel is maximal with respect to set inclusion, in the
following sense: if K strictly contains N, then fow I K is not A-IIA.
*Note that N is not an f -kernel: Take the following tournamentOut
(T,.Xx) € N.
T a b c d c f
9
a-1 0 1 1 0
b O-1 1 0 1
c 1 0-1 1 0
d 0 0 0-1 1
e 0 1 0 0-1
f 1 0 1 0 0-
Now fouts.xx) = {a.b.c} *{d.e.f} and
*
f    (T x )- {a.b.c} I {d) * {el * lf}.0Ut 9X
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If we add x between e and f we obtain
*
fou ('rgA   = f  Out09.X)   =   { a.bic.dic,f,x }   ((T„X)   1    N).
PROPOSInON 3.21 Let K be the subset of H consisting of irreducible
tournaments T satisfying the following condition. Consider the rule
fue induced by the choice junction uc.
If fll(IT)  =Yl  '  ···  '  Yp·  then
for    all    s    €     {1.....p-1}    there    is    an    x    €     Ys   such    that
for all u e {s+1 .....p} and all y e Yu, we have: xI'y.
This set K is a (maximal) fuc-kernel. i
Every algorithm f commuting with concatenation has a non-empty fkernel.
Take for example the singletons.
From now on we restrict our attention to the class 0 consisting of
refinements of fOuf
Let M be defined by
M:=  {030  €  H:  if fou:(T,X)  = Yl  »  ...  »  Yn'  then
Vs  Vx  €   Ys  [out(x,(T.X))  2   Ys+11   +  -.  +   'Y n|   -   1
and in(x,(TX)) 2  Yll + ··· + 1Ys 11 - 11}
The set M may be looked upon as the closure of the set &(fout)·
THEOREM 3.28 /ff €  o then &0 g M.
Proof  Let  (T.X)  I M. Suppose  f    (T X)  =  Yl   *  ··   *  Y  ·   Let us assume,out '      n
because /30 9£ M. that there is a number s and y e Ys such that
out(Y,930) <  Ys+11 + - + 1Yn| -1. Let Z=X u {x} and take (T,Z) such
that (T,Zx) = (T.X) and upp(x,(T,Z)) = Yl u ... u Ys and low(x.(T.Z)) =
Ys+1 u ... u Yn. Then, because (T.X) € AU) and the fact that AU) is
closed under insertion, we know that (T,Z) € AW. Since (T.Zx) e 80 and
for all u€ upp(x,(T,Z)) and all w e low(x,(T,Z)) :u,w: AT.Z ), we may
deduce. using the A-IIA condition. that y,x: AT.z).
But.    on the
other    hand.    out(x.(T,Z))    =       Ys+1 1     +    -    +     1 Yn |' while
out(Y.(T.Z))    <      Ys+11    +     -    +    'Y n| '    This    implies   that   x    *    y    :   fowCT.Z).
hence x,y: AT,Z). But this contradicts y»x: AT,Z) which was derived
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earlier. l
If we arc looking for possible refinements of the rankings produced by
four and for matching nontrivial kernels. we have the following three
important notcs.
Let (T.X) €Mand suppose f  (T,X) = Yl » ··· » Y .0Ut                                            n
(i)  For  all  s  € {1 '..,n}   there  are   p.   q  2  0.   such   that  for   all   x   €    Y
S
out(x.(T.X))  =  ( Ys+11   +  -.  +   1 Y n|   -  1)  +  p  and
in(x./30) = ( Yll + ···+ IYs 11 - 1) + q
Because in general in(x.(TX))  +  out(x.(T,X))  =     X  -1,  we  have
P  +     =   |Y s l   +  1.
(ii) Let (T.X) € A(g) for an algorithm g € o. Suppose that g refines Ys to
Za ,- , Zb. When we add an element z between Ys Zb and Zb we obtain the
tournament   (TX').   Now,   out(z.(T.X'))   =     Ys+1 |    +   -.   +    |Y n|    +    1 Z b l e and   if
u   €    Yseb   then  out(u,(T.X'))  =      Ys+1 1   +   ..   +   1 Yn |    +  P.   The  rule
go being
A-IIA, this implies  that     Zb 1   5  P.
Moreover,  in(z,(T,X'))  =     Y l l   +  ···   1 Ys-11   +   1 YsF-b I'  while  if  v  e   Zb'  then
in(v.(T,X')) = 1Yll + ··· 1Ys 11 +  ' implying that I Ys\Zb' 5 q.
Similarly,  we  have     Z a     5  q  and     Y Za 1   5  P.
(iii) If we combine tKe· previous notes, we may deduce that there are
at most three possible refinements  of an indifference class  Ys  of fOur
Za  *  Zm  *  Zb'  with     Z a l   =  q-1.     Z m|   =   1   and     Z b l   =  P-1,
Za  *  Zb'  with     Z a|   =  q  and     Z b l   =  P-1
Za  *  Zb'  with    Zal   =  q-1   and    Zb I   =  P.
In Monsuur (1990) a class of A-IIA algorithms {F,nar} with 8(4nar) = M
for     each    fnar     G       {Fmar} was introduced. These algorithms    fmar     are
refinements of f and every strict refinement of an algorithm 4nar is notOut
A-IIA any more.
*There  is  little  hope  for the existence  of  a  nice  Ag out -kernel. Looking
at (i) and (iii) above, we see that possible refinements of an indifference
class Y of f depend on information not available in the tournamentOut
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*
(T.X   Y).     On     the     other    hand, the algorithm   f out    only uses information
contained  in  (T,X I Y).
We finally determine subsets of the set of all irreducible
tournaments.  that are an fkernel for all f that commute with permutation.
In preparation of proposition 3.29, we introduce the notion of a regular
tournament A tournament (T.X) is regular if for each pair a.b € X, there
exists a permutation a on X. such that a(a) = b and a(T,X) = (TX). This
means that all alternatives play the same role.
Suppose    X    =  m  =  2n  +   1.   Define  (T.X) as follows:
for   all   i € {1 .....2n+1 J.     x Tx fork E {1 '...,n}.      It     is     easy     toi (i+k)modm'
verify that (T.X) is regular.
PROPOSHION 3.29 E =  {(TX) e H :  (TX) is regular} is an f-kernel for atl
f that commute with permutations.
proof Consider an algorithm f that commutes with permutation. Because each
alternative plays   the   same   role,  AT.X)   =   XxX. See proposition   3.1.    ,
The union of f-kernels is an f-kernel. A certain f-kernel & is said to
be maximal if for all subsets B. such that A is strictly contained in B. B
is not an f-kernel anymore. If A is an f-kernel, then so is AuE. Hence E is
contained in any maximal fkernel. Conversely, we have:
THEOREM 330 E is the intersection of all maximal f-kernels.
proof Let A be the intersection. From proposition 3.29, we know that E c A.
We show that A c E. Given a tournament 930, consider the following
equivalence relation S[T] (same role in (T.X)): aS[T]b iff there exists a
permutation c of X such that ca = b and ag,X) = (TX). To prove the
theorem. it is sufficient to show that if 930 is element of the
intersection of all maximal f-kernels. there is just one equivalence class
of S[T].
To this end. for each choice of tournament (R.X) and each choice of a € X.
we introduce the ranking rule 4.a· Let A be the S[R]-equivalence class
of a. Then 4,a: T -* w i s defined by:
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'a(A) * X\(*A) if there is an a with (*R,X) = (T,Z)
fR.acrz) =.
ZXZ else.
It is easy to verify that the ranking produced by 4,a is independent of
the choice for c. therefore it is well-defined.
The rule 4.a commutes with permutation: Take (Tir) E H and assume that
a(RX) = (TX). Now consider '[(T.X) for a permutation r of X. Because
'ca(R.X) = *T,]0,4.a( (TX)) = taA * 'ca(X\A) = 'c[aA * a(X\A)] =
1 R,a(T,X).
Now. let (T.X) be a tournament from A. Suppose that S[T] has more than just
one equivalence class. hence not all elements play the same role in (T.X).
We derive a contradiction and arc done.
Choose arbitrarily an element   a   €    A and consider 4.a· Because   (T.X)   €    A.
we have (T.X) € A(fr,a) Above we have seen that 4·,a(T.X) =A,X\A. Let
Z   =  X  u   {x}   and   (T.Z)   is  such  that  (T.Z )   =   (T,X)   and   upp(x,(T,Z))  =  A.
low(x,(T,Z))   =   X\A.   Then   (T,Z)   €    &(4,a), because   &(fT,a) is closed under
insertion. Of course there does not exists a permutation c of X such that
aCT,X)   =   (T,Z).   because      Z      4      X  .   Thus  4 aCT,Z')   =   Z'><Z'   instead   of
A   *    {x }   *   X\A.   contradicting 4.a l A 4a) being   A-IIA.   I
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APPENDIX B
INCONSISTENCY IN THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS
AND
THE INSERTION OF NEW ALTERNATIVES
1 Introduction
One of the important aspects of the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is the
allowance for inconsistency in the pairwise comparisons. It is the presence
of inconsistency which necessitates using elaborate estimation methods.
Only when a matrix is consistent, the computation of relative weights
reduces to a simple normalization of one of its columns. Due to the fact
that many applications have been made of the AHP for decisions in complex
situations, several methods for computation of the relative weights have
been advocated. One of them is the eigenvalue technique. developed by Saaty
(1980), which will be introduced in section 2. This method assumes that
inconsistencies are due to the error in preference measurement In a
process of minimizing these errors, one therefore may utilize a measure of
inconsistency.
Most of the other techniques have a statistical nature. In these
approaches. inconsistency is inherent in the preferences. For example.
often it is assumed that the input data always have errors in the form of
W.
a.. = -2 E.,.
4  wj 'J
where   the   error   E.,   has a certain distribution.   The most important problem
U
then is the identification of the statistical model that can best explain
the variability in the data (sce Dadkhah and Zahedi, 1993). Developing
inconsistency measures is meaningless, because there is no justification to
the assertion that a consistent matrix is less random than an inconsistent
mawix.
In this appendix, we follow the approach of Saaty. We assume that
inconsistencies may arise if for example one is not trained to determine
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ratios or because the precise criteria that have to be used in the
evaluation of the alternatives are not yet crystal-clear. In any case. we
think that an inconsistency measure can help the decision maker to move
towards his Oue preferences. It is one of the advantages of the AHP that
it is equipped with an inconsistency measure. In section 3. we show a
connection between this inconsistency measure and the phenomenon that new
alternatives that are included consistently in the analysis of a decision
problem, systematically loose (relative) weight. Finally, in section 4, we
suggest an alternative consistency check.
2 The eigenvalue technique and inconsistency measure of Saaty
Let   X   be   the   set of alternatives  and   let     X     =   n. We consider a reciprocal
matrix     R    =    (r..). A matrix     R is reciprocal    if    r..r..     =     1     for    all     choicestj                                                   /J Jl
ij € {1 '...,n }.     For     each     i j,     this     r..     is     the estirnated ratio of weights
1J
or strengths wi and wj of alternative i respectively j. Given the
reciprocal matrix, we want to use an estimation technique, producing a




This rating is unique up to a multiplication with a
positive constant a. If the matrix R is consistent. a natural rating of the
alternatives is given by an arbitrary column of R. If R is inconsistent.
the columns may yield different ratings.
The eigenvalue technique. fev. orders the alternatives on a ratio scale,
according to the components of the eigenvector w that corresponds to the
unique eigenvalue Xmax with largest modulus. This eigenvector may be
obtained by using the power method:
I . lim 15   }'s ,t-+00 . Inax
c  being a column vector  of  l's.
To give an example. consider the following 3x3 reciprocal matrix.
1 2 5'
R=   12 1   7
1/5  1/7  1
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Then fev(R) = (0.5415, 0.3816. 0.0768), while X = 3.1185. In general.max
1    2 nand k = n iff R is consistent.max max
The inconsistency measure used by Saaty is ii = (Xmax-n)/(n-1) 2 0, which is
the mean of the other eigenvalues. It is equal to
- 1   +  nd-II           I.       (,4   +  EL),15, < 150            1J
where    E- = r. ·W/wi. See Saaty (1980).      If     e..       0       1,      then      there      is      an4         41 1Jinconsistency. This formula shows that 11 is a convex function of E- The
lJfunction B attains its minimum value   when   e..   =   1.
1JWe show that 2kt is the average of the (local) inconsistencies given by
Ce..+  1  -   2).
U   E..
1J
R -T           I .       ('ij   +  E .-2)     „          .2   +   R PIT           I         CE..   +   -1-)15* <,50   1J            15i<jjn 11 Eij
=   -2+2(;1+1)
211.
To establish a consistency threshold, compare ;1 to the average value   of
randomly generated matrices of the same dimension. If &1/11 is too large, one
would recommend that the decision maker revise his elicited preferences.
3 Saaty's measure and the addition of alternatives
Suppose that after applying the eigenvalue technique f to a reciprocalev
matrix   R. we obtain a vector of weights   w   =   (w
1
'...'wn). Of course, onemight as well take aw. Taking a certain value for g may be interpreted as
fixing the unit of the ratio scale.
After choosing a, we consider a new alternative. If we compare this new
alternative with the first alternative, it gives a certain ratio, say p.
Hence we take as the value of this new alternative c = pwl. Therefore. one
might suggest that the rating of these n+1 alternatives should be equal to
(wr- wn,pwl). But the eigcnvaluc technique provides a different rating,
as will be shown in theorem 3.31.
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To introduce this theorem, we compare the new alternative with every other
alternative       from       X       = {x l '...,xn} and assume    that this happens    in    a
consistent way. Since the weight of the new alternative x is supposed ton+1
be equal to c = pwl' we might construct a reciprocal matrix as follows. To
the original matrix R we add a row and column. Further, take rmm = 1. r.   =tm
wi/pwl   and   rmi   =   pwl/wi,   m   =   n+1   and   i   E {1 '....n }.     The     resulting
reciprocal matrix is denote by R'.
To give an example. take the reciprocal matrix of the previous section. Let
c, the weight of the fourth alternative be equal to 0.55. Then we obtain
the matrix
1      2      5    0.984
1/2     1       7     0.693
R' = 1/5 1/7      1     0.139
1.015 1.441 7.161   1
Now fev02') = (0.5415. 0.3816, 0.0768, 0.534). Observe that the weight of
the new alternative. originally 0.55, has become 0.534. The other weights
remain as they were before. This is no accident. as the following theorem
shows.
THEOREM 131 /ffev(R)  =  w• then fev(R·)  =  1'  =  (w.kc),
1-1 + /1 . 1)2 + 4nmax maxwhere k = > 0.
2
Proof Let w' = (wk). Then R'w' = ((1 +k)w,(n+k)c). If we compute k suchmax -
that Xmax +k= (n+ k)/k. we obtain the k given above. Hence R'w' =
(n+k)/k     w:     Because     k     >     0,     w'      > 0. Therefore, using a theorem     of
Perron-Frobenius (see for example Bermond and Plemmons, 1979), this w' is
the eigcnvector corresponding to the unique eigenvalue with modulus equal
to the spectral radius. I
In the example above. k is equal to 0.971. In fact, the number k is always
smaller  than or equal   to   1:
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PROPOSITION 332 The number k in theorem 1 has the following properties.
First   of  all.   0   <   k  5   1    and   k  =   1    5   R   is   consistent.   Furthermore,   k
is a strictly descending function of Xmax (and &1).
Proof As shown in theorem 3.31, if Xmax' is the eigenvalue with largest
modulus of R'. then Xmax' = (n+k)/k. Since. as is shown by Saaty (1980).
Xmax' 2 n+1. we obtain n+kkkA+k, which gives n 2 kn. We obtain k 51.
Above we showed that 0<k.I t i s easy to prove that k=l iff Xmax =n,
which is equivalent with R being consistent Differentiating the function
k(Xmax)' we obtain that k'(Xmax) < 0 I
Theorem 3.31 and proposition 3.32 imply that even if c > wl' it may happen
that    kc    <    wl'    so    we    have    a    kind    of   rank    reversal.    In    any    case, a newly
added alternative is always somewhat at a disadvantage. Moreover. as is
shown above, the cause of this kind of violations may be ascribes to the
inconsistency of the reciprocal matrix R.
Finally, it is straightforward to prove:
PROPOSHION     3.33    The    inconsistency      WR' )    of    R'     is    less    than    the
inconsistency WR) of R: Ll < (n + k)(1 - k)
k                    k( n-1)
Moreover.  k(R' )  >    k(R).  i
4 An alternative consistency check?
To   introduce a possibly new consistency check.   let   s    be   the   sum   of   the
elements of row i: si = I r... We have the following conjecture:IJ
J
CONJECTURE The following three statements are equivalent.
(i)    R is consistent
cii,    EL=1
i =1  Si
(iii)    The harmonic mean of the row sluns si is equal to n.
The proof of the equivalence of (ii) and (iii) is straightforward.
For arbitrary R let us consider the rating rule. which assigns to R the
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rating given by the row sums si· In the same manner as is described in
section 3, we may add a new alternative in a consistent way with weight c =
psl. It is straightforward to prove that if we apply the fore mentioned
rating rule to R'. wc obtain the rating
1 +41
(sl,-.sn' 1 C),1 +c
which completes the proof of (i) = (ii).
The converse in case n=3 can be proved by elementary means. The proof for
n > 3 remains open.
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CHAPTER 4
SOLUTIONS FOR DOMINANCE STRUCTURES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the best known chessboard covering problem is the determination of
the minimum number of queens required to cover the entire chessboard. A
configuration of queens on an m><m chessboard is said to dominate the board
if every square either contains a queen or is attacked by a queen. The
configuration is said to be non-attacking if no queen attacks another
queen. The best upper bound known for the minimum number f(m) of
non-attacking queens needed to dominate an mxrn chessboard is
14
f(m) 5 73m + 0(1). See Grinstcad et al. (1991).






Figure 4.1 A minimal non-attacking configuration, see Cockayne (1991).
In this chapter, we consider asymmetric relations. These relations may for
instance, represent direct domination between parties or countries. This
direct domination means that one party can bend the other one to its will.
Or. when parties are sitting down at the negotiation table. it means that
the stronger party can set the conditions under which cooperation or trade
will take place, compare van den Brink and Gilles (1992).
Of course. in such relations. which we represent graphically using a
directed graph, we may look for dominating sets, as was done in the queens
problem.
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A dominating set that closely corresponds to the queens problem. is the one
introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953. section 65), which we
shall discuss hereafter. Of course, the queens problem is different: it
concerns a bi-directed graph. The vNM-concept has found many applications,
for instance in cooperative game theory, sce Owen (1982). but also in
social sciences, see van Decmen (1991), or von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953, page 41,42).
A subset Y of a set X is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set (vNM-stable
set) of an asymmetric relation if there is no domination inside Y, and for
all alternatives outside Y there is at least one alternative in Y that
dominates iL So it is free of internal conflicts and dominates the rest of
the alternatives. More precisely:
Definition 4.1
A set YCXisa von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set of the asymmetric
relation (GX) if
(a)  for all a.b e Y: - aGb, [internal stabilityl
(b)  for aN aeY there is an beY
such that bGa. Iexternal stabilityl
To give an example. we consider the relation (G,30 of figure 4.2:




vNM-stable sets: {b.c}, {d.e}.
Figure 4.2 A relation (G„30 with two vNM-stable sets.
The general idea iS that only these vNM-stable sets will be formed in the
process of arriving at an enduring and decisive coalition: it is free of
internal conflicts and it dominatcs all other parties. Note that this final
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domination may be quite different from the direct domination Via the
relation G. as is illustrated by the asymmetric relation of figure
4.2. Thcre we have a vNM-stable set equal to {d.e}. while aGle. Hence this
direct domination is overruled by the global domination, expressed by the
vNM-stable set.
Again,      we      let      U      = l u l '...,un}    be a finite   set of alternatives.    The   set
600.0 4 X c U. is the set of asymmetric relations on X. whUe 8 is the
union of all sets 0(X). In section 4.2. we consider acyclic relations:
We let Agobe the set of acyclic relations. For 0*XCU.we let KX) be
the set of acyclic asymmetric relations on X.
4.2 DOMINATION ON ACYCLIC ASYMMETRIC RELATIONS
In this section, we concentrate on acyclic asymmetric relations. Besides
the von Neumann-Morgenstern concept leading to the notion of a dominating
coalition, we introduce a few other solution concepts. After that, we state
two characterizations of the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. The
first one is in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for a choice
function. for the second one we use zero-sum game theory. Moreover, we
introduce a power index for the members of this unique stable set.
4.2.1 Introduction of some choice functions
We discuss four different solution concepts. It will turn out that two of
these lead to the same coalition whenever the relation is acyclic.
We start with the vNM-stable sets.
von Neumann-Morgenstern: vNM
In many situations an asymmetric dominance relation G is acyclic, e. g. in
hierarchies. In such circumstances it is conceivable that one tries to find
a subset or group Y of the set of alternatives X that dominatcs all other
alternatives.
As already mentioned in the introduction, a well-known dominating coalition
is given by the vNM-stable sets. In case of acyclic asymmetric relations,
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we have the following theorem, see von Neumann-Morgenstern, 1953. section
65.8.
THEOREM 4.1 All acyclic asymmetric relations G on finite X do have a unique
vNM-stable set.
Proof   We use induction    to      X .    If      X      =     1, the proof is obvious.    Now,
suppose   that  the   theorem   is   true   for  X   such   that    1 X      5  k.   k  €    R   Let   (G.X)
be  an acyclic asymmetric relation  on  X.   j X     =  k  +   1.
The relation (G,X) is acyclic, so Max(G.X) 4 0. Because a vNM-stable set N
is externally stable. M = Max(G.X) c N. Since N is internally stable. the
set of elements of D. where D =  {x € X: there is an y €  M such that yGx}.
is  contained  in  X\N.   Let  Y  = X\(MuD). Because   G   (MxY  u  Y><M)  =  0.   a
vNM-stable set N is the union of M and a vNM-stable set of (G.Y). Using the
induction hypothesis, we know that (G,Y) has a unique vNM-stable set. which
completes the proof. I
If   X is infinite. theorem    4.1    is   not   true;    the    existence    nor the unicity   is
guaranteed.
We   now   are   able to define the choice function   vNM   :   AGO   +   2X\{0}.
For all G € NX), vNM(G) is equal to the unique vNM-stable set.




1a    -b     d
Then vNM(G230 = {a,d}.
Besides the notion of vNM-stable sets, we consider three other concepts:
top clements. uncovered clements and the strategy equilibrium.
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Marimal or top elements: top
Let (G,X) be an acyclic asymmctric relation on X. Then the choice function
top iS defined by:
top(G) = Max(G).
In the example above.   top(G2)   =   {al.
Uncovered elements: uc
As defined in chapter 3, for a relation (G.X) € 800. uc(G.X) = Max(C.X),
where C is the cover relation.
In the example above,  uc(G2)  =  {a,c}.
The strategy equilibrium: strat
In chapter 2, we introduced the choice function strat. As in the case of
tournaments, we may search for optimal strategies or mixed strategy
equilibria. Unfortunately, these need not be unique for arbitrary
asymmetric relations, contrary to the case Of tournaments. To give an
example. consider once more the acyclic asymmetric relation (G230.
'0 1  1 0'
-1    0    1     0In that case A =
-1    -1    0 1
. The set of symmetric optimal
0 0 -1 0 .
strategies consists Of
2 = 41,0,0,0) + (1-X)(1/2,0,0,1/2), where k € [0,11.
In case G is a tournament. we know from Laffond et al. (1993) and Fisher
and Ryan (1992). that the number of alternatives in the support of an
optirnal strategy is odd. In case of asymmetric relations, this is not
always oue. as the foregoing example shows.
In the example above, strat(G2)  =  {a.d}.
In theorem 4.2 we prove that in case of acyclic asymmetric relations G. the
union of supports of the optimal strategies, stra«G) is precisely the
unique vNM-stable set of G.
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THEOREM 4.2 For all acyclic asymmetric relations G, we have that
vNM(G) = strat(G).
proof We prove that strat(G) is the unique vNM-stable set. Therefore. we
first prove that strat(G) is externally stable.
Note that for arbitrary strategies 2 and elements x.
(RA)x=  I  EY - I  Ry.
y:y Gx y: x Gy
Since. if z *1 strat(G), Rz = 0 for all optimal strategies, we may deduce
that there is an optimal strategy g. such that (gA)z > 0. meaning that
there is an y € stra«G) such that yGz.
As for the internal stability: suppose that x,y € strat(G) and xGy. Then,
to assure that for an opumal strategy 2 such that Ex , 0, we have (RA)  -
0. there must be an z € supp(0 c strat(G), such that yGz. If we pursue
this line of reasoning, we obtain an infinite sequence of alternatives
x,.xi'.-    such    that    for    all    i    2    0,    x.Gx     . But since    G is acyclic,    this1   i+1
means that all xi are different implying that X is infinite, which is not
the case. ,
For another proof of theorem 4.2, we refer to theorem 4.13.
Concerning the (non-) unicity of optimal strategies, we present
THEOREM 4.3 Let (G.X) € 0(X) be acyclic. Then there is a unique optimal
strategy iff Best(GX) * 0.
Proof  It  is  easy   to  see  that  in  case   1 Max(G,X)     >   1   or  in  case  Max(G,X)  =
{x} and there     is    an     y     €      X     such     that     mxGy,     we     have several optimal
strategies. Conversely, if the unique vNM-stable set is equal to {x} =
Bes«G/0, then there is a unique opurnal strategy 2 given by Ry = 0 if
y 4 x and px = 1. The strategy 2 is unique, because (RA)  > 0 for all
y *x, implying that for all other optimal strategies g and all y 4 x. we
have g  = 0. ,
In the case of tournaments. we have: strat(T.X) c ucg,X), see chapter 2,
table 2.2. For arbitrary acyclic asymmetric relation, this does not hold.
Consider the example given in the introduction of the choice function vNM.
Then  strat(G2)  =  {a,d},  while  uc(G2)  =  {a,c}.
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4.2.2 Characterizations; the acyclic case
In this section we provide two characterizations of the choice function
strat on A. the acyclic asymmetric relations. As is proved in theorem 4.2,
on acyclic asymmetric relations. vNM = strat, so the same characterizations
apply to vNM as well.
In the characterization that will be presented in theorem 4.5, we use the
notion of tail stability. This was first introduced in chapter 2 section
2.7.2. We repeat the definition.
• Tail stability
A choice function S on A is tail stable, i 
for all X  and  all  (GX).  (G' X)  e  NX),
if G R IX2 - (X - S(GX))21 = G' n IX  - (X - S(GX))21 then
S(GX)  =  S(G' X).
The asymmetric relation (G.X) may be replaced by another acyclic asymmetric
relation (G'X) without changing the choice set. if the differences between
(G,X) and (G'.X) are limited to comparisons between elements of X\S(G.X).
Not every choice function is tail stable. For example S =top is not
tail stable. as is shown in the following example (G3'{a,b,c}).
a   + b -C top(G3)  =  {a}
a         -b.         c      top(G'3) = {a,c} 4 top(G3).
Also the choice function uc is not tail stable, as is shown using




a   -b    d




In the introduction of this chapter, we mentioned domination in terms Of
setting the conditions under which cooperation will take place. In that
case. if the parties are sitting down at the negotiation table, it is
possible that party a. compared to party b, knows itself to be supported by
a majority of external voters. Indeed, in most cases, the dominance
relation (G.X) is settled before the negotiations start Then, the
assumption of tail stability means that the coalition S(G.X) can withdraw
from 'the scene of battle'. paying attention to more important business.
They are not bothered with fights between losers in XV(G.X) in the tail of
the ranking S(GX) * X\S(G/0. No matter how the comparisons between losers
change, the choice set remains the same. Moreover, for a party not in
S(G.X). in order to become one of the champions, it has to focus on the
comparison with parties from the choice set In our example, it has to
present better proposals to the external voters.
LEMMA 4.4 The choice function vNM a strat on A is tail stable.
proof  As is proved in theorem 4.1. there   is   just one vNM-stable   set   N.
Suppose that we replace an acyclic relation (GX) by another acyclic one,
let us say (G'.10, such that the relationship between (G.X) and (G'.X) is
as described in the definition of tail stability. Then N is the unique
vNM-stable set of G'. I
A second property that we need in theorem 4.5, is the Condorcet principle:
• Condorcet principle
Let S be a choice function on A. Then S sati*fies the Condorcet
principle,  if for  all  (GX)  e   A. we  have  Max(G.X)  9 S(GX).
If an alternative is unbeaten in (GX) € A(X), we want it to be member of
the dominating coalition.
Finally, we describe the behavior of the choice function S with respect to
local differences between two alternatives a and b.
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• Local differences
A choice function S respects local dgerences, if for all acyclic
asymmetric relations (GX) and all a.b e X. the following holds.
If aGb then S(GX) n {a.b} * {a.b}.
If aGb, then this condition implies that it is not allowed that both
alternatives are in the choice seL So the difference between a and b is
not smoothed ouL Note thar this condition does not exclude the possibility
that alternative b is chosen instead of 4 even though aGb. This phenomenon
clearly illustrates that we have two levels of analysis. First of all. we
have a local level of direct binary domination, which expresses the
ability of an alternative to bend others to its will. On the other hand, we
have a more global level, where the strength of an alternative lies in its
nesting among a dominating coalition.
Now we are in a position to state and prove a characterization of the
choice function S = vNM = strat on A.
THEOREM 4.5 (Characterization of vNM and strat on A) Let S be a choice
function on A.
Then S = vNM = strat iff
• S is tail stable
• S satisfies the Condorcet principle
• S respects local differences.
proof (only if). The tail stability is provided by lemma 4.4. Using the
external stability, we may prove that vNM satisfies the Condorcet
principle. Finally. the internal stability of the unique vNM-stable set
implies that vNM does respect local differences.
(if). We prove that S(G) satisfies the internal and external stability,
described in definition    4.1. The internal stability is equivalent    to    S
respecting local differences. We prove the external stability. Suppose
y 8£ S(G) and for all x E S(G), we have that -,xGy. By deleting the
comparison zGy for each z i S(G), we obtain G' € A(X), such that
y E Max(G'). Since S satisfies the Condorcet principle, this means that
y € S(G'). Further, because S is tail stable. we have that S(G) = S(G').
which contains the alternative y. But this contradicts y e S(G). .
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The logical independence of the conditions:
(A) For all (G.X), let S(GX) = X. Then S satisfies the first two
conditions; the third is violated.
(B) Define S(G.X) := vNM(vG.X), where (vG,X) = 1(x,y) € X2: yGA}. This rule
satisfies conditions 1 and 3, but clearly violates condition 2.
(C) The choice function top satisfies condition 2 and 3. Condition 1 is
violated as is shown using the relatic: (03'X).
REMARK Suppose that we replace (G.X\vNM(G,X)) by an acyclic relation
(G'.X\vNM(G.X)). Then it is possible that (G'X) is cyclic: Let (G,X) be
the relation pictured below.
aa           ab         Here, vNM(G,X) = {a,b}. If we change the
outcome between alternatives
d/                      c                    cyclic  relation.
c.d € X\ NM(G.X) to cG'd, we obtain a
But. of course, for cyclic relations too. we may compute vNM-stable sets.
It is easy to see that also in this case, {a,b} is the unique vNM-stable
Set
In the second characterization, we use game-theoretic arguments which
will provide a power index for the alternatives of vNM(G,X).
One problem for a newly established coalition N may be the determination of
a satisfactory division of power. By this we mean the following. For
instance, in the relation G2' we have the vNM-stable set N - {a.d}. The
alternative c is dominated by N through the alternative a. Now. a
satisfactory distribution of power may be a vector (Ra'Ed). such that
Ra , pd. In that case. for the alternative c. the sum of weights of
clements from N that it dominates. is smaller than the sum of weights of
clements of N by which it is dominated.
In general, we search for a division, such that
for all x iN:    E   Ry >     I  Ry.
y€ N . yGx y€ N. xGy
Theorem 4.6 shows that there is just one such coalition:
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THEOREM 4.6 (Characterization of strat = vNM) Let (G.X) be an acyclic
asymmetric relation.
Then N := strat(G,X) = vNM(GX) is the unique subset of X
(I)          that   is   internally    stable   and
(II)  that is support of a distribution of weights £29 summing
to    1.   satisfying:    if   x   e    N    then                  Z         ILY      >                  I.          14.
y€ N. yGI y€ N . IGy
(strong external stability)
proof Suppose that N is internal stable and allows a distribution of
weights as described in (II). Then is is clear that N is externally stable.
Hence N is the unique vNM-stable set. Conversely, if we take N =
strat(G,X). we may construct an optimal strategy 2 with support strat(G,X),
such that for all x IN, we have that (EA)x > 0, which is equivalent with
(II). I
This theorem may be seen as giving a more refined meaning to the notion of
external stability. The weights Ex can be viewed as power indices.
To give an example. consider the following acyclic asymmetric relation
(G4.10: '  '
d// »»»»>e
Then the unique  vNM-stable  set is equal to (a,b,d}. Now. possible divisions
of power between a.b and d. satisfying the conditions of the theorem above.
are the ones satisfying Ea + 4 > Rd (domination of c), Ra < 4 (domination
of f),2>Qand Ra+4+Ed=1
These are 11(0.1.0) + 12(1/2.1/2.0) + %3(0.1/2.1/2.) + 14(1/4.1/4.1/2).
where f=,Ai=  1,0<  1,<  1,  i  e {l .....4 }.   See   figure   4.3.
Let K n,n€N,b e{2€ Rn: 22Qand rei= 1},thesetof mixed strategies.
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Take   (G.X)   E A(X).Let rel(0(G)) be those vectors   in   K n,   m   =      strat(G.X) 6
that are restrictions of an optimal strategy 2 € 0(G) to strat(G.X). Hence,
we delete (zero-) components outside strat(GOO. We give rel(0(G)) the
induced topology from Rm. Then we have:
PROPOSHION 4.7 Take (GX) E NX) to be acyclic. Then 2 satisjies the
conditions   of  theorem  4.6.   i5
10(G) w  <-4 cr p c  irl:(rel(0(G))1. m
d
,    ( 0, '1 ../L)
/'t.'.4,'4)
.1111'j n,                 '
'    1    LU  '     c'.'.'1
(4,9,0)
a
Figure 4.3 Possible divisions of power between a.b and d.
43 GENERALIZED vNM-STABLE SETS
In this section, we introduce and discuss two modifications of von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets.
4.3.1 The drawback of vNM-stable sets
As    we   have    seen in theorem   4.1,    in   case of acyclic asymmetric    relations,
there is just one vNM-stable set In general this is not the case. As is
shown in figure 4.2, there may be several vNM-stable sets. Moreover. it




All subsets of X = { a.b,c} either violate the internal   or the external
stability.
4.3.2 Generalized stable sets
Because of the drawback illustrated above, van Deemen (1991) introduced
generalized stable scts.
Instead of direct domination of the alternatives via G. he considers
domination via the transitive closure '[G.
Definition 4.2 (van Deemen, 1991)
A nonempty subset V of X is a generalized stable set of (G,X), if
(a)  for au x *yev: -x(TG)y,
(b)  for every y EXW there is an x€V such that x(TG)y.
Van   Decmen   (1991,   page 114) showed   that   for each asymmetric relation. there
exists a generalized stable set In our example above, there are three such
sets:      {a },      { b}      and      { c }. while     in the relation of figure     4.1,      there     are     5
generalized stable sets: {a}, {b}. (c}, {d} and {e}. In van Deemen (1991).
the emphasis lies on the internal stability.
Unfortunately. a vNM-stable set is not necessarily a generalized stable
set. Indeed, if we again take the relation of figure 4.2 given in the
introduction. we sce that the vNM-stable sets {b,c} and {d,e} are no
generalized stable sets, since they do not satisfy condition (a).
This led us to introduce generalized vNM-stable sets.
4.31 Generalized vNM-stable sets
We continue with the definition of generalized vNM-stable sets.
Subsequently. we will discuss its merits. Let ar(G.V) be the asymmetric




A nonempty subset VofXQUisa generalized vNM-stable set of G€ 0(X).
if
(a)  for all x,y ev: -, xIar(G,V)ly ,
[generalized internal stabilt:yl
(b)  for every yEX\V there is an x€V such that xGy.
[external stabilityl
The concept of generalized vNM-stable set is an extension of the vNM-stable
Sets:
PROPOSITION 4.8 Let G e «X). If V is a vNM-stable set of G. it is a
generalized vNM-stable set of G. m
From its definition it is clear that compared with the original vNM-stable
sets, we have changed the notion of internal stability, while keeping the
external stability. We may give several reasons for these choices.
First, recall that we search for dominating sets, such that they always
exist Defining generalized internal stability and external stability as
above. assures existence of the generalized vNM-stable sets (sce the
construction theorem 4.9 hereafter).
Secondly, remembering the queens problem, we see that it is important that
we can reach all squares in just one move. This may also be important in
other situations. We want a dominating coalition to be determined and
decisive. Therefore, we prefer the direct domination, because often
external communication is expensive. laborious and not very reliable. We do
not want to depend on an intermediary.
Thirdly. tile generalized internal stability as given in definition 4.3.
means that for all d.t € V, if there is a path in V along G from d to t.
then there is a path from t to d in V. which means that inside V the
domination via TG is symmetric. In other words, if a dominates b in V. then
it lacks backing inside V. If a can set the conditions under which
cooperation will take place. b can do the same. but then indirectly, via
elements of V. It represents a balanced situation.
Finally. it may be desirable for a coalition that it can put pressure on a
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partner. For example, when the coalition has to go into action or when they
want the partner to join an operation.
In figure 4.4 we give two examples of generalized vNM-stable sets.





{ a.d },   {a.b.c,d}.   {a.b.c.e } {a,b,e}
Figure 4.4. Illustration of generalized vNM-stable sets.
The following theorem shows how to construct all generalized vNM-stable
set. Moreover. it shows that there always is at least one generalized
vNM-stable set.
Max('[(G.X)) = Ix€ X: there is no y such that y[ar(G.X)]x}, where ar(G.X)
is the asymmetric part of the transitivc closure.
CONSTRUCI'ION THEOREM 4.9 Every generalized vNM-stable set S of an
asymmetric relation (GX) can recursively be (re-) constructed in the
following way.
Stepl.
Choose a generalized vNM-stable set SQ for (GMax(*GX)).
Let DO be the set of all alternatives of X\SQ that are dominated via G
by at least one element of SO. Next Y := X\(SOuD ).
Step   2.
Choose  a  generalized  vNM-stable  set  S 1  for  (G Y).
If Y  =  0,  then  Sl  =  0.
Take    S    =    S duS  1.
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proof We first verify that the subset S constructed in the lemma above is a
generalized vNM-stable set
External stability: Suppose that x * S. If x € Max(t(G.X)), then there is
an alternative y € S  such that yGx. If x € D , the same is true. Now,
suppose    that    x    E     Y.    Then.    because    S 1     is    a    generalized    vNM-stable    set    of
(G.Y), there is an element y E Si, such that yGx.
Generalized inernal stability:
Since     Gl[SOxS 1      u     S lxS@      =     0,      this     is
evident.
Now suppose that we have a generalized stable set S. We reconstruct S.
Consider SO =S n Max(r(G,X)). Assuming that S  is not internal or
external stable in (G,Max('c(G,X))) easily leads to a contradiction. Hence
S  is a generalized vNM-stable set for (G,Max('c(G,X))). Now, elements of
X\Max(r(GX)) that are directly dominated by SO. included in the set D0'
cannot be dement of S, since S0 9 Max(r(G,X)) and internal stability of S.
Hence S\SO g Y= X\(SOuDO). Now we assert that S\Sl is a generalized
vNM-stable set for (G.Y).
Generalized internal stability: Suppose s,t € S\SO and s[r(G,S\S@]t Then
s[r(G.S)]t hence t[r(G.S)]s. Let us write this as t = zlGzlG...Gzp = s.
Because t = zO e Max('c(GX)) we know that zl e Max('c(GX)). Continuing this
way,      z      =     s     i       Max('c(GOO).      Hence     for     all     i      E       {0 '...,p }     we    have     that
zi  € S\SO. Thus t[*GIS\SC)]s.
External stability: Take y € Y\S. Then there does not exist an s e S0 such
that sGy. But because S is a generalized stable set for (G,X), there is an
t € S such that tGy, implying that t € S\SO. .
We illustrate the construction theorem using the first relation (Gs)0 of
figure      4.4.      In      that case. Max(r(G5'10)      =       { a.b,c,d },      and      there      are      three
possible generalized vNM-stable sets for (G5'Max('c(GX))): {a,b,c,d},
1 a.b.c }     and     { a.d }.     The     sets     Y are respectively:     0,      {e 1     and 0. This     gives
three generalized vNM-stable sets {a,b.c,d}, {a.b.c.e} and {a.d}, so we see
that a generalized vNM-stable set is not unique.
In the remaining part of this subsection. we consider a few relations
between the two modifications of vNM-stable sets.
First of all, we relate Max(r(G.X)) and Max(G,X) to the modifications of
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the vNM-stable set.
PROPOSITION 4.10 Lzt (GX) e «X). Then
(a)   u{D: D is a generalized stable set of (GX)} = Max(r(GX)) c
u{D: D is a generalized vNM-stable set of (G.X)}.
(b)   n{D: D is a generalized stable set of (GX)} = Max(GX) c
m{D: D is a generalized vNM-stable set of (G,X)}.
Proof  (a)   l'he equality follows by theorem   4.17    in van Deemen (1991). The
inclusion may be proved using the construction of a generalized vNM-stable
set given in the construction theorem 4.9. (b) For the equality we refer to
van Deemen (1991). The inclusion follows from the external stability. I
Note that both intersections mentioned in the proposition above, may be
empty. Take e.g. (G,30 to be equal to
b='«f
r.e
Then Dl = {a,c.e} and D2 = {b,d.f } are two disjoint generalized vNM-stable
sets of (G,A
PROPOSInON 4,11 Suppose (GX) is complete, i.e. (GX) is a tournament.
(a)     If  D I'  D2  are   generalized  vNM-stable   sets   of  (GX),   then   D luD2  is   a
generalized vNM-stable set of (GX).
(b) u{D: D is a generalized vNM-stable set of (GX)} is a generalized
vNM-stable set of (GX)·
(c)   u{D: D is a generalized vNM-stable set of (GX)} =
u{D: D is a generalized stable set of (GX)} = Max('c(GX)).
Proof (a) The external stability is no problem. Suppose aGb, where a e Dl'
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b E 02. Because D2 is a generalized vNM-stable set, there is an clement
d E D2 such that dGa. If (G,X) is complete, b and d lie on a cycle in D2'
which means that there is a path from b to a in DluD2- (b). This is a
corollary of (a). (c). The relation (G,X) is complete. Hence Max(r(GX)) is
a generalized vNM-stable set. Moreover. because of generalized internal
stability, all generalized vNM-stable sets are included in Max('c(G,X)). ,
PROPOSITION 4.12 If (G.X) is acyclic, then it has a unique generalized
stable set and a unique generalized vNM-stable set. Both are equal to
the unique vNM-stable set. i
4.4 BALANCED DOMINANT WEIGHTS
In this section, we rejine the notions of generalized internal stability
and external stability by the balanced dominant weights condition. This
leads to a characterization of the choice function strat. Moreover. we show
that there is a unique generalized vNM-stable set satisfying this
condition.
As   a   generalization of theorem   4.2, we state theorem   4.13.
THEOREM 4.13 For all asymmetric relations G: strat(G) is a generalized
vNM-stable set of G.
Proof Let Y = strat(G,X). We prove that Y is a generalized vNM-stable set.
External stability: If x *E Y, then for all optimal strategies 2, we have Ex
= 0. Hence, for any x EY, there exists an optiInal strategy g, such that
(fiA)x > 0. But this means that there exists an alternative y € supp(g) 9 Y
such that yGx.
Internal stability: Let x.y € Y and xGy. Suppose that my[T(G,Y)]x. We
derive a contradiction.
Take an optimal strategy 2, such that supp(2) = Y. Then 2 is an optimal
strategy for (G,Y). Let A be the restriction of the zero-sum matrix to Y:
Consider the following partition of Y:
S = {z € Y: z[r(G.Y)]x} u {x} and T = {z E Y: -,z[r(G,Y)]x} containing the
alternative y. Note that for all (Ls) € TxS: mtGs. Hence. we may write
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A = Als2    D   1C Alfj'
where C = (c..). c.. € {-1.0}, D = (d  ). d 6 {0.1}.
4 4 UV UV
Because     R     is an optimal strategy,     RA     2     Q.     Define     9     -2 I S     and     E     =
(SQ)   E    Kf   t   =   I Y I.   Then   we   have  EA   2 Q, because   RA   2  Q   and   for   all
(t.s) s TxS: -,tGs. Thus r is an optimal strategy for (G,Y). Moreover.
(EA)  > 0 because xGy and Ex , 0. which means that for all optimal
strategies v of (G,Y), v  = 0, which is a contradiction, because
Y  € Supp(0..
As already mentioned before, generalized vNM-stable sets are not unique.





There are four generalized vNM-stable set: C a.b.c,d,e}.tb,c},Id,e} and
{b,c,d,e}.     We    show    that    just    one of these     sets    is    able to reach    a
satisfactory division of power.
If     we     take     a     look     at the coalition      { b, c },      we     see that although     they
dominate     { a.d,e},     it    does     not    reflect the political practice     of    the
formation of coalitions focused on the division of power between its
members (and of course domination of the other parties involved). For.
suppose that b and c do search for a division of power between them.
(pb'Pj with pb + Pc = 1. In order to dominate d, it is necessary that
Pc > Pb' On the other hand, domination of e requires pb > P/ Thus b and c
cannot reach a satisfactory division of power. The same is true for {d,e}.
So. they cannot reach a division that is independent of the alternative
that is to be dominated.
On the other    hand, the coalition    V    = { b,c.d.e}     is    able    to    reach    such    a
division of power, for example (1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4). This division has another
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nice  feature.  For  each  x  €   V,  we may divide  V\{ x }   into  Ux  and  Lx.  The  set
UX is formed by the alternatives that dominate x. L  is the set of
alternatives    that are dominated    by    x.    For   example,    Ub    =     {d },    L     =    le}.    The
division of power (1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4) has the property that for all x the sum
of power of elements in U is equal to the sum of power of clements in L ·
It keeps the scale of power inside the coalition. Furthermore, everyone can
tip the scale in his favour by using his own weight or power. Hence it is a
dynamic coalition. Corollary 4.16 claims that of all generalized vNM-stable
sets, just one. in our case V = {b,c,d,e}. is able to reach a division of
power that is both internally and externally stable, in a refined meaning,
or putting it otherwise, satisfies the balanced dorninant weight condition,
which we shall introduce next.
• Balanced dominant weights
A choice function S : 0(X) + A{0} satisfies the balanced dominant
weights  property,  if for  all  G  €  0(X)  the following  holds:
S(G)   is   support   of  a   distribution   of  weights   2  2  0-  summing   to   1,   such
that:
(I)    if x E  S(G) then I Ry
=
I Ryy€S(G).yTI yES(G).ITy
(II)   if x e S(G) then I  Ry > I   RY.y€S(G),YTI yES(G).xTy
We   first   state   a  characterization of strat. Compare theorem   2.10   of  chapter
2.
THEOREM 4.14 (Characterization of strat) Let S be a choice function on o.
Then S = strat, i5 S sati*fies the condition of balanced dominant
weights.
proof (if) Suppose 2 satisfies (D and (II). Let Y = S(G,X) be the support
of 2. We prove that Y = strat(G.X).
Because of (D. (II) and Y = supp(2), R is an optimal strategy: (RA) 2 9
Thus Y c strat(G,X).
Conversely, if x € strat(G.X)\Y * 0. then (II) implies that (RA)x > 0· But
then. gx = 0 for all optimal strategies g, which is a contradiction.
because x € strat(G.X).
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(only if) In general, we will construct an optimal strategy satisfying (ID
and support equal to strat(G.X).
For all x€Y: = strat(G.X), there is an optimal strategy E such that
Ex > 0. Hence. there exists an optimal strategy g such that supp(g) = Y.
If x ,£ Y. then for all opdmal strategies t. we know that t  = 0. But then,
-Xusing a general theorem from game theory, for all x 4EY, there is an
optimal strategy sx, such that (sxA)x > 0·
Define
w =  I   Axs.., AX e (0,1) forxtY and   I  X  =1.x€ X\Y A x€ X\Y   xThen w is an optimal strategy. Moreover. if x t Y then (wA)x >O, because
(sxA)x > 0 and (syA)x 20. y * x.
Now define 2 - Ag + (1-X)w, X € (0,1). Then 2 is an optimal strategy,
supp(2) =Y, and if x#EY then (RA)x >0· Hence 2 also satisfies (ID. .
Analogous to proposition 4.7. we have
PROPOSITION 4.15 Take (GX) e «X). Then 2 satisfies the conditions of
theorem 4.14,  iff [0(G) =  {1   or p e  int(re!(0(G)))1.  ,
So, this set of distributions of weights is convex, and it is open in
rel(0(G))  if    0(G) j   >   1.
Note that if S isa vNM-stable set, then S is support of an optimal
strategy of the G-game. Therefore, the necessity of the condition in the
following conjecture is easily proved.
CONJECTURE Let (GX) e «X). Then there is a unique optimal strategy for
(G,X), iff
(i)   Max(VGX)) is a generalized vNM-stable set
(ii)   If V is a vNM-stable set of (GX), then V is a
singleton. ,
Using theorems 4.13 and 4.14, we may state that strat(GX) is the only
generalized vNM-stable set that satisfies the balanced dominant weight
condition.    In    corollary    4.16.    (D prescribes possible divisions of power
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leading to a standing coalitions. while (ID expresses the corresponding
decisiveness.
COROU.ARY 4.16 Let (GX) e UX). Then strat(GX) is the unique generalized
vNM-stable set V that is the support of a distribution of weights
2 2 2 summing  to  1.  satisfying
(I)     i  x  €   V then          I     Ry    =           E     R
y€ V. yGI y€ V . 1Gy Y
(m    g x  i   V then           I     RY>           I     Ry·,
y€ V. yGX y€ V ,IGY
The notion strat reflects the political practice of the formation of
coalitions focused on the division of power between its members. and
domination of the other parties involved, which is formally expressed in
the corollary given above.
In the example of figure 4.2 discussed above, all optimal strategies are
equal to 2 = 40,1/2,1/2,0,0,0) + (1-X)(0,0,0,1/2,1/2). But, as one may
easily verify. 2 satisfies the conditions of corollary 4.16, if and only if
X € (0,1), meaning that {b,c,d,e} is the unique generalized vNM-stable set
mentioned in that corollary. In general, the distribution 2 over Y is not
unique. The same example shows that this unique generalized vNM-stable set
is not necessarily the largest generalized vNM-stable set, which equals
{ a.b,c.d,e}.
4.5 CHOICE FUNCTIONS FOR DOMINANCE RELATIONS
In    subsection    4.5.1,    we    extend    a    few    choice    functions    introduced    in    section
4.2 to choice functions on arbitrary asymmetric relations. We assume that
the outcomes in (GX) represent domination. We verify some properties for
our choice functions that are significant in this context. In section




We consider four choice functions on 0(X).
vNM, vNM-max, top, strat
Let (GX) € «X). Then vNM(G.X) is defined to be the union of all
generalized vNM-stable sets.
For (G,X) € «X), we let vNM-max(GX) be that generalized vNM-stable set
that is obtained by taking S = Max(TGY) at each recursively defined step
in theorem 4.9.
For all (GX), we let top(GX) be equal to Max(t(GX)).
For the definition of strat, we refer to chapter 2 section 6 or section 4.2
of this chapter.





Now.  top(G:30  =  {a.b,c.d}.  vNM(G8'30  =  X.  vNM-mar(G830  =  { a.b,c.d,f}  and
Stra<G830          = {a.b,c,d,f}. Possible distributions of weight          over
strat(G,30  in  correspondence  with  theorem  4.14 of section  4.4 are equal  to
11(1/2,0,1/2,0,0.0) + 1. (1/3.1/3,0,1/3.0,0) + 13(1/3.0,1/3,0.0,1/3), where
11+&7+b=landO<Xi<lfori€ {1,2,3}.
Independence conditions
We consider some properties in relation to the choice functions presented
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above. These properties were introduced and discussed in chapter 2.
THEOREM 4.17 The choice function strat on asymmetric relations
(a)  satisfies A-IIA,
(b)  is tail stable.
(c)  satisjies SSP,
Cd)  is globally monotone.
proof Let Y be the unique set that is support of a distribution of weights
satisfying conditions (I) and (II) of theorem 4.14. Since in all four cases
(a), (b). (c) and (d). nothing changes at the expense of this set, it is
easy to verify that the distribution of weights, as described in theorem
4.14, still SatiSfieS these conditions. Using      the      characterization      of
strat. the proof follows.I
The   same   properties   as in proposition   4.17   hold for vNM-mar   and   for   vNM.
The proof for vNM-mar is simple and is left to the reader. For the proof of
vNM, we need the following lemma. see figure 4.5.
LEMMA 4.18 Take (GX) e 0(X). Let S be any generalized vNM-stable set of
(GX). Then, for all y EX, there is an m € Max(*GX)), such that
there exists a path via G from m to y, such that it never occurs that
two consecutive alternatives on that path are both element of X\S.
Proof The proof is easy, if we repeatedly use the construction theorem 4.9:
for S (S = SO u Sl), for Sl (Sl = Slo u Sll). for Sll. etc. I
'4251.
Figure 4.5 Illustration of lemma  4.18.
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THEOREM 4.19 The choice function vNM
(a)  satisfies &-IIA.
(b)  is tail stable.
(c)  sati*fies SSP.
(d)  is globally monotone.
proof (a) Let (GOO €  000 and x E X. Suppose vNM(G,Xx) = D Hencc D is the
union of all generalized vNM-stable sets of (G.Xx). To prove that vNM is
A-IIA, we assume that for all d € D, dGx. Now, it easy to verify that a
generalized vNM-stable set of (G,Xx) is so for (G.X). Moreover, it is clear
that Max(1(G,X )) = Max(*G.X)), so Max('[(G,X)) 9 D.
Suppose S is a generalized vNM-stable set of (G.X). Because in general all
generalized vNM-stable sets do contain at least one alternative from
max(r(G,X)), we may take x  € Max(r(G,X)) n S * 0. Suppose that x €S.
Then. since xTGx, the internal stability implies that x(TG)x  implying
that x € Max(r(G.X)). Since Max(T(G,X)) 9 D, this gives a contradiction.
So, x , S. But then we deduce that S is a generalized vNM-stable set of
(G.Xx)
(b)   We use induction   to   k  =     X 
Induction hypothesis.   For   all   X   such   that     X     5   14 the following holds.   For
all (G.X) € 0, if vNM(G.X) = N and (G'.X) is such that differences between
G'and Gare limited to (X\N)2, then vNM(G,X) = vNM(G'.X).
The case k=l i s obvious.
Take   (GX)   €    000,   with     X     =   k   +   1.   Let   N   =   vNM(G,X),   and   let   G'   be   as
described above.
First we prove Max(T(G'30) = Max('[(G.X)).
b). Suppose z € Max(r(G.X)) C vNM(G,X) and trG'z. This means there do
exist tl, ·.·,tk such that t = tOG'tlG't2G' .....tk. 1G'tk = z. But t -1G'z
means tk- 1Gz. and tk- 1 € Max(r(G.X)). Analogously: t  € Max(*G.X)) for all
i. Thus t € Max(r(G.X)). But then trGI which implies zrGL where we may
restrict G to Max('c(G.X)). Therefore we have zrG't, and thus we obtain that
z € Max('[(G'X)).
(c). Take z € Max(r(G'X)). There exists an xT € Max(r(G.X)) such that
LTTG'z (lemma 4.18)
hence
Z.CG'Lr (z € Max(r(G'.X)))
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SO
ZIG'9 (by choice of G' and x.  € Max(r(G.X)))
which means
z € Max(r(G.X))    (x  E Max(r(G,X)).
Hence, indeed. Max(r(G'30) = Max(r(GOO).
From the construction theorem 4.9, we may deduce the.
vNM(G,X) = U {S u ENM(G,X\[SuDS(G)])}·
S
where S is a generalized vNM-stable set of (GMax(r(G,X))) and DS(G) =
{y   €    X:   there   is   an   s   €S    such   that   sGy}.
Using that Max('c(G.X)) = Max('c(G'.X)) and the fact that differences between
G and G' are limited to (X\N): we may state:
S is a generalized vNM-stable set of (G,Max(r(G.X))) iff S is so for
(G'Max(r(G'30)) = (G,Max(r(GX))) and, moreover, DS(G) = DS(G').
Since vNM(G,X\[SuDS(G)]) c N. we may use the induction hypothesis, to
deduce that vNM(G.X\(SuDS(G))) = vNM(G'.X\(SuDS(G'))), which completes the
proof.
(c) Let x i vNM(G,X). Consider vNM(G,Xx)' where Xx = X\{x}. It is clear
that Max(t(G,X)) c Max('c(G/x))· Next, let us assume that
Max(T(G.Xp)\Max('c(G.X)) = K. where K consists of elements on cycles C in
(G.X). which are unbeaten in (G,Xx)·
Since  G i [Max(r(GX))  x  K]  u  [K  x  Max(r(G,X))]   =  0.  we may state
vNM(G.Xx) =  U {S u vNM(G.Xx [SuDS(G)])}, where Sis a generalized
S
vNM-stable set of (G.Max(r(G.X))). Because x 1 vNM(G.X\[SuDS(G)]). we may
use induction, analogous to the proof of (b). to complete the proof of the
assertion that vNM satisfies SSP.
(d) Analogous to (b) if we use the result from (c). ,
THEOREM 4.20 The choice »ction top
(a) is A-IIA
(b)  is globally monotone. ,
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As shown in section 4.2. it is not tail stable. It also does not satisfy
SSP.
4.5.2 Induced ranking rules
We introduce four ranking rules. induced by the choice functions vNM,
top. strat and vNM-mar. f      f     f     and fvNM'    top' 'strat ' vNM-max
We repeat the definition of an induced ranking rule.
Let S be a choice function on G. then the induced ranking rule f  on G is
dejined as follows. For all (GX) e «X).
if X\S(GX) = 0 then fdGX) = S(GX),
else fdG'X) = S(GX) 1, fdGX\S(G,X)).
First of all, we have
PROPOSInON 4.21 Restricted to tournaments,f.NM = ftop = f.NM-nlox =
ftrant which is the transitive closure.
Proof Let f   (T,X) = Xl * ··· ' Xn where the Xi are the irreducibletrans
parts of (T.X) and (T.X) = 939 1) » ··· ' Cr.Xn). We prove that vNM(TX) =
vNM-max(IX) = topgx) = XY
Now/ Xl = Max(r(T.X)). Moreover. X1 is a generalized vNM-stable set and,
because of internal stability, all generalized vNM-stable sets are included
in Xl. Hence vNM(T,X) = vNM-mar(T,X) = top(T,X) = Xl.
Because    for    i    €      {2'...'
n}, Xi = Max[r(T,X\(Xl u ... Xi-1))]·
the remaining
parts of the proof are analogous. ,
Next. we verify some independence conditions, that are analogous to the
properties in the previous subsection.
First of all, we consider the tail stability for ranking rules. For this
purpose. We need the substitution operation and the notion of a
right-interval, both introduced in chapter 3.
Let Y c X, G.G' arbitrary binary relations on X.
Then Sub((G.X).(G'.Y)) := {(x,y) f XxX :
((x,y) € YxY n G') or ((x,y) e YxY and (x,y) € G) }.
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Let W = Xl * ··· * Xnbea weak order. A right-interval of W isasct Y =
Xi  u  ...  u  Xn' iE{l '....n}.
A ranking rule f on G is tail stable, if for all (GX) e G and all
right-intervals Y  of f(GX)  and  all  (G'Y)  e  0:
 Sub((GX).(G Y)))  =  Sub(f(G,X)J(G'.Y)).
The second condition that we consider iS the global monotonicity.
A ranking nde f on G is globally monotone. if the following is true. Let G
be   an  asyntmetric   relation  on  X.   Suppose  f(G)   =   Xl   '   ···  '  X   .   Let  x.y   e   Xn
be  such  that  x  €  Xi,  Y  e  Xj,  j  2  i.  Then  AG)  =  f(G'),  if  G'   is  such  that
G'  =  IG\{(y,x)1  u  {(x,y)},
This condition can be interpreted in terms of domination. Suppose that y.
who first dominates x. agrees with the fact that x dominates y in the
ranking given by f This means that yGx is overruled by global insight If
we express this in the relation G'. we do not want the ordering to change.
PROPOSHION 4.11 (a) The rides fyNM. fvNM-mar ftop and fstrat on G are
6-IIA and globally monotone. (b) The rules fvNM, ANM-max and fstrat
on 0 are tail stable.,
Proposition 4.23 to 4.25 study the relation between choice functions and
induced ranking rules.
PROPOSIT'LON 4.23 The set of ranking rules f on 0 that are tail stable. is a
subset of the set of ranking rules induced by a choice function.
Proof Define S(G.X) = Best(RG.X)) for all (G,X) €  o. Now, let AGX) =
Xl *  - * Xn' so S(G,X) = Xl. Take Y = X2 u ... u Xn. Of course, we have
(G.X) = Sub((G.X),(G.Y)). Because f iS tail stable, AG.X) =
Sub(RGJOAG,Y)) = X1  * /(G,Y) = S(G.X) * AG.X\S(GX)). I
In chapter 3, we proved: if f is interval consistent. then it is induced by
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a choice function. Conversely, we have
PROPOSMION 4.24 If a choice fimction S on G sati4ies SSP, then 4 is
interval consistent.
Proof Take G E  930 and let 4(G) = Xl » ··· » Xn. Take an interval I =
Xi u ... u Xj. Now, f3(G,D = S(G,I) » fS(G,AS(G,D)), because 4 is
induced by S. Furthermore, Xi = S(GNiu...UXn)' and because S satisfies
SSP. we have S(G.Xiu...UXn) = S(G,D. Hence.
4(G,0 = xi " fs(G,xi+lu...uXj).
The remaining parts  of the proof  that 4(G.D  = 4(G) I I are analogous.  ,
We also can prove the following result.
PROPOSInON 4.25 If a ranking rule f on G is globally monotone and commutes
with concatenation. then f is induced by a choice function S on G.
If moreover. f is tail stable. then S satisfies SSP.
Proof  Let   G   €    000 and suppose   that  AG)   =X l    '   ···   *   Xn.   Take an interval
I=Xi  u  ...  u  XJ. We prove  that £(G,D  = AG)  I. Consider  (G'XI  =
(G.Xl) , ··· *(G.Xi-1) ,(G.D , (G,Xj+1) * ··· »(G,Xn).
The ranking rule f being globally monotone, we may deduce that AG'.X) =
AG.X). But. since f commutes with concatenation, AG'30 =
AG•Xi) ' ..., jIG,xi-1) ' ·RG,I) " .RG,Xj+1) ' ··· ' .RG,Xn)'
implying that AG,D = Xii ' ··· * Xj     =    AG)   I.     Hence,    f    is    interval
consistent In chapter 3, we proved that if f is interval consistent. then
it is induced by a choice function S. Next. we assume that f is tail
stable. Suppose that S(G.B') 9 B c B'. We have to prove that S(G.B) =
S(G,B'). Because f is globally monotone and is tail stable, we may change
the relation (G,B') to (G'.B') = (G.B) * (G.B'\B), while S(G'.B') =
S(G,B'). Since f commutes with concatenation, S is concatenation
consistent. hence S(G'.B') = S(G,B). ,
We next state a characterization of ftop·
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THEOREM 4.26 (Characterization of f   ) Lkt f on G bea ranking nde.  Then
top
f = f top\|f
• f is globally monotone
• f commutes with concatenation
• Max(f(GX)) = Max('c(GX)) for att (GX) e  G.
proof (only if) The global monotonicity of 4op follows from Aeorem 4.22.
The other two p:cpmtics are evident (if) In proposition 4.25, it is
proved that the first two properties imply that f is induced by a choice
function. The third property shows which choice function: top. ,
COROLLARY 4.17 Let fbea ranking rule. Then f=f     iiItop
• f is interval consistent
• Max(f(GX)) = Max(r(GX)) for all (G.X) e G. m
We end this section with a characterization of fvNM restricted to acyclic
asymmetric relations. It resembles theorem 4.5. To prove the theorem. we
nced the following lemna
• Externally consistent
Let f be a ranking rule on G. Then f is said to be externally
consistent, if the following holds for each (GX) e G.
Suppose  NGX)   =Xl   '   ···,   X   .  Then  for   all   1   5  i   <   j   5   n   and  alln
y   e   X    there   is   an   x   e    Xi,   such   that   xGy.
LEMMA 418 Let f be a ranking rule on A. the set of acyclic asynimetric
relations. Suppose
0 f is tail stable
• Max(GX) C Max(f(G,X)), for all (GX) e  A.
Then f is externally consistent.
Proof Assume that AG,X) =Z l  * ··· ' Zk. Take 1 S i<k. Suppose there is
an z € Z , j > i, such that for no zi E Zi we have ziGz in (GX). Define Y
=Zi u ... u f and consider (G,Y). Of course, (G,X) = Sub((G.X),(G,Y)).
Because f is tail stable, AG.X) = Sub(AG,X),AG,Y)). Hence AG,Y) =
AG,X)  Y=  Zi  *  ···  *  ZE
Now define V = Zi+1 u ... u Z . If we delete all relations vGz where v € V.
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obtaining (G'.V) 6 A(X). we see that z is top element of Sub((G.Y),(G'.V))
which is acyclic. But it is clear that z is not a top element of
ASub((G,Y),(G.V))) = Sub{AG.Y),RG,V)), which contradicts the second
assumption. I
THEOREM 4.29 (Characterization  of 4NM  on  A)  Let f be a ranking  nde  on  A.
Thenf=f.NMiff
0 f is tail stable
• Max(GX) 9 MaxU(GX))
(Condorcet principle)
• if aGb then -,a=b : f(G,X).
(local discriminating ability)
proof (only if) The first property is proposition 4.22(b). The second may
be proved using the construction theorem 4.9. To prove the third one, we
observe that because of acyclicity of (G,X) and internal stability of the
unique vNM-stable set. a and b can not both be element of it Suppose
jiG.X) = Zl ' ··· , Zn. Analogous arguments lead to the conclusion that for
all  i € {l '...,
n },   if   a   €    Zi   then   b   01    Zi·
(if) Suppose AG.X) =Z l, ··· "Z. From lernma 4.28 we deduce that then
first two properties imply that f is externally consistenL For example. we
know   that   for   all   x   €    X\Z 1   there does exist an clement   z   E    Zl   such   thatzGx. Combining this with the third property, we deduce that Zl is theunique vNM-stable set. Because.-f is tail stable on acyclic relations. we
may deduce that Z2 is the unique generalized vNM-stable set of X\Zl.
Indeed.  G.X) =Z l'  Z2  * ···  *Z.  Define Y = X\Z . Thenn                      1
ASub((G.X).(G,Y))) = Sub( G,X)/(G,Y)). Hence AG,Y) = Z2 »  - ' Zn. In
an     analogous     way we deduce     that     for     i     € {3 '...,
n},   Zi   is
the unique
generalized vNM-stable set for X\(Zlu...LIZi.1), •
The logical independence of the conditions:
( 1) Define 4 a s follows.a*b: 4(G.X) iff there exist a
partition X=A u B such that a G A,b€B and (G,X) = (G,A) *(G,B).
It is fairly easy to show, using theorem 3.4 of chapter 3 that h=4
iff h is independent of interval changes and commutes with
concatenation and permutation. Hence f satisfies condition 1 and 2.
but violates condition 3.
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(2)  Define  vNM(G.X) := fvNM vG.X). This rule satisfies conditions 1 and
3, but clearly violates condition 2.
(3)   11,c rule fop satisfies condition 2 and 3. Condition 1 is violated.
We conclude the chapter with two tables.
vNM vNM-max top
D-,
P„&,3 -niciL     i 
top           C             C
strat       cnn
Explanation: (i)   S c S' iff for all G € 0, S(G) c S'(G)
(ii)  S n S' iff for all G € 0, S(G) n S'(G) + 0.
Table 4.1 Set-theoretical relations.
A-IIA tail global SSP balanced
stability monotonicity dominant weights
vNM                                                                                           o
vNM                                                                                    omax
top            '              O                      •                       0              0
strat
0 :  not satisfied
.:  satisfied
Table 4.2 Table of properties
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CHAPTERS
CIRCULARITY MEASURES FOR TOURNAMENTS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Decision theory is partly aimed at structuring and clarifying
subjective reasoning. One aspect of this is the consistency or reliability
of a set of pairwise comparisons. This may be seen as the degree to which a
set of alternatives can be ordered from best to worst or to what extent a
preference relation can be sorted out.
Therefore. in all qualitative decision models there does exist a
possibility for the determination of the circularity or inconsistency. If
the circularity is too high. the problem must be reconsidered. Indeed, this
high circularity may indicate that the decision maker uses unsuitable
criteria in the evaluation of the alternatives. There may also be other
factors. such as dependence between criteria, limited reasonal skills or
the simple fact that all alternatives are more or less equal attractive.
For tournaments. there is a variety of circularity measures that one
may use. Well-known examples are Slater's i and the number of 3-cycles. But
this variety also appears to be a problem. because in general, the measures
give different answers. Furthermore, there does not exist a circularity
measure which is recognized or generally accepted as being the best.
Therefore. one tries to find measures which are most suitable for a certain
class of problems. This idea is carried out in this chapter by means of
characterizations and statistical analysis for some measures. thereby
indicating their domain of applicability.
We start with some definitions.
Definition 5.1
A circularity measure I on 1(X) is a function y : 1(X) -4 R. A circularity
measure 7 on Tisa family of circularity measures, one for each 0*XCU.
We mention a few publications concerning circulmity measures.
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Bezembinder (1981.1991). Coombs (1958). Davids (1988), Kendall-Smith
(1940), Phillips (1969), Slater (1961), Maas, Bezembinder. Wakker (1991).
5.2 INTRANSITIVITY AND RATIONALITY
In this section we discuss intransitive decisions and rationality. We show
that in some cases. it is possible for a person to reveal intransitive
decisions, while being rational. Nevenheless, in most cases, circularity
measures appear to be useful: they measure to what extent a set of
preferences    can    be    sorted    out,    thereby    giving    an    indication    of    a    person' s
consistency.
5.2.1 Definition and examples of intransitive preference
Rationality often is subdivided into two parts: (a) internal
consistency (e.g. transitivity) and (b) pursuit of self-interest (Pareto
optimallity etc). As noted by Sen (1986), this definition is too mechanical
and too permissive and does not capture the content of rationality. For
example. a person is considered to be rational when his preferences are
transitive. But few people would consider someone to be rational if the
choices are made by using the transitive, reversed preferences. Also. we
cannot say that someone not pursuing his own interest is not rational. He
may serve another goal. According to Sen, rationality is the correspondence
between the actual choice and a persons reasoning and quality of that
reasoning.
In Delver, Monsuur and Storcken (1991), we followed another route in the
investigation of the phenomenons of rationality and intransitivity. There
we started from the principle that alternatives as well as value systems
may be clarified to such a degree. that between any two elements of X (the
set of alternatives). a strict preference is uncovered. In addition. we
assume that after a certain threshold has been passed. adding further
detail will not. in any of the comparisons, cause reversal of preference.
X is value-distinguishable to a given subject if in each direct comparison
between two of its elements, their context and attributes on the one hand,
and    objectives    of   choice    and    the    subject' s    sense    of    value    on    the    other
hand, have been s iciently clarified, to reveal a definitive strict
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preference of one of the alternatives over the other. (Delver et al. 1991).
This notion allows for intransitive decisions or preferences:
An intransitivity is the result of (geminely) intransitive preference, if
there is no reason to believe that the binary decisions will change under
reconsiderations, because the set of alternatives X is value-
distinguishable and the intransitivities are compatible with a theory under
which the choices are being studied (compare Bezembinder and van Acker,
1980).
The combination of value-distinguishability and cycles may seem irrational.
But as mentioned in Delver et al. (1991), actually two levels of analysis
are bvolved. A tournament is value-distinguishable at the binary relation
level or local level. while cycles occur in the tournament as a whole. the
global level. Hence, alternatives may be value-distinguishable and yet be
equivalent.
Before we illustrate this idea. we may. in a non-specialist way of
speaking, compare this with some drawings from the famous Escher, for
example, 'waterfall'. Lncally. at every place. the drawing gives a
(correct) two-dimensional projection of a three-dimensional space. But
globally, the drawing belongs to the well-known class of impossible
figures.
Now, suppose you own a restaurant. At a certain moment there are 3 guests.
all who want to have the same dinner. You can offer them the choice between
dinners a. b and c. The three guests reveal the following preference:
guest   1:         a   ,   b   ,  c
guest 2:   b,c,a
guest 3: c,a,b.
Which dinner has to be served? Looking at the majority in each pairwise
comparison of the available dinners, you will reach the decision: a * b,
b     *cand    c     *a, a cyclic pattern. see figure     5.1. To Fishburn     (1970),     it
illustrates the untenability of the transitivity condition as a general
desideratum for social choice functions.
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Figure 5.1 A circular tournament.
The second example takes a closer look at what you do not choose in a
pairwise comparison, by introducing the notion of regret which is the only
decision criterion    in    the following example.     Let    X    =     { a.b.c} where    the
elements refer to actions in the decision table below, with states P. Q and
R. each having probability 1/3. The numbers in the table are payoffs.
PQR
a 0 2 1
b 1 0 2
c 2 1 0
Table 5.1 Decision table. (compare Loomes and Sugden. 1984, page 231).
Using Savage's minimax regret criterion in the pairwise comparisons, the
subject would find X value-distinguishable: The maximum regret of b with
respect to a is 2. which would occur if Q materializes. Conversely, the
maximum regret    of    a    relative     to    b    is     1, in states    P    and    &     If    one    tries    to
minimize the maximal possible regret. a is preferred to b. Similarly b is
preferred to c and c to a. All the same a, b and c form a cycle, see figure
5.1. The value of what is chosen depends on what has been rejected.
These examples show that it is not always possible to obtain transitivity
after careful reflection. Intransitivity is not experienced as the result
of poor reasoning. Indeed, in both examples, the alternatives are
value-distinguishable and the decisions are compatible with a theory of
choice.
The two examples clearly illustrate the need for a global level of
analysis. Indeed, from a more global viewpoint, we see that the
alternatives 'play the same role: This may be seen with the help of figure
5.1: there does not exist a reasonable scale of measurement that can treat
the three alternatives as being different. Hence, instead of circulating
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forever between the three possible choices. each time striving for a better
alternative. we switch to a higher level of analysis. We conclude that the
three alternatives are equivalent
In the scientific literature. one may find other examples of
intransiove choices. For example. if the alternatives aIe
multi-dimensional. violations of transitivity may be observed. The number
of primitive characteristics (attributes) by which alternatives can be
compared is so large as to necessitate a selection of the criteria. Since
this sampling may depend On the alternatives that are to be compared, there
is a possibility of circular behaviour. See Quandt (1956). Also see some
experiments conducted by Tversky (1969). He showed that under specified
experimental conditions. consistent and predictable intransitivities can be
demonstrated.
Yet another example of an intransitive phenomenon is given by the
intransitive indifference. If R is a preference on a set X. then
indifference I is defined to be
aIb ** (not aRb) and (not bRa).
Luce (1956) supplies arguments against the transitivity of indifference.
Most people would prefer a cup of coffee with one spoon of sugar to a Cup
with five spoons. But if sugar is added by 1/100 of a gram, they would be
indifferent between successive cups. This contradicts the transitivity Of
indifference. Luce therefore introduced the concept of a semi-order.
Motivated by the use of thresholds in psychophysics. he gave the following
representation of a semi order:
aRb ** there exists an f such that f(a) > f(b) + 6.
where 6 is a pre-chosen constant > 0.
In Fishbum (1991), examples, showing why a cyclic pattern xTy. yTz
and zTx may be rejected, are discussed. They all concern situations in
which the intransitivity, together with other principles of rational
decision making, leads to contradictions. For example. consider the
following actions f and g in a three-state context with equally likely




The state-by-state dominance principle says that f is preferred to g.
because xTy, yTz and zTx. But. on the other hand. f and g results in
precisely the same lottery: you receive price x. y and z each with
probability 1/3.
To Fishburn this problem is not real. He argues that the strong dominance
is more compelling than reduction, because reduction separates the
comparison from its context by obliterating the state-by-state alignments
of outcomes for the two actions. Hence, f N gis considered to be
reasonable in this examole.
In my opinion, agaifi two levels of analysis may be distinguished, a local
and a global one. The state-by-state comparison yields f » g, the global
analysis leads to the conclusion that f g g. This is no contradiction,
because the conclusions are not objectively comparable and, in our view,
cannot be made independent of the kind of analysis in which one is involved
or theory one adheres to. An analogous situation occurs in studying the
phenomenon of light: the nature of light (wave or particle) depends upon
the setting of the experiment
Because of the occurrence of intransitivities, many authors reject the
weak order as part of a normative theory, which deals with ideals and
principles (often culturally conditioned) of good decision making. Fishburn
(1991) mentions three lines of research that challenge the status of
transitivity as cornerstone of order and rationality. Firstly, a variety of
experiments and examples Suggest that people sometimes violate
transitivity. like in the examples above or as described in Tversky (1969).
Secondly. theoretical studies show that in many cases one may obtain Nash
equilibria, maximally preferred lotteries. economic equilibria and so on,
without the assumption of transitivity. Thirdly, new models have been
developed and axiomatized that do not assume transitivity. Most of these
models are in the form
X ky  **  $(X,y) 20.
where 0 : XxX + R. A cycle xTy, yTz and zTx is modeled by 0(x,y) > 0,
(Ky,z) > 0 and $(z,x) > 0. If (D(x,y) = u(x) - u(y), we obtain the familiar
representation
x 2 y  **  u(x) 2 u(y).
Also sce van Acker (1977).
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5.2.2 On the use of circularity measures
Although nontransitive models do exist. the concept of an order has
attractive properties. It is easy to use and easy to understand. Moreover.
practical considerations may force us to make choices in correspondence
with the assumption of transitivity. For example, a politician looses his
credibility if his priorities are circular.
But. as demonstrated in the previous subsection. tournaments often
contain intransitivities. Therefore, these tournament results have to be
ordered. This deciding between alternatives using tournament results. means
the balancing of global information. Circularity measures can be indicative
in that process. This way, using circularity measures, we think that we can
help a decision maker to explore his problem and bring inconsistent beliefs
and preferences to his attention so that he can resolve them.
5.3 SLATER'S I AND KENDALL-BABINGTON SMITH'S LAMBDA
We   consider   two   well-known   circularity   measures:   Slater' s   i   and   the   number
of 3-cycles X. which was introduced by Kendall and Babington Smith. In
section 53.1. we introduce them and show some diferences. In section
53.2     it    is    shown    that     a     combination    of    a    few    properties     leads     to     an
impossibility. Altogether, these two sections illustrate the need for
characterizations.       These        are        developed        in        sections        5.3.3        and        5.3 A.
Finally.     in    section    533,    we     give     a    discussion.    Un     section    5.6,    we     use
statistical techniques to compare 1 and i.)
5.3.1 Introduction of the two circularity measures
In this section. we introduce two circularity measures. As will become
clear. these two measures may give entirely different solutions to the
question which of a set of tournaments is most circular.
Suppose the following tournament Ti contains the results of the pairwise
comparisons between alternatives a, b, c. d and c.
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T i a b c d c with graph         a
a-1 1 1 0        b 
b O-1 1 1
c 0 0-1 1
d 0 0 0-1
c 1 0 0 0- c-d
The tournament is no linear order: the number of 3-cycles is 3. These
3-cycles aT,bT,eT,a. aT,cT,eTja and aTldT,(Tla, we regard as
inconsistencies.
In case of preferences. there are several explanations for the occurrence
of inconsistencies. see section 5.2. But since often we are interested in
establishing a transitive tournament, we may ask ourselves, to what extent
this tournament does represent an order. And if we draw the conclusion that
there must be an underlying order that generated this tournament. one may
ask: which order?
In the example above, the number of 3-cycles is 3. Note that they arecaused by one pair:
eT,a. Since a linear order is free of cycles, one may
say that there are 3 violations of linearity. Therefore we introduce the
circularity measure 4 which counts the number of 3-cycles. It was first
used by Kendall and Babington Smith (1940). In our example, X(T,) = 3.Intuitively. the larger k<T). the less T represents an order.
Definition 5.2
Let T be a tournament. Then 1(T) is the number of 3-cycles.
For all tournaments T, the circularity MT) is easy to compute:
PROPOSITION 5.1 (Kendall, Babington Smith (1940)). Lzt (770 be a
tournament. Then
'S 1
*TJO    =     [;1    -   I     12'j.
J XEXC
where   (sx XEX  is  the  score  vector   of  (TX),  n  =    \X\.
Moreover, the maximum number, Xmar is (2-n)124 if n is odd,(24n)124   if  n   is   even.
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proof The total number of
triads  is     .   Given  an  element x, there   are   I2191triads in which x dominates the other two, meaning that these are
non-circular triads. For the determination of Xmax' see Moon (1968. page
9)..
We assume that if MT) is small, it is compatible with an trder, not
withstanding a lack of perfection. But which order has to be taken? We
propose the weak order fouu(I). The motivation for this choice is given in
section 5.3.5.
In Kadane (1966). it is proved that X.(T) is the number of preference
reversals necessary to break all ties in the score vector. To see this.
suppose that x,Tx2 and xi and x2 do have the same score. say a. Let us
consider the effect of reversing the preference between x, and x2. The only
triads affected are those containing xt and x2' There are four possible
types of such triads:
x,   %   say u in number./\
J ·  ,          which must number a -  1  - u to assure that the score- x2       of x1 equals  a.
Z
which must number a-u t o assure that the score of x
2
X           - X also equals a.
When xiTx2 is reversed. the first two remain noncircular. The third becomes
circular, the fourth ceases     to     be     so.     Thus    X     has been reduced     by     1.     (See
David, 1988).
A second approach for the determination of circularity is provided by
Slater (1961). who searched for the nearest linear orders. To introduce
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this method. we suppose that we have a linear order in mind. What is its
difference or distance to T? To compute this, we define a metric on
relations. which are assumed to be subsets of the cartesian product XxX.
where X is the space of alternatives.
This metric counts the number of elements of XxX that are in p and not in q
or in q and not in p. More popular. it counts the number of ordered pairs
upon which p and q d o not agree. For example. if p=a»b»c and
q=b,a*c. then d(p,q) =2: see definition 5.3.
Definition 5.3
Let p. q g X)(X be two relations on X. The distance between p and q is
d(p,q) =  1(0 u 9)- (0 n $)1,
where for arbitrary relations p,  =pu idx· (  is reflexive).
To give an example, let p=a»b»c»d»e, and let q=T,b e the
tournament of page 8. It is easy to verify that d(p,q) = 2. because of
(e,a) € T,. (e,a) i p and (a.e) E p. (a.e) i Tl.
Which linear order iS closest to T? Slater (1961) proposed to take the
linear orders which minimize the metric d. The corresponding circularity
measure i is defined by:
Definition 5.4
Let   (TX)   be   a  tournament.  Then  i(TX)  =     12          min           d((LX),(TX))(L.X)€UX)
which is equal to the minimal number of preference reversals needed to
convert (TX) into a linear order.
In our example. i(T,) = 1. A linear order that has minimal distance to T is
called a nearest adjoining order. In our example Ti' there is just one
nearest adjoining order: a»b*c*d*e.
How can we compute i('ID? Interesting methods for the computation of
Slater's i and all nearest adjoining orders have been developed in Remage
and Thompson (1966) and Phillips {1967. 1969). The computations require
exponential computer time. Another method is described in Bezembinder
(1981) (for small values of i only).
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As proved by Kadane (1966). MT) is the number of preference reversals
necessary to break all ties in the score vector. Hence for all tournaments
T: i(T) 5 %(T). It also shows that i and X belong to a same category:
pairwisc comparisons are reversed so that the tournament becomes
non-circular.
Yet. the circularity measures X and i may be quite different For example,
take a linear order on n alternatives. Then reverse the comparison between
the top and bottom element In that case, the number of 3-cycles is equal
to n - 2. all cycles going through the same arc. As for the measure i. a
reversal between top and bottom has the same weight as a reversal between
the k-th and the (k + 2)-th alternative, 1 5 k E n-2. Hence i i s equal to
1. To summarize, X does not care about counting things double. while i does
not take into account the position of the two alternatives in the linear
order.
To show another difference. consider the following tournaments.
Let T be
a b c d c f
a-1 1 1 0 1
b O-1 1 1 1
c 0 0-1 1 1
d 0 0 0-1 1
e 1 0 0 0-1
f 0 0 0 0 0-
The unique nearest adjoining order is {a} » {b} » {c} * {d} * {el * {f}.
Hence    iCD    =     1. By using the formula from proposition    5.1.    we    calculate
X(T) = 3.
Now. let S be equal to
a b c d e f
a-1 0 1 1 1
b O-1 1 1 1
c 1 0-1 1 1
d 0 0 0-1 0
e 0 0 0 0-1
f 0 0 0 1 0-
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A nearest adjoining ordering is {al » {b} » {c} » {d} » {e} » {f}, giving
i(S) = 2. Since there are two 3-cycles, MS) = 2.
We deduce that using i. S is more circular than T, while using 4 T appears
to be more circular than S.
Thus, in the determination which of a set of tournaments is most circular,
it matters which measure is taken. In the following subsection. we will
show that there is no circularity measure that combines all attractive
features (to be introduced hereafter) of both i and X.
5.3.2 An impossibility theorem
In this subsection, we introduce a few desirable properties for circularity
measures. We will show that. taken together. they lead to an impossibility.
All these properties are satisfied by either i or X.
• Standardization
A circularity measure 7 on T(X) satisfies standardization. if
for all T: 7(T) 2 0: *T) = O Yl T € UX).
It is clear that the standardization is a desirable property.
In what follows, we frequently need the notion of a tournament with one
reversal. If xTy then yxT denotes the tournament T with only (x.y)
reversed. The tournament yxT is obtained from T by means of an elementary
change. To be more precise:
Definition 5.5
Let Tbea tournament on X and x*y€X. Then yxT is a tournament that is
defined by
yxT   =    {CY,I)}   U  7\{(X.y)}.
Looking at the introduction of the measure i in the previous section, we
observe that it satisfies the following property:
• Uniform weighting of elementary changes
A circularity measure 7 on T(X) uniformly weighs elementary changes,
if for  all  x  *y.x'  *f,  which  are  element  of X,
if  *yxT)   >  *T)  and  MY x'T)   >   VT)  then
1(yxT) = 1(y'X'T).
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As made clear with the example of the linear order with top and bottom
element reversed, X does not satisfy this property.
A tournament is a linear order if and only if there are no ties in the
score vector. Now. MT) may be reduced by breaking ties in the score
vector. Therefore we introduce the following property:
• Tie-brenking reduction
A circularity measure 1 on T(X) satisfies tie-breaking reduction,
if for all x, ye  X  such that x*y,
ifsx= syand xTythen *yxT) < *T).
The reader will convince himself that Slater's i does not satisfy the
tie-breaking reduction property.
Of course, we do not want our circularity measure to depend upon different
ways of naming the alternatives. Therefore, we demand
• Independence of labeling
A circularity measure i on T(X) is independent of labeling if
for all permutations c of X. *dr)) = VT).
All of these four properties are more or less natural. But. as will be
proved in theorem 5.2, there is no circularity measure that fulfills all
these conditions.
THEOREM 5.1 Let  X  2 4. There does not exist a circularity measure 1 on
1(X) that satisfies standardization. uniform weighting of elementary
changes. tie-breaking reduction and independency of labeling.
proof
a -
, = „i) =  ,}5 11  and  a  . 70,)  . '12<1    ,   0




because of the uniform weighting of
elementary changes.
In the last tournament f, we have sa = sb' while afb. Hence. using the
tie-breaking reduction property. we conclude that
'a - b'
a >fr5 -y Ix'.d -c
But this is in contradiction with the independence of labeling, because
there exists a permutation a. such that dI'* = f. ,
Because of the differences described in section 5.3.1. and the
impossibility theorem presented above, we have to consider the question
which measure has to be taken in different situations. In the following
subsections, we give a characterization for both measures. Moreover. in
section 5.6, we compare them using statistical techniques. These
considerations may help us to choose the appropriate measure for a given
situation. We conclude our comparison with a discussion in section 5.3.5.
5.3.3 An axiomatization of Slater's i
Take a tournament T and suppose i(T) = i,. Let S be a tournament that
differs from T in just one pair. We say that Slater's i gives equal weight
to      all      preferences,      because     i(S)      E       (i,      -      1.i„io     + 1} , irrespective      of      the
pair in which the tournaments differ. Apparently, there does not exist a
context so that some preference reversals are more sweeping and therefore
must receive more weight To express this more formally, we hereafter
introduce a property which we call equability. Together with two mild
assumptions, it completely characterizes multiples of Slater's i.
We impose the following conditions or axioms upon K
A circularity  measure 1 on T(X)  satisfies
• Standardization
if for  all T:  1(T) 2 0  and *T)  =  O ijf T  e  UX).
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• Reducibility by elementary changes
if for  all T  e  UX)  there  exists  a pair  (a.b)  such  that
*baT) < *T).
• Equability
if for  all  x.x'.y.y'  e  X  and TI  E  T(X):
if  xTy,  iT y'.  1(yxT)  *  *T)   and  Vy'x'T)  *  1(T'),
then 17(yxT) - VT)  = 17(y'x'T') - 7(T) .
Note that the equability implies uniform weighting of elementary changes.
The existence of a positive response by means of an elementary change
is guaranteed by the reducibility property. The equability means that the
effect of all elementary changes at the local level is weighted uniformly.
All observed binary decisions are assumed to be of equal importance and are
given equal weighL In theorem 5.3 we prove that y fulfills
standardization, reducibility and equability, if and only if there exists a
positive number k. such that 7 = ki.
THEOREM 5.3 (Characterization of Slater's i) Let X = ixl'-'.9,3 be afinite set of alternatives. A circularity measure 7 : 1(X) 4 R
satisfies the conditions of standardization, reducibility and
equability,
if and only if there exists a positive number k, such that 7 = ki,
where  i   is  Slater' s  i.
proof (if) To prove the standardization property, we observe that i(L) = 0
if L E LOO. If T e 1.00. then i(T) =t>0. Furthermore, there is a pair
xTy. such that i(yxT) =t-1, because i i s the minimal number of upscts
necessary to reach L(X). This proves the reducibility. The equability is
evident from the definition of i and k.
Conly if) Take T' I L(X). Because of the reducibility. there exists a pair
x'.y'   such   that  7(yxT')   0 7(T'). Define   b = 17(y'x'T')   -   7(T') 1    >  0.   Then.
using the equability, this number b is the same for all T and all pairs x.y
such that *yxT) 0 *T).
Now consider  y. Then
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 *L) = 0 if L € L(X) and
 *yx'r) -  7(T) = O or *1 forall T and all x.y.
We prove that  7 = i. which means that we may take k -b.
Take a tournament T. If T E L(X) then  7(T) = i(T) = 0. Now suppose
T *1 LOO. Using the standardization and reducibility properties and the
fact    that    1 T(X) I    <   oo.    we may deduce that there exists a sequence   of
tournaments






such that the corresponding values of  y are strictly descending. But we
already proved that the drop in value must be in steps of 1, which means
that  7(T) =s k i(T). Now, take any sequence of tournaments. starting with
T and ending up in L(JO. Again, changes in value of  7 are restricted to
1                                           1-1. 0 and 1. Because 6*L) = 0 if L f LOO and 57(T) = s, this sequence
(without T) contains at least s tournaments. Thus i(T) 2 s, implying that
'.(T)=s= l*T). .
Theorem 5.3 means that the set of circularity indices that satisfy the
three conditions, is parameterized by the set of positive numbers, or
similarity transformations, which means that for each X, such a circularity
measure is on a ratio scale. The value of k(X) may be computed by taking a
circular tournament T': k(X) = 7(T'.X)/i(T'.X).
The  independence  of  the three conditions of theorem  5.3   if    X    2  3.
CA) Take X = {al'a2'83'34}. If Ti = al » 32 * 83 1 84. then we define
7(T') = 1. for all other linear tournaments L we define KL) = 0. Next. let
f be equal to
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Define *f) = 2. For all other tournaments T', we define 7(T') = i(T').
This circularity measure is not independent of labeling. But it satisfies
the reduction property and equability of elementary changes. To show the
reduction property: All tournaments T' 0 f can be converted into a linear
tournament L' 4 T'. by means of an elementary change. As for the
equability: All tournaments    T'     0    f are assigned a value    0    or 1. There     is
no tournament T' with 7(T') = 0 that can be converted into f by means of
an elementary change. It is clear that this choice of y does not satisfy
standardization.
If    X    =  3  then  take  y  -  i  +   1.  Then  7  does not fulfill standardization.
(B) Take y = 4 where X<T) is the number of 3-cycles of T. It does not
satisfy the equability    if      X       2    4:     reverse     top and bottom element    in    a
linear order. To show that it satisfies reducibility, find that alternative
j with highest score sj, that is dominated by an alternative k with lowest
score    sk.    Take    (a.b)    =    (kj).    As    for    the    case      X      =    3.    give    different
values to the two possible 3-cycles.
(C)  Take y as follows. If T € 1„ then *T) = 0, otherwise *T) = 1. This
measure docs not satisfy the reducibility condition.
From part A of the verification of the independence of the conditions, one
may conjecture the following corollary. Its proof is completely analogous
to that Of theorem 5.3.
COROLLARY 5.4 Let X = fxl····.xn  be a finite set of alternatives. A
circularity      measure      7      :      1(X)      -*     R     satisfies      independence      of      labeling,
reducibility and is equable.
if and only if there exists a positive number k and a number c, such
that  Y  =   ki  +   c.  where  i  is  Slater' s  i.  m
The set of circularity measures that satisfy these conditions are on an
interval scale.
In preparation of proposition 5.5. we introduce the following conditions.
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that may be seen as weaker versions of the equability condition.
• The smallest step property
A circularity measure 7 on T(X) satisfies the smallest step property,
if for all T. the following holds. If aTb then there are no T with
*T )  strictly  between *T)  and  *baT).
• Level dependence
A circularity measure 7 on T(X) is level dependent if there exist
functions v,w : R -+ IO,00), such that for all x.y e X and all T:
if *yxT) 5 *T) then *yxT) = v(*T)), else *yxT) =  «*T)).
Note that if a circularity measure is level dependent. then it uniformly
weighs elementary changes (introduced in section 5.3.2.).
PROPOSHION 5.5 Let X be a finite set of alternatives.
(a) A circularity measure 7 on T(X) satisfies standardization,
reducibility and the smallest step property, if and only if
there exists a stiictly increasing function 4:R -4 R with *0) =0,
such  that  7  =  4oi,  where  i   is   Slater' s  i.
(b) A circularity measure 7 on T(X) satisfies standardization.
reducibility and is level dependent, if and only if
there exists a strictly increasing function 4:R-,R with *0) =0,
such  that  Y  =  4oi,  where  i  is  Slater' s  i.
proof We only give a brief sketch of the proof of the 'only if of part a.
the rest is left to the reader. We may define sets or levels of
tournaments, where each level consists of tournaments that need the same
number of preference reversals to convert a tournament T into a linear
tournament, under the restriction that the corresponding sequence of
circularities is strictly decreasing. Now, define the function 0 for each
level. i
Such       measures       are       on       a restricted ordinal scale.       It      is       restricted.       because,
using the standardization property, we must have 0(0) = 0, which is the
natural zero point of circularity. Ordinal scales with a zero point arc
rare. To the best of our knowledge, the only two places in the literature
where they do come up are in Bezembinder and van Acker (1987. page 102) and
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Coombs and Avrunin (1988. page 82).
Since the positive number k. defined in the proof of theorem 5.3. depends
upon the choice of X. we cannot state:
for all (T.X) € T(X) and all (S,Y) 6 T(Y):
7(T,X) > 7(S,Y) iff i(T,X) > i(S,Y).
This    may    be    seen by taking   y   = I X I i. satisfying all three conditions    of
theorem 5.3. and choosing (T,X) and (S,Y) such that ig,X) = i(S.Y). while
X 1   >    Y   Indeed.  we  have  KT,X)  >  *S,Y).
To achieve a result that is independent of the set of alternatives X. we
*introduce an additional axiom for a circularity measure on T*. We let T be
the set of tournaments on arbitrary finite X = {xl-- •xk}. Also see
chapter 3. section 3.5.4.
• Extensiveness
A circularity measure 1 on  E satisfies extensiveness, if
for all tournaments (TY) and (TZ) with Y n Z = 0:
*(TY),(Tl)) = 1(TY) + *TZ).
As for the name, attributes that have additive properties have
traditionally been called extensive in the theory of measurement (see
Roberts, 1979).
We have the following theorem. Its proof is analogous to the proof of
theorem 5.3.
THEOREM 5.6 A circularity measure 7: T  -* R satisfies standardization,
reducibility and equability of elementary changes for each finite set
X. and satisfies the extensiveness property if and only if there
exists  a  positive  number  k.  such  that  1  =  ki.  where  i  is  Slater' s  i.   
5.3.4 An axiomatization of Kendall-Babington Smith's lambda
In the previous subsection. we characterized Slater's i. The distinguishing
property was the equability. As already made clear in section 5.3.1, the
number of 3-cycles is not equable. A reversal between top and bottom
clement of a linear order introduces more 3-cycles than other reversals.
Yet, it satisfies a related property, which we call outscore equability:
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Two elementary changes are weighted uniformly, if the domination difference
between the elements of both pairs is the same. more precise:
Let  s  =  (sx)xe X'  be the score vector  of  T.
A circularity measure 7 on 1(X) satisfies
• Standardization
if for  all T:  1(T) 2 0:  VT)  =  O  £5 T  €  UX).
• Outscore equability
if for all x.y,x'.y'  e  X  and Tr  €  1(X):
if  xTy   and   x'Ty'    and   s %-s   -   s' x'-s'  y.
then  "1(yxT)  -  1(T)  =   yly'x'T)  -  *T).
One may view the score of an alternative as a measure of the strength
or desirability of that alternative, and thus order the alternatives by
their score, as is done in ranking players in a win or loose round robin
tournament. The difference between the scores may be seen as the distance
on that scale given by the scores. The outscore equability relates the
change of circularity that a reversal may cause, to that difference. In
theorem   5.10 we prove   that y satisfies the standardization and outscore
equability property. if and only if y = kl for some k > 0, where *T) is
the number of 3-cycles of T.
LEMMA 57 The circularity measure 1 satisfies standardization and outscore
equability.
proof l'he standardization is evident. As for the outscore equability,
suppose xTy. Now consider Myx'D - A.(T). It is easy to verify that this is
equal to
12,1 +12,1 -1,2-11 -1,2.11
which isequal tosx-sy- lifsxklands 20.I
Note that Slater's i does not satisfy the outscore equability. To show
this, recall that the number of 3-cycles of a tournament is equal to the
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number of preference reversals necessary to break all ties in the score
vector (Kadane, 1966). Sometimes. such a preference reversal reduces the
value of i. sometimes it does not. showing that Slater's i is not outscore
equable.
In preparation of theorem 5.10. we present the following two lemmas. The
first lemma shows that the larger the difference between the scores of x
and y. the larger is tile effect of the preference reversal between x and y.
LEMMA 5.8 Suppose that a circularity measure 7 on T(X) satisfies
standardization and outscore equability.
Then, for att tournaments T€ 1(X) and all x*y€X such that xTy. we
have 1(yxT) - VT) = a(sx - s  - 1) for some constant a > 0.
proof From the outscore equability. we deduce that if xTy then 7(yx'D -
7(T) = f(sx - s ). for some f:Z- *R.W e prove that there are real numbers
a    and    b,    such    that    for    all    t    €     1 1,2 .....
 X  -1 }.     f(t)     =    at    +    b.     Take     a
tournament   T   e    LOO.     X     =   n   2  3,   and   x.y.z   E    X.   such   that   sz   =   0,   s    =   1.
Sx 2 2 and xTyTz. Because yx(zy'D = zy(yxT). we obtain the relation
f(1) + f(sx) = f(sx - 1) + f(2). This may be rewritten as
f(s ) - f(s -1) = f(2) - f(1).
Because s  can take any value between 2 and n-1. this implies that «t) =
at +b,t€ 11,2,3.....n-1.}. If a=0 then f(t) =b. USing the
standardization. we sce that b > 0. But then we arrive at a contradiction.
For take T to be linear and x and y are two consecutive alternatives in
that linear ordering. Then yxT is a linear ordering too. which means that
0 =7(yxT) = b. Hence a#0. If T € L(X) and sx - s  = 1, then yxT € L(X),
thus f(1) =0. But f(1) =a+b, hence b= -a. Now. Rt) = a(t-1). Because
7 2 0, we have f 2 0, thus a > 0.
Now, consider the case sx - s  5 0 and xTy. Then we have s'  2 s'x + 1 and
yT'x. T' = PT, where s' stands for the score in yxT. Applying what already
has been proved. we obtain 7(T) = 7(yxT) + a(s'  - s'x - 1). Because
s'y = sy + lands'x = sx - 1. we finally arrive at
KyxT) = 7(T) + a(sx - sy - 1). I
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LEMMA 5.9 i[kt 0 : Ium) -* R. Then $01 sati es standardization and
outscore equability. g *t) = kt. for some k > 0.
proof (only if) Because of lemma 5.8, $ok(yx'D - 001(T) = a(s  -s  -1) for
some number a > 0. We prove that 0(t) = at. We use induction to K = MT).
(Basis step) If K = 0, then T € L(X). So, using the standardization
property, we obtain 0 = $ok(T) = 0(0).
(Induction step). Suppose that for k 5 K. we have 0(k) = ak. Now take T
such that 0 = X(yx'D = K+1 and a = 1(T) 5 K. Then
0(B) - 0(a) = 00*yx'D - toMT) = a(sx - s  - 1). (lemma 5.8)
Thus
0(B) = Ma) + a(sx -sy-1)
= ak(T) + a(sx - sy - 1). (induction hypothesis)
Hence
4(B)=aCACT) + sx-sy- 1)
= a(X<77 + A.(yxT) - A.(77) (lemma 5.7)
= al(yxll = aB.
(if) The standardization is obvious. The measure y is outscore equable.
because kA(yxT) = k[MT) + sx - sy - 1] = kl(T) + k(sx - sy - 1).I
THEOREM 5.10 (Characterization of k) The circWarity measure y on T(X)
satisfies standardization and is outscore equable i  there exists a
number k>0 such thaty= kk
proof (if) This is already done in lemma 5.9.
Conly if) The measure y is completely determined by the choice of the
number a in lemma 5.8, for example X is determined by a - 1. Take a
tournament T. It may be obtained through a sequence of reversals between
pairs of alternatives. starting with a linear tournament L. Suppose we have
the chain
L =f + Tiv 72 4...vr= T
where    two    consecutive    tournaments    only    differ    in    one    pair:    T'    =    y x,H -1.
17441.  i  G I l '...'n }.   Next. we define
di = s(xi··r-') - s(yi,·r-1), where s(x,T) is the score of x in f. From
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lemma 5.8, we may deduce: 79') = a(d, - 1), *f) = a(d, - 1) + a(d2 - 1).
.... y(T) = i ' a(d, - 1). But this is equal to a i , (di - 1) = aMT). .
Note that lemma 5.9 cannot replace theorem 5.10. For, suppose we only have
lemma 5.9. Then we cannot be sure that there does not exist a circularity
measure K satisfying standardization and the outscore equability. while
7 4 *ok for 811 choices of 0. For example, it couJd be possible that for
two tournaments T and S we have X(T) = ACS), while 7(T) 4 *S). meaning
that the axioms would not imply regularity of the scale. see Roberts (1979,
theorem 2.1). Also consider the discussion preceding theorem 5.6.
Logical independence of the conditions of theorem 5.10.
(1) The measure i satisfies standardization. It is not outscore equable.
(2) If only the outscorc equability must be satisfied, we may take X + 1.
5.3.5 Discussion: comparison and applicability
As is made clear in the characterizations of Slater's i and 1, again
we meet two levels of analysis. First of all, we have Slater's i which
weights all preferences uniformly, because for all tournaments T and all
x.y     €     X,    if    i(D    =    i,    then    i(yxT.X)     €      {i, -     1.i„    i,    +     1} . This matches    a
local level of analysis, where all preferences receive equal weight. There
is no information, order or context available causing some inconsistencies
to be more sweeping and therefore deserving more weight. Secondly, we have
Kendall-Babington Smith's lambda. The characterization of X shows that
changes in the existing status quo, are taken into account by using scores.
One may assert that the status quo is a weak order. determined by the
scores: the larger the difference between the scores of x and y. the more
impact the reversal between x and y has on the circularity. Hence, although
in general the tournament T is no weak order. it bears in it a weak order,
for example the one that may be derived by looking at the scores. This fits
a more global level of analysis. which consists of balancing and weighting
pairwisc comparisons. Also see section 5.6.1.
Therefore. we discern two domains of applicability for our circularity
measures. Slater's i may be useful when there is no reason to believe that
the comparisons satisfy the conditions of a linear order. This is the case
when for example pairwise comparisons arc generated randomly or when we
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have a problem where we may expect a large number of inconsistencies. Then
Slater's i indicates to what extent these pairwise comparisons constitute
an order. In all other cases, when we have to decide to what extent an
order is disturbed. we recommend the use of X.
5.4 CIRCULARITIES DEFINED BY THE SCORE VECTOR
As stated in proposition 5.1, the number of 3-cycles in a tournament (TX)
is   x(rx)   =     f'    -  I    \2 \,   where    sx   is   the    score    of   alternative   x.   Thus   1   isC XEXC J
a function of the score vector. In this section, we characterize the
circularity measures that are a function of the score vector, by using
Independence of 3-Cycle Orientation. Furthermore. we show that the strict
utility model may be seen as a probabilistic analogon of this notion.
5.4.1 Independence of 3-Cycle Orientation
First. we introduce rT. Let T € TOO. Suppose r is a 3-cycle in T. Then rT
is the tournament which can be obtained from T by reversing (the
orientation of) the 3-cycle r in T. If the 3-cycle r is equal to aTbTcTa.
we may denote this tournament with <abc>T.
If alternatives form a 3-cycle, we may interpret this as an indifference of
these alternatives. Therefore. we demand that the orientation of a 3-cycle
does not have consfquences for the circularity:
• Independence of 3-cycle orientation
A circularity measure 7 on T(X) is independent of 3-cycle orientaion,
if for  all T  e  1(X)  and  all  3-cycles  r  in T:
*T) = *rT).
The effect of reversals of 3-cycles on rankings have been studied
extensively: se for example Moon (1968, page 73), Henriet (1985), Bouyssou
(1992) and the chapters 2 and 3 of this monograph.
The following theorem provides a characterization of these measures: they
are functionally dependent of the score vector.
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THEOREM 5.11 Let X = {xj.....x  be a finite set of alternatives. A
circularity measure i on T(X) is independent of 3-cycle orientation
if   there   exists   a  function  f   :   it   +  R,   n   =    \X \.   such   that
1(T)  = f(sl '..."'sn).  where  (s 1 '...in) is the score vector of T.
proof (if) Because f only depends on the score vector, which is the same
for T and rT for all 3-cycles r of T, 7 is independent of 3-cycle
orientation.
(only  if)  Lct  X bc equal  to {a, ....,a }.     Suppose    that    the score vectors    of
T and S are the same: (s, '...'s ),   where   s   is   the   score   of   alternative   a,
i € {1 .....
n }.     We    must    show    that   *T)    =    KS)    if   7    is    independent    of    3-cycle
orientation. If we prove that S may be obtained from T through a series of
3-cycle reversals. we are finished, because of the independence condition.
Just for the convenience, we assume that 1 b1 '....b }    is    a   labeling   of   the
set X such that the corresponding scores are not increasing.
Take     the     alternative b,. Consider the smallest     k     such     that     (T.{b,.bk l)     4
(S.{ bi,bk  ) Suppose b,Tbk' which means that bkSb,.   Because  sb (T)  =
st't(S),
there exists an alternative bz with b,Sbz and bzTb,. By the
minimality of k. z > 2 thus sk 2 sz.
We consider two cases. Case I: b Tbz' Case II: bybk
In  case  I,  we  have  the  3-cycle  b,TbkTbyb,.  See  figure  5.2. Ris 3-cycle
does not contain arcs
between  b,  and b  with p  < k  Now.  T'  = <b.b.b >T1' k' zis a tournament that is obtained from T by a 3-cycle reversal. Moreover.
the pairwise comparisons
between   b,   and   b,   i   e {1 '....k }     is     the     same    both
for S and <b„bk.b>T.
b    b        -b
bi  ../ k
1                                                k
r
bz-        bj
Case I Case II
Figure 5.2
Now  consider  case II. Because  sk  2  s z,  we  know that there exists  an
alternative     b     such     that     b Tb.     b.Tb.     Thus     we     have     the     4-cycleJ       k j'  z
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b, TbkTbTb:Tb,. See figure 5.2. Define r = bzTb TbjTb:. Then we have the
following 3-cycle   in   T'    =   <b 'bk'b>T:   v    =   biT'b T'b:T'b,    and
<bl,bk'b,<b,b.,b.>T   is   a   tournament   that is obtained   from T through   aZ     Z K J
series      of 3-cycle reversals. Moreover, in <bl.bk'bz,<b.bk'bi>T      the
relation between  b,  and  b,i  e   1 1.....k}  is  the  same  as  in  S.
Repeat the process described above, until the arc between bi and
alternadve c is the same in T and S for all c. After this operation, we
'remove' bl and all its arcs from both tournaments. which result in two
tournaments     on the alternatives     {b2....,b } with equal score vector,
because 3-cycle reversals do not have impact on the score vector. Continue
as before. ,
From theorem 5.11 we deduce:
COROLLARY 5.12 4' 7 is independent of 3-cycle orientation, then 7 is
independent of n-cycle orientation, n e {3,4,5....}.
Proof If y is independent of 3-cycle orientations, we know from theorem
5.11 that for all T, *T) = f(st ....,sn) for some f : Rn 4 R. Since
reversing an n-cycle does not change the score vector, y is independent of
n-cycle orientation. ,
n
Let 7(T) = I xsx.  If r is a circuit in T, we see that 7(T)  = *rT), hence yX=1
is independent of 3-cycle orienta n. But y is not neutral or independent
of labeling: 7(T) 4 7(cIT) for all permutations a of X.
If we want our circularity measures to be independent of labeling, we must
demand that y is a function of the score sequence: see theorem 5.13. Let X
=  al,-.,an} and T € TOO. The sequence (sl '...,sn) such that
sl 2 52 2 ... 2 snisthe score sequence of T. if there exists a labeling
(al' an )       of      X      such      that      for      i      E {1 ..... n }.      si       is the score       of
alternative a..
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THEOREM 5.13 Let X = {xl.....xn  be a finite set of alternatives. A
circularity measure 7 on T(X) is independent of 3-cycle orientation
and is independent of labeling ijT
for    each   finite    X     there    exists    a    function    f    :    f     -4   R.    n    =     \X 1,    such
that *T) = f(sl···-in)' where (sl '...,s n)     is     the     score     sequence     of
the tournament T.
proof (if) Evident, because for all a, the score sequences of T and aT are
the same. (only if) Suppose that the score sequences (sl '...,sn) of T and S
are the same. Then there exist CT and a  such that the score of alternative
ai     is    equal    to    si.    both    in    aTT    and    ass.    i    E {1 .....n }.      Because     y     is
independent of labeling. *aTT = 7(71 and Kass) = KS). Continue with aTT
and as(S) as in the proof of theorem 5.11. I
It is evident that X is independent of 3-cycle orientation and is a
function of the score sequence.
There are several circularity measures that are not independent of 3-cycle
orientation. We investigate the independence for a few circularity measures
that we introduce in definition 5.6. For all these circularity measures we
have: the higher its value, the more circular is the tournament.
Definition 5.6
Let T be a tournamenL
(a)   %(T) is the number of 4-cycles in T.
(b) 6(T) is the proportion of the total number of preferences that are
part of a circuit in T.
(c)  Bezcmbinder's p (Bczembinder. 1981, David, 1988): the dimension of the
cycle space, which appears to be equal to N6 +k-n, where k i s the
number   of indifference classes   of the transitive   closure,   n   =     X     and
N = n(n-1)/2. Unlike 4 it takes into account all p-cycles,
p = 3,4.... 7Mhis cycle space is obtained in the following manner. Take
a circuiL Assign to every pair of alternatives (x,y) a 1 if xTy or
yTx is in this circuit. a 0 otherwise. This gives an N dimensional
vector. The dimension of the subspace of all those vectors is p.
Furth„ emax.1-n.1;}
(d) sc(T) = d(Tfom(T)). This circularity measure determines the distance
to the weak order given by the ranking rule four
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To show the working of these measures. we consider the following
tournament.
Let S be a b c d e
a-1 1 1 0
b O-1 1 1
c 0 0-1 1
d 0 0 0-1
e 1 0 0 0-
Now MS) = 3, with the following 3-cycles: {a,b.e}, {a.c.c} and la.d.e}.
Further. i(S) = 1 since the reversal of the relation between the
alternatives e and a gives a linear tournament %(S) = 3: we observe 3 four
cycles. { a.b,c.e}. { ixb.d,e} and {a,c.d,e}. The tournament S is
irreducible. because   of   the   5-cycle {a.b,c,d,e}. hence   6(S)   =   6 nax   =    1.
Thus £(S) = 10, p(S) = 4.
Verifications of the independence of 3-cycle orientation:
Slater's i is not independent of 3-cycle orientation. To See this, observe
that i(S) = 1. while i(<ace>S) = 2. The measure sc. which is defined by
sc(T) = d(17 (T)) is not independent of 3-cycle orientation: f (S) =Out Out
{a,b} » {c} , {d,e}. Then sc(S) = 4. Take the cycle r = aScSeSa. Then
fout(rS) = {a.b} * {c} ,{d.e}. while sc(rS) = 6. The circularity measure X
is not independent of 3-cycle orientation. Indeed, %(S) = 3, but
%(<e,c,d><a,c,e>S) =2. Of course. this does not mean that we cannot find a
formula for %(T): Storcken (private communication) provided the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION 5.14 (Storcken) Lkt Tbe a tournament. Let A be the tournament
matrix. Then  19)  =  14  trace(A4 ).
Proof Let  B  =  A4.  Then  b..  is the number of paths of length 4, starting  and
11
ending with alternative i. Since each path contains four different
alternatives, each path is counted four times. ,
As for the computation of 6(T), we mention the following.
Suppose that the transitive closure of T i s X l* ··· *X. Now takek
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x.y e X. The relation between x and y lies on a cycle. iff there exists an
i E {1 '... 39}     such     that     x.y    E      X..     Thus,     if we
define     t.     =        X.    .     we     have
t k
1                                        1            1
6(T)   =  N  ;51 ti(ti-1)/2,   N  =   n(n-1)/2.  n   =     X  .
If two tournaments have the same score sequence, then the transitive
closure is the same for both tournaments. se chapter 1. proposition 1.3.
Hence 6 and p are independent of 3-cycle orientation.
5.4.2 The strict utility model: a probabilistic analogon
In this subsection, we give a probabilistic analogon of independence of
3-cycle orientation. We assume that a person does compare all pairs of
alternatives at least once, giving rise to a system P = (pab ' a.b € X,
where Pab is the frequency with which a is preferred to b. Furthermore, we
assume that the person is forced to make a choice between each pair. For
all a*b w e have Pab + pba =1. Such a system is called a forced pair
comparison system.
In many cases transitivity is violated, hence all measurement techniques
break down. because they use the concept of an order. Nevertheless, in many
cases there is a pattern to the inconsistencies in the pairwisc
comparisons, hence they are called 'variations'. For example, we may have
strong stochastic transitivity, see Roberts (1979):
Definition 5.7
A system P = (Pab)' a,b E X. satisfies Strong Stochastic Transitivity (SST)
if for all a.b and c
if  Pab 2 112  & pbc 2 112   then   pac k max{pabjpbj,
Such a system gives rise to (various) so-called weak stochastic orders
Cal,a2'....an)   where   p..   2   1/2   if  i   <  j.
1J
Or one may have the strict utility model, sec Roberts (1979):
Definition 5.8
The forced pair comparison system P = (Pal,) satisfies the strict utility





From this representation. one may deduce that paa = 1/2 for all a. hence
w(a) 0 0 for all a. which implies that pab * 0,1 for all pairs a.b.
Note that the weights w, which are unique up to a multiplication with a
constant   k    €     R\{0}.    give    a    weak   order:    a    »    b    iff   w(a)    >    w(b)    iff   pab   >     1/2.
a z b iff w(a) = w(b) iff Pab = 1/2.
PROPOSITION 5.15 (Roberts 1979). Suppose the system P = (pab . a,b € X
satisfi,es the strict utility model. Then it sati Ii',es strong
stochastic transitivity.  
If a set (pab ' a.b € X is given, we can easily test whether or not it
satisfies the strict utility model, sce Roberts (1979). There it is proved
that
the system P satisfies the strict utility model iff
PabPbcPca  = Pacpcbpba' for all a.b and c and pab 0 0,1 for all a.b.
This means that the two 3-cycles a»b»c»a a n d a*b*c*a d o have
the same probability.
There are several other transitivity conditions, see Roberts (1979). A
person may be called probabilistically consistent if its pairwise
comparisons satisfy such a condition.
In preparation of theorem 5.17, we introduce the (maximum) likelihood.
Let for al a.b E X. Pab be the probability that alternative a beats
alternative b. The likelihood of a tournament T therefore is L(T) =
Ti Pal)' where we assume that all choices are made independently of one(ab)€T
another.
Now, suppose that we have an irreducible tournament T. We could have
generated this tournament using probabilities pab' a.b € X. We may wonder
which values of pat, are the most natural. The strategy wc follow is: choose
those pab that maximize L, giving risc to the marimwn likelihood estimates
n   of the 'true' values xrab ab
In maximizing the likelihood. we want to restrict the choices of the system
P = CPal) , a,b 6 X. to subsets of the whole space of systems P. that we can
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interpret or describe in terms of transitivity conditions. For example. we
may want to maximize the likelihood under the restriction that the system P
satisfies weak stochastic transitivity. see definition 5.11.
In this section we consider systems that satisfy the strict utility model.
If the system P = ( ab ' a.b E X satisfies the strict utility model. we may
compute the likelihood of a tournament T given this system P:
ri wasaLCT) =  I                                                   (a)
(a.bi),€TPab = 11   (wa+ wb) '(a.b)€ T
where (sa)'a€Xis the score vector.
If the tournament is reducible. it is easy to verify that the maximum value
cannot be attained by systems satisfying the strict utility models. For,
let (wal a € X. be the point where the maximum value is obtained. Then, if
T= (T,Y) , (T,Z), we replace the values wz by kwz, 0<k<1 and z€Z.
But then the value of L(T) grows, a contradiction.
In case T is irreducible. there exists a unique point where the maximum
value is obtained, see David (1988, page 62) or Moon (1968, page 43).
There. one may find an iterative scheme for the determination of these
weights:
(O)
Let  n  =    X6  wi      =   1/n  and
w0(Ii) - si for i=l t o n.        (b)
1      r ,   (k-1)     (k-1) -12. (wi      + W.
j *i
If we let w(ai) be the limit of this series as k + -, we define pat, =
w(a)/(w(a)+w(b)).
Combining the formulas (a) and (b) given above, we see that, in case T is
irreducible. the likelihood is a function of the score vector or sequence.
Summarizing. if we restrict the Systems P to the strict utility model. the
maximum likelihood is a function of the score vector.
To obtain a converse result, we continue with lernma 5.16. where an
equivalent form of the strict utility model is presented by
Pab = Rea - 09' where F(t) = 1/(1 +  e-t).
To se the equivalence, define 0i = ln(wi)·
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LEMMA  5.16  (Bithlmann and Huber (1963)). Suppose pab * 0 for au pairs a.  b.
Then the maximum likelihood of a tournament is a function of the score
sequence W P = (pab  is of the form
pab = F(ea - 81))'
for real ea' a€X and F(t) = 11(1  + et). a
The sentence ' the maximum likelihood is a function of the score vector'.
must be read as follows. If we insist upon the fact that the score vector
is a sufficient statistic for the maximum likelihood. we implicitly
restrict the domain of possible systems   P = (pat). Lemma 5.16 shows   that
the restriction is to strict utility models.
Now we can state and prove the following theorem. illustrating a
probabilistic analogon of independence of 3-cycle orientation.
THEOREM 5.11 We assume that P  * 0 for all a,b € X. Restricted to
irreducible tournaments. the following two statements are equivalent.
( 1) The maximum likelihood of a tournament is Independent of 3-Cycle
Orientation.
(2) For each (TX), the maximizing system P satisfies pal:Pbc ca =
PaLPcipba for all  a.b,c and pa * 0,1  for all  a.
Proof (1 => 2) Because of theorem 5.11. the maximum likelihood, (which is
independent of labeling) is a function of the score vector. As shown in
lemma 5.16, P = ,(pab) satisfies the strict utility model. In Roberts (1979)
it is proved that the system satisfies the strict utility model if and only
if PabPbcPca = Pacpcbpba, for all a.b and c.
(2 4 1) The system P satisfies the strict utility model, see Roberts
(1979). Hence, the maximum likelihood is a function of the score vector. as
is described before lemma 5.16. Now, theorem 5.11 implies that it is
independent of 3-cycle orientation. ,
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5.5 CHARACTERIZATION OF EPSILON
In section 5.4.1, we introduced the circularity measure 8, which assigns to
a tournament T the proportion of all pairwise comparisons that are part of
a cycle in T. We consider the measure E = NS. where N is the number of
pairwise comparisons. Thus VT) is the total number of pairwise comparisons
that are on a cycle in T. In this section. we assume that tle circularity
measures are defined   on   T.
Let d be the distance introduced in definition 5.3. For any tournament T.
frans(T) is the transitive closure of T.
LEMMA 5.18 For all tournaments T: VT) = d(ftrans T),T)
proof Suppose that the transitive closure of T is equal to ftrans(T) =
Xl *-. * Xk. Now take x.y € X. The pairwise comparison between x and y
lies    on    a    cycle,    iff there exists    an    i    € {1 '....k} such that x.y € Xi·
1 k
Thus. if we define ti = 1 Xil. we have 6(T) = N ,51 ti(ti-1)/2, N = n(n-1)/2.
n    =      X     where    ti(ti-1)/2    is the number of pairwise comparisons between
elements of Xi. But this expression is also equal to  dqtrans(T).T), hence
em = dgtransm,T). I
Of course. in defining a circularity measure that gives the distance
between a tournament and a weak order, we could have taken any ranking rule
f : TOO + WOO giving d(Kr),T). This is the finduced circularity
measure:
• f-induced
Let f be a ranking rule on T. A circularity Y on T is f-induced, if
for all tournaments T: 1(T) = d(f(T),T).
We yet introduce another f related property for a circularity measure.
• f-additive
Let      f      be      a      ranking      rule       on      T.      A       circularity      measure      7      on      T       is
f-additive.  if for all  tournaments T
k
*T) =  1 *Tli), where frr) = Xl * -' * XIC
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LEMMA 5.19 The circularity measure e on T is f -additive.trans
Proof Suppose that franscr) = Xl  * -   2 Xk' Since the pairwisc comparison
between two alternatives x and y is part of a cycle. if and only if x and y
are in the same indifference class of f , it is easy to verify that Etrans
.S f -additive. ,trans
Now, given a ranking rule f we can generate all circularity measures that
arc additive with respect to f. define y for all non-empty sets Y c U and
all tournaments (S.Y) such that ffS,Y) = Y. Then let *T) be recursively
defined   by
 1*T.Xi), where  jA   =   Xl   »      -   "   XT   But,   as   we   shall   prove
in theorem 5.20. under certain conditions for the ranking rule f, a
circularity measure can be both fadditive and finduced, only if f =
f         One of these conditions for f is that it is recursively closed:trans
Definition 5.9
A ranking rule f on I is called recursively closed. if for all tournaments
T,  f (T)   =  f(T),  where  /   is  the  recursive   application  of f.
For example, 4rans and f satisfy this condition. Now. we presentOut
theorem 5.20.
THEOREM 5.20 (Characterization of E) Lkt f be a ranking nde on T that is
recursively closed and commutes with concatenation.
A circularity measure 7 on T is f-induced and f-additive. ijf 1 = E.
Proof   (if)    This    is    proved    in    lemma    5.18    and    5.19.
(only if) Suppose m = Xl , ··· * Xk. Let ti = 1 Xil, i € { 1 .....k}.
Because y is finduced. 7(T) = durr),T). This means that
k
*T) 2  I ti(ti-1)/2                                                            (1)
i=t
because all alternatives from X. are indifferent in the ranking produced by
1
f It is larger than this sum if and only if there are alternatives x and y
such that xTy while y*x: fr).
On the other hand. because y is fadditive, we have *T)
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k
I d(AT,Xi)·(T.Xi))· But. since f is recursively closed, Er,Xi)  =  xiu.
giv ng d(RT.X )·(T.Xi)) = ti(ti-1)/2. Thus
1%  =   i  lti(ti-1)/2.                                                                                                       (2)
Combining (1) and (2), we sce that X  * X  : T if i < j. Because f cornmutes
with concatenation. the indifference classes of f are not a concatenation
of two tournaments. Thus f=f which means 7 = E. c' trans'
Note that we could have replaced the recursively closed condition with the
condition     that    for all tournaments    T,     d(RT),T)     5       Xj( X -1)/2.     It     means
that the weak order AT) is not allowed to differ too much from T; the
distance between them is less than or equal to the number of pairwise
comparisons made.
PROPOSITION 5.21 Let f be a ranking rule on T commuting with concatenation
and such that for all 0*YCU and all tournaments (TY):
d(RT,Y),(T,Y)) 5  Y ( Y -1)/2.
A circularity measure 7 is f-induced and f-additive,  iff 7 = e.
proof Expression (2) in the proof of theorem 5.20 may be replaced by 7(T) 5
k
,  iti(ti-1)a..
Independence of the conditions in theorem 5.20.
*                *
Clearly.   rs«T)   =  d(f /:„(T).T)   is  f out-induced.   but   not  f out-additive.
as the proof of theorem 5.20 shows. If we only know that a circularity
measure y is f-additive.  we  are  free in choosing KS,Y)  if,RS,Y) =  Y.
5.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we want to answer the following questions. First. what are
acceptable values for X and i? Second. what is the rank correlation between
1 and i? To answer these questions, we use statistical analysis.
5.6.1 Acceptable values
Consider tournaments   on   a   set   X   with     X     =   7. As stated in proposition   5.1.
the maximum number of 3-cycles possible is 14. Now, every value between 0
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and 14 can occur. But how do we decide which values of X are acceptable?
Analogously. i ranges from 0 to 7. For what values of i does a tournament
show some degree of consistency with respect to an order. not withstanding
a lack of perfection? For what values does it look as if the tournament has
been randomly generated?
To answer these question, we introduce H. the null hypothesis that T is
randomly generated.    This   means   that   for   all    { x,y }    c   X,   x   and   y   are   equally
likely  to be chosen  from  the  set   {x,y}.   Or in other words,   we are unaware
of any difference between the objects. Choices are made at random,
independently of one another.
This null hypothesis is rejected if an unexpectedly large number of choices
are intcrnally consistent This means that they cohere with one out of all
m! possible orders for m objects. Of course. this raises two questions.
First. how do we measure internal consistency when a tournament is randomly
generated? Second what is meant by -unexpectedly large'. how small must X
or i be?
In Slater (1961) a clear choice is made in favour of i measuring internal
consistency or consistency to an order. Because the null hypothesis relates
to all  1 pairwise comparisons, these choices are the simple events that
are to be studied. Slater rejects the use of 4 since 3-cycles are compound
events. not conceivable independent of one another. For example, if n is
large.    Xmax    >      ·    Moreover.    it is clear    that    the    use    of   X    implies    that
some inconsistencies receive more weight than others. To illustrate this,
suppose we have two sets of pairwise comparisons between 5 objects
at'.-'a. We assume  that  a Tai  if  i  < j, except  that  in the first  set
a Ta   and  in the second  set  a Ta. The value  of  i  is  the  same  for  both3 1 5    1
sets. the inconsistencies receive equal weight Using X, the inconsistency
a5Tal   receives more weight than aiTal' because  a Ta introduces  more5   1
3-cycles. But since the null hypothesis assumes that inconsistencies occur
at random. there is no justification for this weighting. Only after the
null hypothesis is rejected, weighting can become relevant. At first
instance, all responses receive equal weight True as this may sound, David
(1988) does not entirely agree with Slater. He argues that for most
reasonable alternative hypotheses H to randomness, the slight upset a3Ta,
is more likely to occur than the major upset a3Ta,. Therefore the first set
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of pairwise comparisons, being more in accord with H  than the second. is
less compatible with H. This is reflected in its lower X value.
Compare our characterizations of X and i.
Hereafter, we describe a technique that we use in deciding whether or not
we do reject the null hypothesis. As will become clear. this technique is
applicable to both measures. Therefore, we continue to use both X and i.
In answering the second question (what is unexpectedly large?). we assume
that we have a tournament, say T. and i(T) = i,.
If i, is small, we may have the feeling that it is unlikely that T is
randomly generated. To give a more precise meaning to this feeling, we
compute the probability that i(S) 5 i,for randomly generated tournaments
S.    This    is the conditional probability    P(i    5   i0   H).    It    is    used to scale   all
circularity measures to the interval (0,1]:
Definition 5.10
Let 7 be a circularity measure. Then 7_w is a circularity measure
defined by
7-Jr) = P# 5 *THH).
where H iS the hypothesis that tournaments are randomly generated.
Compare Slater (1961). who called it the cumulative proportions.
Note that y_w : TOO + (0,1].
Suppose our computation shows that i_, ,CD =p< 0.05. Then the
probability that in a random generated tournament, the value of i does not
exceed i, = i(T), is smaller than 0.05. hence is highly unlikely.
Conversely, since we observed this small value i(T) = i,. we may state that
it is unlikely that T is randomly generated; there is some degree of
consistency. In that case we reject H and replace it by an alternative
hypothesis (for example by the hypothesis that we have weak stochastic
transitivity, see definition 5.11).
Hence. the higher i_w(T). the more likely it is for T to be randomly
generated. On the other hand. if i, = i(T) is small. i_ (T) is small.
and it is unlikely that T is randomly generated.
To summarize, if i_wID < 0.05, we accept the tournarnent and tile value
of i, because there is some degree of consistency. If i-w(T) exceeds
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0.05, it is very well possible that the tournament is randomly generated
and we consequently treat it like that. Of course. this threshold value
0.05 is arbitrary and rnay be replaced by another value. Nevertheless
almost everyone experiences 0.05 as the threshold value.
To give an example. we took tournaments on X with  X  = 7, see graph 5.1.
For precise values. we refer to table 5.2.
This figure has to read as follows. For example, if i(T) = 1 then
i _6377  = 0.03, which means  that  3%  of all tournaments  do  have a value
of i smaller than or equal to 1. From this graph and table 5.2. we deduce
that T is acceptable if and only if i(T) 5 1, because in that case
i   (T) 5 0.05 and we may reject H.scaled
1.0
scated
03              •
01234567
Graph  5.1   i_ for tournaments  T  with    X    =  7,  c.f.  Table  5.2.
To give values for X_w and i_w when n = 4. 5, 6 and 7, consider
table 5.2. The values are derived from Slater (1961). For larger values of
n. we may use random samples.
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n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7
1
1/aled X LkA X A.-ld X X./ded
0 .375 0 .117 0 .On 0 .002 8          .420
1 .625 1 234 1 .051 1 .006 9     353
21 2 .469 2 .119 2     .017        10     .737
3 .703 3 -208 3      .033         11      .853
4 .977 4 .398 4 .OG9 12      .964
51 5 309 5 .112 13       .999
6 .773 6 .198 14      1
7 .919 1     7/7
81
n=4 n=5 n=6 n=7
iscated i i_w i i_6., i     i_w
0 .375 0 .117 0 .022 0 .002 5          .979
1 1 1 386 1 .183 1 .030 6          .999
2 .977 2 388 2 .163 71
31 3 .941 3          .474
41 4          .825
Table 5.2 Values of 1_6  and i_w, see Slater (1961).
We see that for small n, the method of setting arbitrarily a level a, for
example a = 0.05, is not very useful: if n = 5, even transitive tournaments
are unacceptable: we cannot reject H. Nevertheless, the scaled values give
some insight in the circularity. Moreover it makes clear another difference
between i and A. The various sets of acceptable tournament structures for a
given      level     a.      are     quite     different.      For     example,      if     a     = 0.185, there     are
tournaments T and S, such that 1_w(T) < a. while i_w<I) > a and
1_ (S) > 04 while i_ (S) < a. Sce table 5.3, structures 7 and 14, n
= 6.
For n=4 one may verify the values of table 5.2 by using figure 5.3.
showing the four possible tournament structures and the number of ways of
labeling their nodes. where it is to be understood that if an arrow has not
been drawn, it is oriented from the higher node to the lower node. For
example, the second structure allows for 8 different ways of labeling: for
the first node we have four possible labels (4 b, c or d), and there are
two different 3-cycles on the remaining three labels.
185
.-
0/\    i
0 0/Qh: 0. -4
ways of labeling:
24                   8                            8                               24
Figure  5.3    Re    four different tournament structures   of   TOO,     j X      =   4   and
the number of ways of labeling their nodes.
(n)
All    21 tournaments   on    a    set   X    with    n    =      X 1 are equally likely    if   the
tournaments are randomly generated. Thus the probability of obtaining a
tournament of structure 1, is 24/64. The other probabilities are 8/64. 8/64
and 24/64.
In determining X *.w for large n, we use a normal approximation: If a
tournament T is randomly generated, the number of 3-cycles ACT) of that
tournament, is approximately normally distributed if n. the number of
alternatives, is sufficiently large (n 2 10). Furthermore, for all n. the
mean   number  of   3-cycles   is  equal   to   61(n)   =   1/4      and its variance   is   02(n)
=  3/16    .  see  Moon  (1968,  page   12).
As mentioned earlier, if the null hypothesis is rejected, we replace it by
an alternative one, for example that we have weak stochastic transitivity.
see Roberts (1979).
Definition ill
A  system P  =  (Pi   satisfies weak stochastic  transitivity  if for all  ij.k
if  p.. 2 112 and pjkk 112   then   pik 2 112.
lJ
where   p..   is   the   probability   that   the   i-th   alternative   beats   the   j.th.
IJ
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Such a system gives rise to (various) so-called weak stochastic orders
Cal,22'...,an) where pij 2 1/2 if i < j.
The case for the nearest adjoining order has been strengthened by a
probabilistic basis provided in Thompson and Remage (1964) and Remage and
Thompson ( 1966). Lzt a.- be 1 if alternative a  wins from aj. otherwise4                                                                            it
is 0. The likelihood of a tournament T is therefore L(T) =
1-a.
rl Pij (1 -pij) tj. Thompson and Rcrnage propose ranking the alternatives
i<j
by    maximizing    L with respect    to    P    = (p..). subject    to    the weak stochastic
lJtransitivity condition. They proved that the resulting weak stochastic
orders are Slater's nearest adjoining orders.
On the other hand. if we maximize the likelihood with respect to the strict
utility model (sce definition 5.8). it is shown in chapter 3 section 3.8,
that the resulting weak order is the same as f  (T). This may be seen as aOut
strengthening for the case of A.
If wc have two circularity measures 71 and Q. for which there is a
strictly increasing function 0 such that Yl = 0072, then 71_, , =
Cd.
To give an example, consider Kendall's coefficient of consistency k(T),
which is defined as follows. Given the score vector, the mean score of the
alternatives is equal to s=
n =  -ri   where   n   =    I X I. The variability
x8X sx  n-1
of the scores in T is therefore
2  n(n-1)2
v(T) = x8XCSx- i)2 = x8x sx  -    4
Now, define k(T) = - v(T). It is easy to verify that
MT) =C 3 1- n(n-l)/4
- n(n-1)2/2 + 1/2k(T).
PROPOSmON 5.22 1_w = k_w
proof As is described above, 0(k(T)) = 1(T), where
0(,) = 1, + 81 - n(n-194 - n(n-1)2/2.
Because 0'(t) = lh > 0. 1_14 - k_LA. I
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5.6.2 Rank correlation
Using a circularity measure, we may order all possible tournament
structures to their circularity, from low to high. For example. if n = 4,
there are 4 different structures. 1 to 4. see figure 5.3. Since the
corresponding values of X arc equal to: 0.1,1,2. we obtain the sequence
or weak order of tournament structures
{1}  {2,3}  {4}.
We may do this for i as well. The appendix in Moon (1968, page 91-95)
contains all the different (or nonisomorphic) structures for n = 4.5 and
6.     If    n    =    4,    there    are    4    structures,    for    n    =    5    we    have    12    structures,
finally for n=6 there are 56 different structures. If we numerate the
tournament structures that are introduced in Moon (1968) in the obvious
way, we obtain the following sequences of structures, from low to high
circularity, see table 5.3.
Note that strict differences between i and X for the first time occur when
n = 6. Consider the following pairs: (7,14), (8,19). (12.31). (12,32),
(12,36),(12,37),(14,16).(14,19) and (17.19).
n
In order to compute the rank correlation for each X. we order all 2(2)
tournaments by using the weak orders of table 5.3 and the number of ways of
labeling their nodes compare figure 5.3. If y is the circularity measure,
this weak order is written as sn(72..
For    example,    if    n    =    4, this order   for    X    is    {a}     *    {b,c}     * {d}, where    a    is   an
indifference class containing 24 tournaments of structure     1,     b    (c)     is    a
class containing 8 tournaments of structure 2 (3) and d is an indifference
class containing 24 tournaments of structure 4.
Using the weak orders sn(X) and sn(11' we may compute the rank correlation
between i and X. We make use of the symmetric difference d to compute this
rank correlation, see definition 5.3. The symmetric difference attains its
maximal value if we take a linear order L and its reverse vL:
d(L.vL) = n(n-1), n =  X .
188
n=4 n=5
tx                   1                               X
Ill                 Ill          Ill                 Ill






i                                                             X









Table 5.3 Structures ordered by using i and A.
Definition 5.12
Let n =  X  and a,   be two circularity measures on T(X). Then the rank
correlation «a.#) is defined by
«a.B) =1- d(srja)·S, 4))ltn<tn-1)
41
where tn= 2    is the number of different tournaments.
In case a and  are linear ordcrings. r reduces to Kendall's rank
correlation. which is equal to the number of upsets of the one linear order
with respect to the other. divided by the maximal value n(n-1). 'I'he values
are given in table 5.4. For example, if n = 4, then t4 = 64, d = 2x8x24,
thus r(40 = 0.905. We also give the rank correlations for the circularity
*
measures, Li, p and rsc, where rsc(T) = d(f out<D,T).
Although the rank correlation is pretty high. it does not prevent
differences between X and i as described after table 5.2.
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See Bezembinder (1981) for the comparison between A. i and p by looking at
their product moment correlation
cor«a.B) = E((a-Iia)(B- 1114Vaaall,
If corr(a,0) is Close to 1, it means that if a is large (with respect to
its mean) then P is large, and vice versa
n=4
X 1               9              rsC
1 1 .905      1         .666
i                       1 .905 .833
p                      1        .666
n=5
l            i             p            rsc
1 1 .885 .924 .811
i               1 .874 .894
p                      1        .742
n=6
lip            rsc
1 1 .865 .766 .813
i             1 .765 .835
p                      1        .714
Table 5.4 The rank correlations for n = 4,5 and 6.
5.7 TABLE OF PROPERTIES
In this section. we summarize some properties of circularity measures
considered in this chapter.
We start this section with the introduction of just one additional
property. We first repeat the definition of a separable tournament. compare
chapter 2.
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Definition 5.13 (Storcken (1989))
Suppose T€ T(X). Then a tournament (TB),  BQXis called separable from
(TX)  in Tif for all x€  X\B:  bTx for all b€B  or xTb for ati be  B.
This means that the elements of B behave like a single alternative.
We consider a circularity measure y on T and a tournament T € TOO. For all
separable subsets B of X. we consider the set of tournaments T' such that
T' n 092-82) =T n 092-82). Thus changes are limited to 82. Furthermore. we
demand that the replacement of (T,B) with (T'.B) is such that *T,B) =
7(T',B):
• Separability
A circularity measure 7 on T is separable. if
for all T and all separable subsets B of X we have:
if T  n (X2.82)  =T  n (](3-82)  and *T.B)  =  *TB)  then
*T)  =  *T).
PROPOSITION 5.23 The measures X, i, e, 6, p and % are separable.
Proof (X) Suppose B is separable from X in T. Take a 3-cycle. If it is
entirely contained in B there is no problem, because T n 82 is replaced by
a tournament T n 82 with the same number of 3-cycles. If it is entirely
contained in X\B, we also have no problem. Moreover, it is impossible that
2 of the 3 elements are in B. because these two elements behave uniform
with respect to elements outside B. Hence only one of the three
alternatives is in B, which means that this 3-cycle can not be removed.
(0 Suppose that (T,B) is separable from T. Using an indirect proof, it is
clear that, if L is a nearest adjoining order of T, then (L,B) is so for
(T.B). From this it follows that i is separable.
Ce. 6. p, x) Left to the reader. ,
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In the following table, the ranking rule f is recursively closed and
commutes with concatenation.
standard- redx- separ- cites- equable out:core indepen- f-induced
ization ible awe Slve equable    dent d    &-aditive
3 -cycles
i m i l i o*l o
1• • • • ®                  O                   0                   0
E.O. '0 0. ®
6            0.000.0
p.0. "0 0.0
XI               ..0       0       0       0
o: not satisfied
.: satisfied
1 : characterizing properties, to be taken together in each row.
Table 5.5 Table of properties.
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KEUZE, ORDENING EN CIRCULARMEIT
IN ASYMMETRISCHE RELATIES
SAMENVATTING
In dit proefschrift bestuderen we verzamelingen van paarsgewijze
vergelijkingen. Hierbij worden alternatieven geevalueerd in termen van
bijvoorbecld preferende, belangrijkheid, dominantie, kwaliteit enz. We
nemen aan dat als er in de vergelijking van een tweetal alternatieven een
strikte keuze voor een van beide wordt gemaakt. deze keuze definitief is.
Dit gebeurt bijvoorbeeld wanneer alternatieven en criteria voldoende zijn
uitgekristalliseerd. zodat de gemaakte keuze kan worden gemotiveerd.
Gebruikmakend van deze paarsgewijze vergelijkingen, trachten we de
alternatieven te ordenen. In het algemeen echter. wordt dit bemocilijkt
door het optre(len van intransitiviteiten in het kiczen tussen
alternatieven. Desondanks blijft in veel gevallen de noodzaak tot het
verkrijgen van een ordening bestaan. Vandaar dat ons cerste hoofdthema is:
hoe mocten we alternatieven ordenen, hoc kiezen we een beste alternatief,
hoc bepalen we een dominante coalitie? Daartoe worden een groot aantal
ordenings methoden geintroduceerd en besproken. Nu is het zo dat het
mocilijk is om te beslissen welke methode moct worden gebruikt want elke
methode heeft wel enkele aantrckkelijke eigenschappen. Natuurlijk kunnen we
trachten het toepassingsgebied van elk der methoden te bepalen. Een methode
die bijvoorbeeld geschikt is om spelers in een toemooi te rangschikken.
zal wellicht ongeschikt blijken voor problemen met een politiek karakter.
Onze benadering van het probleem is derhalve axiomatisch van aard. We
bestuderen een groot aantal condities die kunnen worden gebruikt bij het
kwalitatief vergelijken van ordeningsmethoden. Deze condities
representeren. in mindere of meerdere mate, de noties van redelijkheid en
eerlijkheid. Gebruikmakend van deze condities kan in sommige gevallen een
karakterisering worden afgeleid. Dit is cen collectic van onderling
onafhankelijke condities voor een klasse van methoden. zodat er slechts 66n
methode overblijft die aan alle condities voldoet Op die manicr kunnen we
in een aantal gevallen aangeven wanneer een bepaalde methode kan worden
toegepast.
Het tweede hoofdthema is de bepaling van de inconsistentie of circulariteit
van een toernooi. Een circulariteitsmaat geeft aan in hoeverre een toernooi
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kan worden geordend of wat de afstand is tot een ordening. Net als in het
geval van ordeningsregels en keuzefuncties, bestaat ook hier geen maat die
als beste wordt erkend. Onze benadering van het probleem is axiomatisch van
aard. We karakteriseren circulariteitsmaten met behulp van noodzakelijke en
voldoende condities.
De indeling van het proefschrift is als volgt
Hoofdstuk 1 valt uiteen in drie gedeelten. In het eerste gedeelte worden
een aantal illustratieve voorbeelden besproken. Het tweede gedeelte bevat
enige elementaire stellingen betreffende de relatie tussen irreducibiliteit
en cycliciteit. Tevens worden noodzakelijke begrippen ingevoerd. zoals
binaire relaties, toernooien. ordcningen. transitieve afsluiting,
permutaties enz De appendix geeft cen overzicht van de ordcnings en keuze
procedures. circulariteitsmaten en condities die zijn gebruikt in cen
kwalitatieve studie.
In hoofdstuk 2 behandelen we keuzefuncties voor toernooien. Als eerste
keuzefunctie bespreken we de topcykel. We laten zien dat deze functie een
aantal gebreken heeft Ten eerste is dc resulterende keuzeverzameling vaak
zo groot dat deze moct worden verfijnd, verder kan de topcykel Pareto
gedomineerde elementen bevatten. Beide bezwaren zijn aanlciding om andere
keuzemechanismen te introduceren. We bespreken de uncovered set, de minimal
covering set en karakteriscringen hiervoor. Daarnaast bespreken we de Banks
set. de tournament equilibrium set, de Copeland keuzefunctie en de Slater
keuzefunctie. We geven een nicuw bewijs van de uniciteit van de optimale
strategie van een toernooi-nulsomspel. Als toepassing hiervan. leiden we
een karakterisering af van de corresponderende keuzefunctie. We voeren een
groot aantal nieuwe condities in zoals A-IIA, separabiliteit, globale
monotonicitcit staartstabiliteit enz. Het hoofdstuk wordt afgesloten met
een tweetal tabellen betreffende een aantal verzameling-theoretische
inclusies, cn een aantal eigenschappen van keuzefuncties.
Ordeningsregels worden uitgebreid onderzocht in hoofdstuk 3. Ook hier
introduccren we een groot aantal nieuwe conditics die kunnen worden
gebruikt bij het kwalitatief vergelijken van verschillende ordeningsregels.
We geven een karakteriscring van door keuzefuncties geinduceerde
ordcningsregels. de transiticve afsluiting en de Copeland ordeningsregel.
Daarnaast karakteriscren we de Copeland keuzefunctie en een daaraan
gerelateerde keuzefunctic. Ook regels die zijn gebaseerd op een
afstandsbegrip worden bestudeerd. In cen aparte paragraaf worden door
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